[Home]  [Headlines]  [Latest Articles]  [Latest Comments]  [Post]  [Mail]  [Sign-in]  [Setup]  [Help]  [Register] 

Kamala Harris, reparations, and guaranteed income Did Mudboy Slim finally kill this place? "Why Young Americans Are Not Taught about Evil" "New Rules For Radicals — How To Reinvent Kamala Harris" "Harris’ problem: She’s a complete phony" Hurricane Beryl strikes Bay City (TX) Who Is ‘Destroying Democracy In Darkness?’ ‘Kamalanomics’ is just ‘Bidenomics’ but dumber Even The Washington Post Says Kamala's 'Price Control' Plan is 'Communist' Arthur Ray Hines, "Sneakypete", has passed away. No righT ... for me To hear --- whaT you say ! "Walz’s Fellow Guardsmen Set the Record Straight on Veep Candidate’s Military Career: ‘He Bailed Out’ " "Kamala Harris Selects Progressive Minnesota Governor Tim Walz as Running Mate" "The Teleprompter Campaign" Good Riddance to Ismail Haniyeh "Pagans in Paris" "Liberal groupthink makes American life creepy and could cost Democrats the election". "Enter Harris, Stage Lef"t Official describes the moment a Butler officer confronted the Trump shooter Jesse Watters: Don’t buy this excuse from the Secret Service Video shows Trump shooter crawling into position while folks point him out to law enforcement Eyewitness believes there was a 'noticeable' difference in security at Trump's rally Trump Assassination Attempt We screamed for 3 minutes at police and Secret Service. They couldn’t see him, so they did nothing. EYEWITNESS SPEAKS OUT — I SAW THE ASSASSIN CRAWLING ACROSS THE ROOF. Video showing the Trump Rally shooter dead on the rooftop Court Just Nailed Hillary in $6 Million FEC Violation Case, 45x Bigger Than Trump's $130k So-Called Violation 2024 Republican Platform Drops Gun-Rights Promises Why will Kamala Harris resign from her occupancy of the Office of Vice President of the USA? Scroll down for records/details Secret Negotiations! Jill Biden’s Demands for $2B Library, Legal Immunity, and $100M Book Deal to Protect Biden Family Before Joe’s Exit AI is exhausting the power grid. Tech firms are seeking a miracle solution. Rare Van Halen Leicestershire, Donnington Park August 18, 1984 Valerie Bertinelli Cameo If you need a Good Opening for black, use this. "Arrogant Hunter Biden has never been held accountable — until now" How Republicans in Key Senate Races Are Flip-Flopping on Abortion Idaho bar sparks fury for declaring June 'Heterosexual Awesomeness Month' and giving free beers and 15% discounts to straight men Son of Buc-ee’s co-owner indicted for filming guests in the shower and having sex. He says the law makes it OK. South Africa warns US could be liable for ICC prosecution for supporting Israel Today I turned 50! San Diego Police officer resigns after getting locked in the backseat with female detainee Gazan Refugee Warns the World about Hamas Iranian stabbed for sharing his faith, miraculously made it across the border without a passport! Protest and Clashes outside Trump's Bronx Rally in Crotona Park Netanyahu Issues Warning To US Leaders Over ICC Arrest Warrants: 'You're Next' Will it ever end? Did Pope Francis Just Call Jesus a Liar? Climate: The Movie (The Cold Truth) Updated 4K version There can never be peace on Earth for as long as Islamic Sharia exists The Victims of Benny Hinn: 30 Years of Spiritual Deception. Trump Is Planning to Send Kill Teams to Mexico to Take Out Cartel Leaders The Great Falling Away in the Church is Here | Tim Dilena Status: Not Logged In; Sign In United States News See other United States News Articles Title: The GOP Is Dying Off. Literally. Source: Politico URL Source: http://www.politico.com/magazine/st ... 8035.html?hp=t2_r#.VVnQK_lVhHx Published: May 17, 2015 Author: DANIEL J. MCGRAW Post Date: 2015-05-18 07:50:21 by Jameson Keywords: Old Angry, White, Guys Views: 27545 Comments: 128 It turns out that one of the Grand Old Party’s biggest—and least discussed—challenges going into 2016 is lying in plain sight, written right into the party’s own nickname. The Republican Party voter is old—and getting older, and as the adage goes, there are two certainties in life: Death and taxes. Right now, both are enemies of the GOP and they might want to worry more about the former than the latter. There’s been much written about how millennials are becoming a reliable voting bloc for Democrats, but there’s been much less attention paid to one of the biggest get-out-the-vote challenges for the Republican Party heading into the next presidential election: Hundreds of thousands of their traditional core supporters won’t be able to turn out to vote at all. The party’s core is dying off by the day. Read more: www.politico.com/magazine...118035.html#ixzz3aURTGXqk Click for Full Text! Post Comment   Private Reply   Ignore Thread   Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 108. #2. To: Jameson (#0) The GOP represents crony capitalists. That's its core. Those are the people who always get everything that want out of the GOP. To get the votes and the seats to advance that agenda, the GOP has in contemporary times made allies with militarists and pro-life Christians, gun nuts and other so-called "conservative" causes. The problem, though, is that crony capitalists in general are liberal rich people, so they WANT abortion rights, and gun control, and open borders, and they want government contracts but not full-on wars to victory that require tax hikes. And, because the Republicans always do the bidding of the crony capitalists, who are really liberal on social issues, the result has been that the systematic betrayal of the Christian pro-lifers, the Borderbots, the gun nuts and the soldiery. Republicans only fight to the death for one thing: low taxes on the rich (and contracts for cronies). Everything else is negotiable. Net result? The crony capitalists are intensely loyal to the GOP base, but others have left, stayed home, given up. And it isn't as though Mexicans, or young people, or really, anybody, is flocking into the GOP. It's time for a new party. Crony capitalism has a death grip on the Republican Party that cannot be, and will never be, pried loose. People have two choices: form a new party, or satisfy themselves with Democrat rule. I'm not satisfied with Democrat rule. I want to see a third party. But Republican rule is godawful and old people are stubborn. So we're going to get Hillary. Oh well. Vicomte13  posted on  2015-05-18   8:13:46 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #12. To: Vicomte13 (#2) Oh well. What are your thoughts on a constitutional convention? Jameson  posted on  2015-05-18   10:35:20 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #14. To: Jameson (#12) What are your thoughts on a constitutional convention? I'm mildly in favor,for the same reason I favor Scottish independence: it will be entertaining. I doubt anything good will come out of a convention, because the entrenched powers are too entrenched, so they'll just use the convention to further entrench and streamline. But I'm prepared to be surprised. A constitutional amendment that stated that life began at conception and (therefore) banned abortion outright would be good. Vicomte13  posted on  2015-05-18   10:41:59 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #82. To: Vicomte13, Jameson (#14) [Vicomte13] A constitutional amendment that stated that life began at conception and (therefore) banned abortion outright would be good. As phrased, the amendment might accomplish nothing. Abortion as interpreted by Roe depends on competing