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Title: Two Officers Shot in Ferguson After White House Declares Open Season on Cops
Source: [None]
URL Source: [None]
Published: Mar 12, 2015
Author: sara noble
Post Date: 2015-03-12 08:20:15 by tpaine
Keywords: None
Views: 31030
Comments: 162

www.independentsentinel.com www.independentsentinel.com

Officer Cries In Pain On One Video

Ferguson “protesters” gathered outside the Ferguson police station following the resignation of Chief Jackson. Shortly after midnight, someone shot two police officers. No one knows who fired, but it appeared the shots were fired directly at the officers.

The DOJ released a scathing report accusing Ferguson police of racism knowing it would reignite the nearly-burned out furor in Ferguson.

A 32-year-old officer from nearby Webster Groves was shot in the face and a 41- year-old officer from St. Louis County was shot in the shoulder, St. Louis County Police Chief Jon Belmar said at a news conference. Both were taken to a hospital, where Belmar said they were conscious. He said he did not have further details about their conditions but described their injuries as “serious.”

They weren’t even Ferguson police officers.

You can hear the officers screaming in pain on this video.

There were about 60 to 70 protesters and their behavior prompted the police to send officers in riot gear.

St. Louis County Police Chief Jon Belmar told reporters, “I’ve said many times we cannot sustain this without problems and that’s not a reflection of those expressing their first amendment rights. But this is a very dangerous environment for our officers to work in.”

At least three shots were fired and the wounds were “very serious”, Belmar said.

Some said the shots seemed to come from a house but there was no house nearby and others said they might have come from a small hill.

Prior to the shooting, “protesters” were chanting to show they weren’t satisfied with the resignation of Chief Jackson. Others were angry and potentially dangerous. They smell blood in the water.

One protester said it was mostly peaceful until the shots rang out. Mostly peaceful?!?

If the participants were in the Tea Party, would it be described as mostly peaceful?

The acting head of the Justice Department’s civil rights division released a statement saying the U.S. government remains committed to reaching a “court- enforceable agreement” to address Ferguson’s “unconstitutional practices,” regardless of who’s in charge of the city.

What about the rights of the police who they are endangering with their race baiting?

MSNBC’s Ed Schultz wants Ferguson police disarmed.

The riots/protests were funded by George Soros among others and engineered by Barack Obama and Eric Holder.

The video of the shooting via Matthew Keys:

After the shooting, the leftists chanted this allegedly:

after the shooting

The chanting was utter nonsense. The only ones losing their freedom are the police and the normal people in Ferguson being subjected to these Soros-communist funded riots/protests which are based on a lie. They still have the hands up, don’t shoot posture.

This was one of the “chants”:

And another – “hands up, don’t shoot, stop this shit, we’re bullet proof”.

Don’t expect any words of comfort from the White House or calls to families of the officers.

One confused protester thinks the cops are “trigger happy”.

CNN

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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 157.

#2. To: tpaine (#0)

No one knows who fired, but it appeared the shots were fired directly at the officers.

Uh...as opposed to the vast majority of shootings where people are injured by ricochets?

Are these reporters paid by the word to utter such drivel? Do they even have an editor?

They weren’t even Ferguson police officers.

The article doesn't explain why they were present if they weren't Ferguson cops.

Nor is there any exploration of who the protesters were, whether they were Ferguson residents or some thug types from around the greater metro area, as we saw during the riots that attracted every thug in the (larger) city.

It may be that the thugs deliberately shot cops just to provoke them into massacring the crowd to create another incident. Sharpton's crew is fully capable of it.

The riots/protests were funded by George Soros among others and engineered by Barack Obama and Eric Holder.

Any proof of that or will the accusation be enough to flack this sad-sack hatchet job?

Tooconservative  posted on  2015-03-12   8:39:38 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#3. To: TooConservative (#2)

It may be that the thugs deliberately shot cops just to provoke them into massacring the crowd to create another incident. Sharpton's crew is fully capable of it.

The zoo animals will reap what they sow... when they force a little roof top Justice.

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-12   8:52:09 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#5. To: GrandIsland (#3)

The zoo animals will reap what they sow... when they force a little roof top Justice.

Like that is a desirable solution.

Given Ferguson's history (and constant looting of the citizens as a notable bandit town), why don't the police have some cameras outside the station? You'd think that some cop would at least pull out a smartphone and try to record all the protesters' faces in the event of rioting or unrest. Or cops getting shot in front of a police station.

The scammy website this is from has insecure, possibly malware, scripting on it.

Here are the two vids, direct from YouBoob.

Given such a lousy article, we get more actual info from these lo-res vids. And that police HQ doesn't look like a poverty-stricken precinct that can't afford cameras. They're blowing plenty of money on electricity for decorative outside lighting.

Tooconservative  posted on  2015-03-12   9:01:45 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#7. To: TooConservative (#5)

Like that is a desirable

Neither is being a target because you wear a uniform.

See, every once in a while, you spin. Not as much as some others... but you do spin. I never suggested it would be desirable... sticking your hand in your toilet to clean it isn't desirable... but if you keep shitting all over the bowl... it's a must.

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-12   9:21:32 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#14. To: GrandIsland (#7)

See, every once in a while, you spin. Not as much as some others... but you do spin.

Because I suggested that vigilantes firing from rooftops isn't desirable?

Yes, I am guilty of that, I suppose. Not sure why that is so heinous or considered grounds for being accused of "spin".

Reuters filed a story, not much better than this one:

The violence grew out of a Wednesday night demonstration in which several dozen protesters gathered in front of the Ferguson police department, just hours after Police Chief Thomas Jackson resigned.

The night started peacefully but about two dozen officers clad in riot gear later faced off with the protesters. At least two people were taken into custody.

