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Title: The Iraqi Army No Longer Exists
Source:
DefenseOne
URL Source: http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/201 ... exists/114607/?oref=d-topstory
Published: Jun 7, 2015
Author: Barry Posen
Post Date: 2015-06-09 07:34:20 by Tooconservative
Keywords: None
Views: 4535
Comments: 21
The fog of war lies thick over the battlefields of Iraq and Syria. Deliberate enemy deception, willful self-deception, and the complexity of large-scale combat ensure that the truth about war is almost always obscured by a kind of fog. Occasionally a major event parts the clouds and reveals a few fragments of truth, only to have the fog close in again. The collapse of Iraqi defenses in Ramadi is one such event. But we must look quickly to learn anything at all. The most important fact revealed by ISIS’s victory is that the “Iraqi Army” no longer exists. This is a different observation from that of Secretary of Defense Carter, who avers that they lost the will to fight. Some people did lose the will to fight in Ramadi. But, we should ask a more fundamental question. Ramadi was under siege for months. How is it that few if any reinforcements were sent to defend a city deemed critical to the defense of Baghdad itself? Public sources reported some fourteen divisions in the Iraqi Army in 2014. Between three and five were destroyed in Mosul, leaving nine. At most one was defending Ramadi. Where were the rest? Indeed, where are they now? How is it that Shiite militias must be called upon to liberate Ramadi? If the Iraqi Army has evaporated, or perhaps more accurately deteriorated into a collection of local militias and palace guards, then the U.S. "re-training" mission in Iraq is vastly more difficult than we have been led to believe. Having claimed to build an Iraqi Army, which seems not to exist, and which one doubts ever really existed, the U.S. military is now trying to build another one, from the ground up. Why will things turn out better this time? ISIS’s victory in Ramadi also reveals that it is quite capable, not merely tactically, but at the “operational level.” Put another way, it is good not merely at fights, which require committed fanatics who are good with a gun, but at campaigns, which require canny commanders, logistical support, coordinated mutually supporting battles, movement, and intelligence. In Ramadi, despite U.S. command of the air, ISIS was able to sustain its forces for many months. They were able to manufacture very large truck bombs, requiring tons of explosives, to support their final offensive. They attacked under the cover of a sandstorm, which helped neutralize U.S. air power. Finally, in light of ISIS’s success in Ramadi, we must revisit claimed coalition successes such as the fight at the Syrian border town of Kobani, and the “victory” in Tikrit. It was a mystery why ISIS fought so hard for a worthless border town, in the face of waves of U.S. air attacks. In retrospect, one suspects that they were “going to school” on us—spending lives and equipment to learn how to operate in the face of sustained U.S. air attack, which they apparently have figured out how to do. Central Command has claimed that since the campaign began air attacks have killed 8,500 ISIS fighters. These claims seem implausible. The battle of Tikrit, viewed in light of the Ramadi success, now appears as a matador’s cape, a diversionary operation to draw the attention of Iraqi government forces, militias, the Iranians, and the U.S. away from Anbar province and ISIS’s preparations for the attack on Ramadi. Press reports of ISIS casualties in Tikrit do not suggest large losses. Tikrit was well defended, but not heavily defended — an economy-of-force operation, reliant largely on IEDs. If so, the amount of time and energy and collateral damage it required to re-take that town bodes ill for future attacks on places that ISIS might heavily defend, such as Mosul. Of course, the fog of war only lifted briefly, and we still cannot see the whole picture, which may be worse, or for that matter, better. But the notion that the Iraqi Army, and the supporting U.S.-led coalition, can soon go on the offensive against ISIS seems a fantasy. If instead, an offensive is launched with the collection of Shia militias that now forms the core of the Iraqi government’s military power, heavily supported by U.S. airstrikes, then we can be sure that any victories they might enjoy will be immensely destructive to the local infrastructure, and will be followed by the most brutal repression of the local Sunni Arab population — not the victory for Iraqi civil society U.S. leaders seek, but rather a guarantee of new waves of recruits for jihad. What policy therefore ought the U.S. to follow? The ingredients exist in the region for a loose ring of containment around ISIS. That ring strengthens when ISIS pushes into areas populated by other ethnic or religious groups. The U.S. should buck up these defenders with weapons, money, intelligence, and air strikes, when they are under pressure, but should be under no illusions about their capability to defeat ISIS, re-occupy huge swathes of Iraq, and bring those areas into a cohesive Iraqi political community. Poster Comment: 
"Run away...run away!"