interests of the State and the individual at various stages of development, and whether the fetus is viable. For the purpose you appear to desire, an amendment may be preferred holding that a fetus, from conception, is a person under the 14th Amendment. (If the Union Pacific RR Corp can do it, why not a fetus?) You might want to change the citizenship clause to confer citizenship at conception. This raises a few other issues: The “anchor fetus” would replace the “anchor baby.” In the case of rape, the government would require the impregnated victim of the crime to carry the rapist’s child to term and deliver it. Can the mother, impregnated and forced to give birth against her will, be held responsible for the child or to pay child support? nolu chan  posted on  2015-05-22   17:02:08 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #83. To: nolu chan (#82) Yes, the rape victim must carry the baby. She cannot murder the child. No, she cannot be compelled to provide child support out of the gate. She has the right to give up the child to the state for orphanage or adoption, if she does so at once. However, if she keeps the child, she loses this right. Long-term optionality does not remain. The mother must bear the child, but she either keeps the newborn or hands it over for adoption. In this way, the child is affected least. Of course the abolition of abortion means that there will have to be a larger and more effective social safety net, because without abortion there would be 1.5 million more kids in the country every year, and probably 1,3 million of them would be poor. Vicomte13  posted on  2015-05-22   18:06:09 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #84. To: Vicomte13, nolu chan, Y'ALL (#83) For the purpose you appear to desire, an amendment may be preferred holding that a fetus, from conception, is a person under the 14th Amendment. You might want to change the citizenship clause to confer citizenship at conception. Can the mother, impregnated and forced to give birth against her will, be held responsible for the child or to pay child support? ---- nolu chan No, she cannot be compelled to provide child support out of the gate. She has the right to give up the child to the state for orphanage or adoption, if she does so at once. However, if she keeps the child, she loses this right. Long-term optionality does not remain. The mother must bear the child, but she either keeps the newborn or hands it over for adoption. In this way, the child is affected least. Of course the abolition of abortion means that there will have to be a larger and more effective social safety net, because without abortion there would be 1.5 million more kids in the country every year, and probably 1,3 million of them would be poor. Vicomte13 A better question is: --- Can the impregnated woman be forced to give birth against her will, under the present constitution? -- And would an amendment giving that power to government be valid? tpaine  posted on  2015-05-22   18:29:10 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #87. To: tpaine, Vicomte13 (#84) A better question is: --- Can the impregnated woman be forced to give birth against her will, under the present constitution? -- As currently interpreted under Roe, even a voluntarily impregnated woman cannot be forced to continue the pregnancy against her will. The court found a constitutional right to an abortion emanating from an uncertain penumbra. And would an amendment giving that power to government be valid? I do not see why not. There is no such thing as a legal challenge to the validity of a constitutional provision. SCOTUS could not rule a part of the Constitution invalid. Once the Secretary of State certifies an amendment as having been ratified, the amendment and the process by which it was ratified is beyond judicial review. An amendment saying booze was unconstitutional was valid. Enough people chose to ignore that amendment that it was not enforceable. An anti-abortion amendment would not end abortion. Neither Democrats nor Republicans will touch upon proposing a constitutional amendment. Do nothing, feel good legislation is fair game. nolu chan  posted on  2015-05-23   2:12:37 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #89. To: nolu chan (#87) A better question is: --- Can the impregnated woman be forced to give birth against her will, under the present constitution? -- As currently interpreted under Roe, even a voluntarily impregnated woman cannot be forced to continue the pregnancy against her will. The court found a constitutional right to an abortion emanating from an uncertain penumbra. No, the court opined that a woman has the same rights against involuntary servitude as a man. Call it a penumba if you must. And would an amendment giving that power to government be valid? Ido not see why not. There is no such thing as a legal challenge to the validity of a constitutional provision. SCOTUS could not rule a part of the Constitution invalid. Once the Secretary of State certifies an amendment as having been ratified, the amendment and the process by which it was ratified is beyond judicial review. Not true. The prohibition amendment was so challenged, and the SCOTUS refused to make an opinion on the issue. It remains unresolved.. An amendment saying booze was unconstitutional was valid. No, the issue was unresolved. Enough people chose to ignore that amendment that it was not enforceable. True. An anti-abortion amendment would not end abortion. Neither Democrats nor Republicans will touch upon proposing a constitutional amendment. Do nothing, feel good legislation is fair game. We agree, again. tpaine  posted on  2015-05-23   2:48:07 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #91. To: tpaine (#89) As currently interpreted under Roe, even a voluntarily impregnated woman cannot be forced to continue the pregnancy against her will. The court found a constitutional right to an abortion emanating from an uncertain penumbra. No, the court opined that a woman has the same rights against involuntary servitude as a man. Call it a penumba if you must. No, the court did not opine about involuntary servitude. It opined about a constitutional right to privacy. It is a right that emanates from a penumbra of the 9th or 14th Amendment. 410 U.S. 113, 129 The principal thrust of appellant's attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept of personal "liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); id., at 460 (WHITE, J., concurring in result); or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 410 U.S. 113, 153 This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The right is somewhere in the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, either in the 9th Amendment or the 14th Amendment, and wherever it is, it "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." I must use the word penumbra as SCOTUS explicitly used that word in locating the constitutional right of privacy. There is no such thing as a legal challenge to the validity of a constitutional provision. SCOTUS could not rule a part of the Constitution invalid. Once the Secretary of State certifies an amendment as having been ratified, the amendment and the process by which it was ratified is beyond judicial review. Not true. The prohibition amendment was so challenged, and the SCOTUS refused to make an opinion on the issue. It remains unresolved.. You're wrong. SCOTUS lacks jurisidiction to issue such an opinion. It has similarly refused to review the process by which the 14th Amendment was ratified. It is non-justiciable. It is a political question given by the constitution to the Legislative Branch to decide. You do not identify a court decision. In 1920, SCOTUS emphatically held of the 18th Amendment, "That Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution, and must be respected and given effect the same as other provisions of that instrument." https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/253/350/case.html U.S. Supreme Court National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) National Prohibition Cases No. 29, 30, Original, and No. 696, 762, 788, 794, 837 Argued March 8, 9, 10, 29, 30, 1920 Decided June 7, 1920 253 U.S. 350 ORIGINAL, AND APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY, THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY, THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN, AND THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI Syllabus The adoption by both houses of Congress, each by a two-thirds vote, of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution sufficiently shows that the proposal was deemed necessary by all who voted for it. An express declaration that they regarded it as necessary is not essential. P. 253 U. S. 386. The two-thirds vote in each house which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote of two-thirds of the members present -- assuming the presence of a quorum -- and not a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership, present and absent. Id. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276. The referendum provisions of state constitutions and statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, in the ratification or rejection of amendments to it. Id. Hawke v. Smith, ante, 253 U. S. 221. The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, as embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, is within the power to amend reserved by Article V of the Constitution. Id. That Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution, and must be respected and given effect the same as other provisions of that instrument. Id. [...] See also Coleman v. Miller. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/307/433/case.html U.S. Supreme Court Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) Coleman v. Miller No. 7 Argued October 10, 1938 Reargued April 17, 18, 1939 Decided June 5, 1939 307 U.S. 433 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS Syllabus 1. Upon submission of a resolution for ratification of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution, known as the Child Labor Amendment, twenty of the forty senators of the State of Kansas voted in favor of its adoption and twenty voted against it. The Lieutenant Governor, the presiding officer of the Senate, then cast his vote in favor of the resolution, and later it was adopted by the other house of the legislature on a vote of a majority of its members. The twenty senators who had voted against ratification, challenging the right of the Lieutenant Governor to cast the deciding vote in the Senate, and alleging that the proposed amendment had lost its vitality because of previous rejection by Kansas and other States and failure of ratification within a reasonable time, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Senate to erase an endorsement on the resolution, to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate, and to endorse thereon the words "was not passed," and to restrain the officers of the Senate and House of Representatives from signing the resolution and the Secretary of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor. The State entered its appearance, and the State Supreme Court entertained the action, sustained the right of the plaintiffs to maintain it, but overruled their contentions, upheld the ratification, and denied the writ. Held: (1) The questions decided were federal questions, arising under. Article V of the Constitution. P. 307 U. S. 437. (2) The complaining senators, whose votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught, although, if they are right in their contentions, their votes would have been sufficient to defeat ratification, have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. They have set up and claimed a right and privilege under the Constitution of the United States to have their votes given effect, and the state court has denied that right and privilege. P. 307 U. S. 438. (3) This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the state court by certiorari, under Jud.Code § 237(b). P. 307 U. S. 438. Page 307 U. S. 434 2. The Court, being equally divided in opinion as to whether the question presents a justiciable controversy, or is a political question, expresses no opinion upon a contention that the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas was not a part of the "legislature," and, under Article V of the Federal Constitution, could not be permitted a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment. P. 307 U. S. 446. 3. In accordance with the precedent of the Fourteenth Amendment, the efficacy of ratification of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution by a state legislature which had previously rejected the proposal is held a question for the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment. P. 307 U. S. 447. 4. The legislature of Kansas having actually ratified the proposed Child Labor Amendment, this Court should not restrain the state officers from certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State because of an earlier rejection, and thus prevent the question from coming before the political departments. There is found no basis in either Constitution or statute for such judicial action. P. 307 U. S. 450. 5. R.S. § 205; 5 U.S.C. 160, presupposes official notice to the Secretary of State when a state legislature has adopted a resolution of ratification. No warrant is seen for judicial interference with the performance of that duty. P. 307 U. S. 450. 6. The Congress, in controlling the promulgation of the adoption of a constitutional amendment, has the final determination of the question whether, by lapse of time, its proposal of the amendment had lost its vitality before being adopted by the requisite number of legislatures. P. 307 U. S. 451. 7. In determining whether a question falls within the category of political nonjusticiable questions, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments, and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination, are dominant considerations. P. 307 U. S. 454. 