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#1. To: TooConservative (#0)
Perhaps they aren't interested in fighting for a U.S backed democracy. Maybe they prefer the Koran and it's barbaric code for society.
Not a democracy. It was more of a democracy under Saddam with enforced tolerance of minority religions and broad integration of different minorities (including Jews and Christians) in many neighborhoods. We gave them a constitution which enshrined Islam as Iraq's official religion. So it became a question of which Islam was to rule Iraq. The Shi'a are a majority of over 60% in Iraq. Two-thirds of the 1.5 million Christians have fled, many to seek refuge with the Kurds. The small ancient Jewish community, dating back to the Babylonian captivity, are all gone now. The great surprise here is how completely inept and disloyal the Iraqi army is, considering the billions we spent on training it. And, contrary to the spin the GOP candidates are trying to apply, leaving a residual force of 10,000 in Iraq would not have saved the regime at all. It would only have drawn us back into the civil war that started because we took the violent dictator, Saddam, out of the picture and unleashed the inevitable civil war that would follow, exactly as Bush Senior and James Baker thought it would when they refused to topple Saddam after Gulf War I for exactly that reason.
How many of them were there only to collect a paycheck?? And I would imagine since we pulled out the paychecks got fewer and further between.
Actually, many of them were not there and still collected paychecks. Apparently, many soldiers didn't think they were getting paid enough so they covered for each other in being AWOL while they worked other jobs in the civilian sector, often hundreds of miles from where they were (supposedly) stationed. While it is true that many Iraqi army soldiers did retreat from ISIS assaults, many of them simply were not at their assigned posts to begin with. You may recall in previous major actions like the Mosul conquest, the soldiers woke up and found all their generals and commanders had fled during the night. Combined with all their fellow-soldiers who were off moonlighting for extra cash in Baghdad, it's easy to see why the rest decided to flee as well.
#5. To: TooConservative, CZ82 (#4)
Apparently, many soldiers didn't think they were getting paid enough so they covered for each other in being AWOL while they worked other jobs in the civilian sector, often hundreds of miles from where they were (supposedly) stationed. While it is true that many Iraqi army soldiers did retreat from ISIS assaults, many of them simply were not at their assigned posts to begin with. You may recall in previous major actions like the Mosul conquest, the soldiers woke up and found all their generals and commanders had fled during the night. Combined with all their fellow-soldiers who were off moonlighting for extra cash in Baghdad, it's easy to see why the rest decided to flee as well. The above is a trait of many of the Arab armies. Arab 'leaders' have one solution for such. Public flogging or execution. That keeps the AWOL and desertion rate down in their culture. Early in the war in the summer of 2003 one of my unit missions was to train Iraqi national guard soldiers. Basically to be employed as fixed site security and patrolling market places. Providing an Iraqi presence in everyday Iraqi life. I put one of my CPTs in charge of the academy as a command for him. When it came to the point where they were to all go on leave for 96 hours he refused to pay them. So I was called in to mediate. They still had another two weeks of training to conduct. So the CPT reminds me he is "Texican" and lived in south Texas all his life and experienced the migrant workers from Mexico in his town. So he tells me that if we pay the Iraqis for 'half a job' and let them go, they will never come back. Which was his experience with Mexican workers. I thought that was a good analysis so checked the regs and there was some wiggle room. The agreement said we did not have to pay them until the job was done, but could pay them a stipend to support their family. So we paid them enough to support their families. They all came back on time. So much to opine on with regards to the posted article. Hope to comment more later.
When I was an AB slick sleeve in 1979 my base pay was right at $500 a month, not a hell of a lot to support a family. My 1st assignment was in England and I was living on the economy. The money exchange rate varied from $2.20-2.60 dollars to "1" British pound.
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#2. To: A K A Stone (#1)
(Edited)
Perhaps they aren't interested in fighting for a U.S backed democracy.
#3. To: TooConservative (#2)
The great surprise here is how completely inept and disloyal the Iraqi army is, considering the billions we spent on training it.
#4. To: CZ82, redleghunter (#3)
How many of them were there only to collect a paycheck?
Replies to Comment # 4. Actually, many of them were not there and still collected paychecks.
#19. To: TooConservative (#4)
Apparently, many soldiers didn't think they were getting paid enough so they
End Trace Mode for Comment # 4.
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