146 Kan. 390; 71 P.2d 518, reversed. nolu chan  posted on  2015-05-26   18:13:17 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #95. To: nolu chan (#91) There is no such thing as a legal challenge to the validity of a constitutional provision. SCOTUS could not rule a part of the Constitution invalid. Once the Secretary of State certifies an amendment as having been ratified, the amendment and the process by which it was ratified is beyond judicial review. Not true. The prohibition amendment was so challenged, and the SCOTUS refused to make an opinion on the issue. It remains unresolved.. You're wrong. SCOTUS lacks jurisidiction to issue such an opinion. It has similarly refused to review the process by which the 14th Amendment was ratified. It is non-justiciable. It is a political question given by the constitution to the Legislative Branch to decide. That's your opinion. Just above I posted Roots opinion, -- and the court refused to issue an opinion on the constitutional issues HE raised. -- They remain unresolved.. tpaine  posted on  2015-05-26   21:51:56 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #96. To: tpaine (#95) [tpaine #95] The prohibition amendment was so challenged, and the SCOTUS refused to make an opinion on the issue. It remains unresolved.. [tpaine #95] That’s your opinion. Just above I posted Roots opinion -- and the court refused to issue an opinion on the constitutional issues HE raised. -- They remain unresolved.. [tpaine #94] Neither Root’s reasoning nor his emotional oratory moved the Court. On June 7, 1920, it rejected every argument of the appellants in the National Prohibition Cases. Unanimously upholding the constitutionality of the Eighteenth Amendment, the justices also approved the method by which the state legislatures had ratified it. They held that the prohibition embodied in the amendment was within the power to amend reserved by Article V of the Constitution, and that therefore the amendment must be respected and observed. There is no Root opinion. Courts issue opinions. “No. 788. Argued March 29 and 30, 1920: Messrs. Elihu Root and William D. Guthrie, both of New York City, for appellant.” Root presented an argument for the Appellant in one of seven cases. It was a LOSING argument. With a resounding slam dunk, SCOTUS posterized the constitutional argument. The Court REJECTED every argument of appellants. You posted that at #94. I quoted from the actual opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, captioned National Prohibition Cases, or State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). The issues were resolved. The constitutional argument was held contrary to the Constitution. The 18th Amendment was held to be in force throughout the United States. The Volstead Act was upheld. No injunction was granted. Here is the opinion of the court: http://laws.findlaw.com/us/253/350.html U.S. Supreme Court State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350 (1920), National Prohibition Cases 253 U.S. 350 STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. PALMER, Atty. Gen., et al. STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SAME. DEMPSEY v. BOYNTON, U. S. Atty., et al. KENTUCKY DISTILLERIES & WAREHOUSE CO. v. GREGORY, U. S. Atty., et al. CHRISTIAN FEIGENSPAN v. BODINE, U. S. Atty., et al. SAWYER, U. S. Atty., et al. v. MANITOWOC PRODUCTS CO. ST. LOUIS BREWING ASS’N v. MOORE, Collector, et al. No. 29, Original. No. 30, Original. No. 696. No. 752. No. 788. No. 794. No. 837. Decided June 7, 1920. [253 U.S. 350, 353] [No. 29. Argued March 8 and 9, 1920: Mr. Herbert A. Rice, of Providence, R. I., for complainant. Mr. Solicitor General King and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for respondents. No. 30. Argued March 29, 1920: Mr. Thomas F. McCran, of Paterson, N. J., for complainant. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for respondents. No. 696. Argued March 9, 1920: Mr. Patrick Henry Kelley, of Boston, Mass., for appellant. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for appellees. No. 752. Argued March 9 and 10, 1920: Messrs. Levy Mayer, of Chicago, Ill., and William Marshall Bullitt, of Louisville, Ky., for appellant. Mr. Solicitor General King and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for appellees. No. 788. Argued March 29 and 30, 1920: Messrs. Elihu Root and William D. Guthrie, both of New York City, for appellant. Mr. Solicitor General King and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for appellees. No. 794. Argued March 30, 1920: Mr. Solicitor General King and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for appellants. Mr. Ralph W. Jackman, of Madison, Wis., for appellee. No. 837. Submitted March 29, 1920: Messrs. Charles A. Houts, John T. Fitzsimmons, and Edward C. Crow, all of St. Louis, Mo., for appellant. Mr. Solicitor General King and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for appellees. [253 U.S. 350, 384] Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER announced the conclusions of the Court. Power to amend the Constitution was reserved by article 5, which reads: ‘The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures [253 U.S. 350, 385] of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.’ The text of the Eighteenth Amendment, proposed by Congress in 1917 and proclaimed as ratified in 1919 (40 Stat. 1050, 1941), is as follows: ‘Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. ‘Sec. 2. The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.’ We here are concerned with seven cases involving the validity of that amendment and of certain general features of the National Prohibition Law, known as the Volstead Act, c. 85, Acts 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (41 Stat. 305 ), which was adopted to enforce the amendment. The relief sought in each case is an injunction against the execution of that act. Two of the cases — Nos. 29 and 30, original, —were brought in this court, and the others in District Courts. Nos. 696, 752, 788, and 837 are here on appeals from decrees refusing injunctions, and No. 794 from a decree granting an injunction. The cases have been elaborately argued at the bar and in [253 U.S. 350, 386] printed briefs; and the arguments have been attentively considered, with the result that we reach and announce the following conclusions on the questions involved: 1. The adoption by both houses of Congress, each by a two-thirds vote, of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution sufficiently shows that the proposal was deemed necessary by all who voted for it. An express declaration that they regarded it as necessary is not essential. None of the resolutions whereby prior amendments were proposed contained such a declaration. 2. The two-thirds vote in each house which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote of two-thirds of the members present-assuming the presence of a quorum-and not a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership, present and absent. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 , 39 Sup. Ct. 93, 2 A. L. R. 1589 3. The referendum provisions of state Constitutions and statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, in the ratification or rejection of amendments to it. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 , 40 Sup. Ct. 495, 64 L. Ed. --, decided June 1, 1920. 4. The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, as embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, is within the power to amend reserved by article 5 of the Constitution. 5. That amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution, and must be respected and given effect the same as other provisions of that instrument. 6. The first section of the amendment — the one embodying the prohibition — is operative throughout the entire territorial limits of the United States, binds all legislative bodies, courts, public officers and individuals within those limits, and of its own force invalidates every [253 U.S. 350, 387] legislative act, whether by Congress, by a state Legislature, or by a territorial assembly, which authorizes or sanctions what the section prohibits. 7. The second section of the amendment — the one declaring ‘The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation’ — does not enable Congress or the several states to defeat or thwart the prohibition, but only to enforce it by appropriate means. 8. The words ‘concurrent power,’ in that section, do not mean joint power, or require that legislation thereunder by Congress, to be effective, shall be approved or sanctioned by the several states or any of them; nor do they mean that the power to enforce is divided between Congress and the several states along the lines which separate or distinguish foreign and interstate commerce from intrastate affairs. 9. The power confided to Congress by that section, while not exclusive, is territorially coextensive with the prohibition of the first section, embraces manufacture and other intrastate transactions as well as importation, exportation and interstate traffic, and is in no wise dependent on or affected by action or inaction on the part of the several states or any of them. 10. That power may be exerted against the disposal for beverage purposes of liquors manufactured before the amendment became effective just as it may be against subsequent manufacture for those purposes. In either case it is a constitutional mandate or prohibition that is being enforced. 11. While recognizing that there are limits beyond which Congress cannot go in treating beverages as within its power of enforcement, we think those limits are not transcended by the provision of the Volstead Act (title 2, 1), wherein liquors containing as much as one-half of 1 percent. of alcohol by volume and fit for use for beverage [253 U.S. 350, 388] purposes are treated as within that power. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 , 40 Sup. Ct. 141, 64 L. Ed. --. Giving effect to these conclusions, we dispose of the cases as follows: In Nos. 29 and 30, original, the bills are dismissed. In No. 794, the decree is reversed. In Nos. 696, 752, 788 and 837, the decrees are affirmed. See also, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/282/716 United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) 282 U.S. 716 (51 S.Ct. 220, 75 L.Ed. 640) UNITED STATES v. SPRAGUE et al. No. 606. Argued: Jan. 21, 1931. Decided: Feb. 24, 1931. [...] The United States asserts that article 5 is clear in statement and in meaning, contains no ambiguity, and calls for no resort to rules of construction. A mere reading demonstrates that this is true. It provides two methods for proposing amendments. Congress may propose them by a vote of two-thirds of both houses; or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the States, must call a convention to propose them. Amendments proposed in either way become a part of the Constitution, ‘when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress. * * *’ The choice, therefore, of the mode of ratification, lies in the sole discretion of Congress. [...] This Court has repeatedly and consistently declared that the choice of mode rests solely in the discretion of Congress. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 348, 15 L. Ed. 401; Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U. S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495, 64 L. Ed. 871, 10 A. L. R. 1504; Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994; National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 488, 64 L. Ed. 946. Appellees urge that what was said on the subject in the first three cases cited is dictum. And they argue that although in the last mentioned it was said the ‘Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution,’ the proposition they now present was not before the Court. While the language used in the earlier cases was not in the strict sense necessary to a decision, it is evident that article 5 was carefully examined and that the Court’s statements with respect to the power of Congress in proposing the mode of ratification were not idly or lightly made. In the National Prohibition Cases, as shown by the briefs, the contentions now argued were made-the only difference between the presentation there and here being one of form rather than of substance. [...] The United States relies upon the fact that every amendment has been adopted by the method pursued in respect of the Eighteenth. Appellees reply that all these save the Eighteenth dealt solely with governmental means and machinery rather than with the rights of the individual citizen. But we think that several amendments touch rights of the citizens, notably the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Nineteenth, and in view of this, weight is to be given to the fact that these were adopted by the method now attacked. The Pocket Veto Case, supra. For these reasons we reiterate what was said in the National Prohibition Cases, supra, that the ‘Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution.’ The order of the court below is reversed. nolu chan  posted on  2015-05-27   1:34:44 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #99. To: nolu chan (#96) The prohibition amendment was so challenged, (on constitutional grounds, by Root) and the SCOTUS refused to make an opinion on the issue. It remains unresolved.. Just above I posted Roots opinion -- and the court refused to issue an opinion on the constitutional issues HE raised. -- They remain unresolved. here is no Root opinion. Courts issue opinions. Root made a constitutional argument. SCOTUS did not address that specific constitutional argument. That specific issue remains unresolved. “No. 788. Argued March 29 and 30, 1920: Messrs. Elihu Root and William D. Guthrie, both of New York City, for appellant.” Root presented an argument for the Appellant in one of seven cases. Thanks for finally admitting that fact. It was a LOSING argument. With a resounding slam dunk, SCOTUS posterized the constitutional argument. SCOTUS did NOT specifically address the constitutional aspects of Roots arguement, they ignored those constitutional issues. The Court REJECTED every argument of appellants. You posted that at #94. Of course I did, and, -- I objected to their nonspecific rejection. -- They did not resolve the constitutional issues Root argued. Iquoted from the actual opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, captioned National Prohibition Cases, or State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). The issues were resolved. The constitutional argument was held contrary to the Constitution. They issued a nonspecific opinion, The constitutional argument is not resolved. tpaine  posted on  2015-05-27   11:19:15 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #100. To: tpaine (#99) The prohibition amendment was so challenged, (on constitutional grounds, by Root) and the SCOTUS refused to make an opinion on the issue. It remains unresolved.. The Court did not refuse to make an opinion. It not only rendered an opinion, I quoted it from start to finish. As you quoted at your #94, "Neither Root's reasoning nor his emotional oratory moved the Court. On June 7, 1920, it rejected every argument of the appellants in the National Prohibition Cases." Just above I posted Roots opinion -- and the court refused to issue an opinion on the constitutional issues HE raised. -- They remain unresolved. You quoted an article about the argument made by attorney Elihu Root. The Court rejected his argument as without merit. Root made a constitutional argument. SCOTUS did not address that specific constitutional argument. That specific issue remains unresolved. The Court did not waste words giving Root a long explanation. They gave him a short opinion rejecting his argument and ruling against his client. From the Article you quoted at #94: The argument of Elihu Root attracted the most attention. The former Secretary of War, Secretary of State, and senator represented a New Jersey brewer. Drys jested that "Hires Root Beer" had been changed to "Beer Hires Root," but they were clearly worried about the impact this distinguished attorney might have on the Court. Root asserted that the Eighteenth Amendment was simply unconstitutional. The substantive portion of the so-called Eighteenth Amendment, he said, did not relate to the powers or organization of government, as constitutional provisions ordinarily do. Rather, it was a direct act of legislation. He denied that the amending provision of the Constitution, Article V, authorized this type of amendment. [...] Neither Root's reasoning nor his emotional oratory moved the Court. On June 7, 1920, it rejected every argument of the appellants in the National Prohibition Cases. Unanimously upholding the constitutionality of the Eighteenth Amendment, the justices also approved the method by which the state legislatures had ratified it. They held that the prohibition embodied in the amendment was within the power to amend reserved by Article V of the Constitution, and that therefore the amendment must be respected and observed. The Court ruled in the National Prohibition Cases, 4. The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, as embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, is within the power to amend reserved by article 5 of the Constitution. 5. That amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution, and must be respected and given effect the same as other provisions of that instrument. I objected to their nonspecific rejection. -- They did not resolve the constitutional issues Root argued. They specifically, unanimously and emphatically resolved the issue Root argued. The Court directly addressed it and held that it had no legal merit, leaving nothing to resolve. It is clear and explicit for all but those who will not see. It is established and well settled precedent. They issued a nonspecific opinion, The constitutional argument is not resolved. They clearly, emphatically and unanimously held what the law is. They rejected the argument of Root. Root “denied that the amending provision of the Constitution, Article V, authorized this type of amendment.” The unanimous Court held, “The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, as embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, is within the power to amend reserved by article 5 of the Constitution.” I do not see how the Court could more specifically reject the argument of Root. He argued the Amendment was not within the power of Article 5. The Court explicitly and unanimously held that the Amendment was within the power to amend reserved by Article 5. A unanimous rejection by the U.S. Supreme Court resolves a constitutional argument unless it is overturned or the Constitution is amended. nolu chan  posted on  2015-05-27   18:39:36 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #101. To: nolu chan (#100) Root argued: --- "If your Honors shall find a way to declare this so-called Amendment to the Federal Constitution valid, then the Government of the United States as it has been known to us and to our forefathers will have ceased to exist. Your Honors will have discovered a new legislative authority hitherto unknown to the Constitution and quite untrammelled by any of its limitations. You will have declared that two thirds of a quorum of each House of the Congress, plus a majority of a quorum of each of the two Houses of the Legislatures of three fourths of the States, may enact any legislation they please without any reference to the limitations of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights itself. In that case, Your Honors, John Marshall need never have sat upon that bench." They clearly, emphatically and unanimously held what the law is. They rejected the argument of Root. ---- Root “denied that the amending provision of the Constitution, Article V, authorized this type of amendment.” The unanimous Court held, “The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, as embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, is within the power to amend reserved by article 5 of the Constitution.” The SCOTUS did NOT address the limits on power, placed on ALL three branches of govt, by the constitution, -- as Root argued. I do not see how the Court could more specifically reject the argument of Root. I do not see WHY you want to see the fiat rejection by the Court as more than it is, but so it goes. He argued the Amendment was not within the power of Article 5. The Court explicitly and unanimously held that the Amendment was within the power to amend reserved by Article 5. ----- A unanimous rejection by the U.S. Supreme Court resolves a constitutional argument unless it is overturned or the Constitution is amended. Tell that to Dread Scott. -- The opinions of the SCOTUS are not law, and they do not 'resolve' constitutional issues. And amendments to the constitution can be deemed unconstitutional. tpaine  posted on  2015-05-27   21:04:18 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #108. To: tpaine (#101) Root: We are of opinion that a state legislature cannot rescind or with­draw its ratification of an amendment after three-fourths of the states have duly ratified it. The Constitution expressly provides that the amendment shall then become "valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution," and we think this conclusive. That's right. The 18th Amendment was ratified in 1919. However, the ques­tion of the power so to rescind or withdraw before three-fourths of the states have duly ratified an amendment presents, in our opinion, an essentially different question. Neither aspect has been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States. Different question, same answer. States can't rescind at any time after they have ratified. Root's paid opinion on the Volstead Act was equally successful in Court. Pure Products, Volume XVI, 1920 6 Opinion of Counsel as to Constitutionality of National Prohibition Act (Under date of December 18, 1919, Elihu Root and William D. Guthrie, counsel for the United States Brewers' Association, gave out the following opinion as to certain questions arising under the Eighteenth Amendment and Act of Congress of October 28, 1919, generally called the "Volstead Act."— Ed. Note.) THE opinion of counsel has been requested upon three questions arising in connection with the Eighteenth Amendment and the Act of Congress of October 28, 1919, styled the "National Pro­hibition Act." The first of these questions is whether or not a state may rescind or repeal its ratification of an amendment to the Constitu­tion of the United States; the second is whether or not legislation by Congress to enforce the amendment must be concurred in by the states in respect of intra-state commerce, and the third is as to the legal effect of state legislation passed to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment in local or intra-state commerce which conflicts with provisions of an act of Congress. I. As to the power of a legislature to rescind or withdraw a prior ratification of a constitutional amendment, there are two aspects: the one before the legislatures of "three-fourths of the several states" have ratified the amendment and the other after the requisite three-fourths have duly ratified it. We are of opinion that a state legislature cannot rescind or with­draw its ratification of an amendment after three-fourths of the states have duly ratified it. The Constitution expressly provides that the amendment shall then become "valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution," and we think this conclusive. However, the ques­tion of the power so to rescind or withdraw before three-fourths of the states have duly ratified an amendment presents, in our opinion, an essentially different question. Neither aspect has been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is, of course, familiar history that the question of the power of a state legislature to rescind a resolution ratifying an amendment before three-fourths of the states had duly ratified it, arose in connection with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The legislatures of the States of New Jersey and Ohio ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 and 1867, respectively, but in each case a subsequent legislature, in 1868, passed a resolution withdrawing the ratification (15 U. S. Stat., appx. XI); the legislature of New York ratified the Fifteenth Amend­ment in 1869, but a subsequent legislature, in 1870, passed a resolution withdrawing the ratification (16 U. S. Sat., appx. IX), and a concurrent resolution was passed by Congress on July 21, 1868, so worded as to imply a declaration on its part that New Jersey and Ohio could not withdraw their ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Although in each of the three cases above mentioned (that is, in New Jersey, Ohio and New York), the attempted rescission or with­drawal was made before three-fourths of the states had ratified, never­theless, as the necessary number of ratifying states was subsequently secured, the question became of no practical importance thereafter. Hence, no occasion arose calling upon the courts to determine whether or not a state could rescind or withdraw its ratification of an amend­ment before three-fourths of the states had duly ratified it. Some authors of legal treatises have expressed the opinion that whilst a state legislature could not rescind its ratification of an amendment either before or after three—fourths of the several states had ratified it, a state legislature could rescind its rejection of and refusal to ratify an amendment and thereupon ratify it. It seems to us difficult to reconcile these two points of view. If it be true in any aspect that action upon a proposed amendment is final and that the power or function provided for in Article V of the Constitution of the United States becomes ex­hausted or spent by a resolution of ratification, then it should logically follow that it is equally final and exhausted by a resolution of rejection. If a state be competent to rescind its refusal to ratify an amendment, it should, as it seems to us, be equally competent to rescind a ratification of an amendment which has not become effective because three-fourths of the several states have not yet ratified it. The underlying theory of Article V undoubtedly is that the Constitution may be amended if there be at the time of ratification a consensus of approval on the part of three-fourths of the states, and violence will be done to this principle if change of circumstance or opinion with regard to the proposed amend­ment has created a condition where one or more of the states that have ratified no longer approve it and no longer deem it necessary or advis­able. The conclusion we reach is that where a state legislature has rati­fied an amendment, but before it has become effective by ratification of three-fourths of the several states, it appears that there has been a change of circumstance or opinion, then the state legislature has the power and ought to voice such change by a resolution of rescission, to the end that the other states may be advised of the true opinion and po­sition of the state in regard to the amendment. In the case of the proposed Eighteenth Amendment, it has been suggested to us that there is grave doubt as to the power of a number of the state legislatures that have ratified the amendment to do so in view of the referendum provisions of their respective constitutions vest­ing legislative power in the electorate, and that the exercise of such referendum, as recently in the State of Ohio, may operate to annul the legislative resolution of ratification. We have not studied the laws of these states sufficiently to express a definite opinion as to the effect of the several referendum provisions in question under the respective state constitutions. The question de- 8 pends in each case upon the local constitution and laws, upon which we would want to consult local counsel. But until the question of the effect of these referendum provisions is finally decided, it seems to us that it would be proper and prudent to assume that it may be held by the courts that adverse action on the referendum will nullify the ratification, and that thereby the number of states duly ratifying may be reduced to less than the three-fourths required. If the very important and undetermined question of the power of a state to withdraw its ratification before three-fourths of the states havs ratified it should arise in connection with the Eighteenth Amendment, it would become a matter of profound concern to all interested in our constitutional form of government that it should be promptly presented to the Supreme Court for definite settlement. II. Concurrent power to legislate upon the subject of the enforce­ment of the prohibitions contained in the Eighteenth Amendment is vested in the Congress and the several states by the following language: "Section 2. The Congress and the several states shall have con­current power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." This provision for concurrent power is unique; its equivalent is not to be found either in the Constitution or in any of the prior articles of amendment. It will be recalled that .the prohibitions contained in sec­tion 1 of the Amendment are definite and absolute, and are expressly confined to "intoxicating liquors/' and section 2, therefore, confers concurrent power only to enforce these specific prohibitions by appropriate legislation. The true construction of this novel provision may well be held to require concurrent action on the part of the Congress and the states in respect of intra-state commerce, and the effect of the amendment may well be limited so as to extend the power of Congress to regulate intra­state commerce in intoxicating liquors only when the states in which such legislation is to be enforced have concurred in the legislation. There is judicial authority tending to support the view that the term "concurrent power*' as used in this amendment will be held to mean and imply that the Congress and the several states must act in conjunction in respect at least of intra-state commerce. Illustrations will be found in the case of Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U. S. 315, 321, and the cases there cited, and Congress must be presumed to have had these cases in mind in 1917 when it used the phrase "concurrent power." Had it been intended in and by the amendment to provide not for action in conjunction, but for separate and independent action, the obvious phras­ing would have been to the effect either that— "The Congress or the several states shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation," or that— "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro­priate legislation, but in the absence of any such legislation by the Congress, the several states may pass appropriate legislation." 9 It has been urged that although the amendment expressly provides for its enforcement by the exercise of concurrent power, it may, never­theless, be enforced by legislation of Congress acting alone, and that if federal and state legislation should conflict, the former would prevail as "the supreme law of the land" under Article VI of the Constitution of the United States. But in our opinion this provision of Article VI does not necessarily control and overthrow or annul conflicting state legislation. The pro­vision refers to laws "made in pursuance of" the Constitution. Obvi­ously, if the term "concurrent power" as used in the Eighteenth Amend­ment requires concurrent action by a state, then legislation by Congress without such concurrence would not be in pursuance of the Constitution. Moreover, it must be manifest that if this provision of Article VI controls and the legislation of Congress under the Eighteenth Amend­ment without concurrence by the state must be treated as supreme or as overriding any state legislation to the contrary, then the grant of "concurrent power" to the several states would become futile and leave practically nothing for the states to legislate upon. Their legislation to enforce the amendment would be idle and inoperative whenever it conflicted with legislation by Congress, and wholly futile, unnecessary and useless whenever it happened to agree with that of Congress. It is hardly reasonable to assume that the framers of the Eighteenth Amendment intended that the states should have power merely to con­cur in whatever Congress saw fit to enact and power to legislate inde­pendently only where Congress was silent. The sounder view would seem to be that it was the intention to confer on the states a co-operat­ing function by the term and the grant of "concurrent power," and to require concurrence in legislation, especially as to intra-state commerce, which it was contemplated might well be appropriate in one or more states and not at all appropriate elsewhere by reason of varying con­ditions. III. The "National Prohibition Act" passed by Congress October 28, 1919, over the veto of the President of the United States, is gener­ally called the Volstead Act, and it provides in Title II as follows: "When used in Title II and Title III of this Act (1) Tlie word 'liquor' or the phrase 'intoxicating liquor' shall be construed to in­clude alcohol, brandy, whisky, rum, gin, beer, ale, porter, and wine, and in addition thereto any spirituous, vinous, malt, or fermented liquor, liquids, and compounds, whether medicated, proprietary, pat­ented, or not, and by whatever name called, containing one-half of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume which are fit for use for beverage purposes; Provided, That the foregoing definition shall not extend to dealcoholized wine nor to any beverage or liquid pro­duced by the process by which beer, ale, porter or wine is produced, if it contains less than one-half of 1 per centum of alcohol by vol­ume, and is made as prescribed in section 37 of this title, and is 10 otherwise denominated than as beer, ale, or porter, and is contained and sold in, or from, such sealed and labeled bottles, casks, or con­tainers as the commissioner may by regulation prescribe." In the legal proceedings now pending in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, it has been established by the affidavits of exceptionally competent and distinguished scientists and medical experts of high national repute that beer containing 2.75 per cent, by weight of alcohol cannot be deemed intoxicating within any reasonable or accepted definition of that term, and that one-half of one per cent, by volume (that is, about one-seventh of 2.75 per cent, by weight) could not by any practical possibility be intoxicating. This being so, the definition by-Congress of "intoxicating liquors" would seem to be an erroneous and arbitrary one. The grant of power in the Eighteenth Amendment is expressly confined to "intoxicating liquors." Congress cannot, by means of an erroneous definition of the term "intoxicating liquors." extend its power beyond the grant so as to include non-intoxicating beverages. In our opinion this definition, if proved to be clearly erroneous and arbi­trary, should be held not to be appropriate legislation. Plainly, on the face of the Volstead Act, non-intoxicating beer has been prohibited, not because Congress deemed this an appropriate means for the enforce­ment of the Eighteenth Amendment, but because it erroneously and arbitrarily assumed and therefore declared it to be intoxicating as mat­ter of fact. It seems to us of great importance that the legislatures of the sev­eral states should now promptly and independently investigate and de­termine the question of fact whether light beers and light wines contain­ing so small a content of alcohol as three or four per cent, by weight or volume can be deemed intoxicating within any reasonable and accepted definition of that term, and further and separately whether and how far it is reasonably necessary or appropriate to prohibit beverages which are indisputably non-intoxicating for the alleged purpose of effectively reaching and prohibiting intoxicating liquors. If state legislatures should promptly determine after due investigation that light wines an4 light beers containing not to exceed three or four per cent, of alcohol by weight or volume were clearly not as matter of fact intoxicating, and that the prohibition of beverages containing as little as one-half of one per cent, by volume was an arbitrary and unwarranted interference with individual rights and in no reasonable degree authorized by or appropri­ate for the enforcement of, the Eighteenth Amendment, it would pre­sent the questions as to the alleged controlling and supreme power of Congress and the validity of the Volstead Act in their clearest and most striking aspects. A very serious and grave question of permanent importance is thus presented to the state legislatures by the legislation contained in the act of Congress of October 28, 1919, known as the Volstead Act, This leg­islation embodies so drastic an enforcement of prohibition that, if valid, 11 it will deprive the inhabitants of the several states of the right hereafter to use nutritious and healthful beverages which are not as matter of fact intoxicating, and this may cause much hardship, discontent and just resentment. If one class of non-intoxicating beverages may be thus pro­hibited, it is difficult to perceive why many harmless beverages, even those containing no alcohol whatever, cannot be equally prohibited. If the states now acquiesce in this drastic, if not arbitrary, legislation, such acquiescence may operate to render any challenge in the future entirely futile, or at least much more difficult and unpromising than it would be if prompt state action had been taken. ELIHU ROOT, WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE. New York, December 18, 1919. nolu chan  posted on  2015-05-29   17:58:31 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   Replies to Comment # 108.         There are no replies to Comment # 108. End Trace Mode for Comment # 108. Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest

[Home]  [Headlines]  [Latest Articles]  [Latest Comments]  [Post]  [Mail]  [Sign-in]  [Setup]  [Help]  [Register]  Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com