Gunshots rang out about midnight turning a scene of relative quiet into pandemonium. Many of the remaining few dozen demonstrators fled, some screaming.

The line of police scrambled, with many taking defensive positions drawing their weapons and some huddling behind riot shields, according to a video published online.

Belmar said the shooter was among the demonstrators standing across from the officers.

"I don't know who did the shooting, to be honest with you right now, but somehow they were embedded in that group of folks," he said.

Protesters at the scene, however, said on social media that the shots did not come from where they were standing.

"The shooter was not with the protesters. The shooter was atop the hill," activist DeRay McKesson said on Twitter.

"I was here. I saw the officer fall. The shot came from at least 500 feet away from the officers," he said.

I'd like to know more about the firearms used. If it was rifle ammo, then maybe the shots rang out from the Grassy Knoll, as the protesters said. If the slugs are from a pistol, most likely it came from the protester ranks.

Apparently, ballistics is a forgotten police science in Ferguson.

Tooconservative  posted on  2015-03-12   9:49:42 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#18. To: TooConservative (#14)

I'd like to know more about the firearms used. If it was rifle ammo, then maybe the shots rang out from the Grassy Knoll, as the protesters said. If the slugs are from a pistol, most likely it came from the protester ranks.

Apparently, ballistics is a forgotten police science in Ferguson.

Do you think ANY serious, honest investigation will be forthcoming in this case??

(come on - really.)

Liberator  posted on  2015-03-12   9:57:23 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#22. To: Liberator, Grand Island (#18)

Do you think ANY serious, honest investigation will be forthcoming in this case??

It's hard to imagine they'll fail to do ballistics tests and identify the type of bullets and guns used.

Maybe they'll be those 5.56 NATO steel-tipped NATO rounds that BATFE wants to ban. But it would be hard for that cop to take one to the face and still have a face left.

I'm leaning toward pistol rounds, fired within 20'. Given that there were a few dozen cops in riot gear only feet from the protesters, it seems hard to imagine that someone didn't see a flash from the gun or something to indicate where the bullet originated.

Maybe they were having a donut break and wear too busy to watch the crowd.

I still don't grasp why the cops went out in riot gear on their front step. It seems purposeless to me. "Hey, you darned protesters, get off our lawn!"

Seems dumb but maybe you had to be there to get why the supervising officer sent them out.

Tooconservative  posted on  2015-03-12   10:18:45 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#29. To: TooConservative (#22) (Edited)

It's hard to imagine they'll fail to do ballistics tests and identify the type of bullets and guns used.

Maybe they'll be those 5.56 NATO steel-tipped NATO rounds that BATFE wants to ban. But it would be hard for that cop to take one to the face and still have a face left.

I like the way you're thinking here. Of course your theory that 5.56 wouldn't leave much face would obviously disprove that this round was used, but I wouldn't expect "investigators," the media, and the Regime to dismiss rhetoric and propaganda that would be so useful.

I'm leaning toward pistol rounds, fired within 20'. Given that there were a few dozen cops in riot gear only feet from the protesters, it seems hard to imagine that someone didn't see a flash from the gun or something to indicate where the bullet originated.

In a universe where there's an honest investigation. law, and justice? Yeah. ("Remember: SELMA!!!!")

I still don't grasp why the cops went out in riot gear on their front step. It seems purposeless to me. "Hey, you darned protesters, get off our lawn!"

HA!

Well, there's two trains of thought -- strap it on, OR, play it passively (which would be perceived as weak.) Look -- Ferguson is Ground Zero for "The Beginning."

Liberator  posted on  2015-03-12   10:43:46 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#33. To: Liberator (#29)

I'm leaning toward pistol rounds, fired within 20'.

If they fired from the crowd under fluid nighttime conditions and managed to hit two cops, I assume they had to be close. Or they were really terrific shots with a pistol. Given the gunslinging skills of your average homeboy, I'm thinking they were close, not expert pistoleros from Da Hood.

[Notice how I deftly managed to reply to myself while only pretending to reply to you? LOL.]

Tooconservative  posted on  2015-03-12   10:51:27 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#45. To: TooConservative (#33)

If they fired from the crowd under fluid nighttime conditions and managed to hit two cops, I assume they had to be close.

Good assumption,given the fact that the typical black thug almost always missed the guy he is shooting at and hits children 10 feet away from them.

sneakypete  posted on  2015-03-12   16:56:03 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#46. To: sneakypete (#45) (Edited)








Italians: be gone!

Tooconservative  posted on  2015-03-12   17:28:46 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#48. To: TooConservative (#46) (Edited)

Italians: be gone!

Fixed?

tpaine  posted on  2015-03-12   17:36:37 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#49. To: tpaine (#48) (Edited)


Yeah, I tried. I think it's twisted in a HTML knot with unclosed B and I and SPAN tags mixed together. You can confuse a browser if you do enough of those.

Tooconservative  posted on  2015-03-12   17:42:06 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#50. To: TooConservative (#49)

Is it busted forever?

tpaine  posted on  2015-03-12   17:47:30 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#51. To: tpaine, Pinguinite, A K A Stone, Murron (#50)

I dunno. Neil might know a trick. Otherwise, it's just this thread that's borked. Or Stone could just delete Murron's comment.

Tooconservative  posted on  2015-03-12   18:05:45 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#64. To: TooConservative, tpaine, A K A Stone, Murron (#51)

I dunno. Neil might know a trick.

It can be fixed by admin editing the offending comment and removing the stray bold tag.

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-13   3:02:01 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#65. To: Pinguinite, TooConservative, tpaine, A K A Stone (#64)

It can be fixed by admin editing the offending comment and removing the stray bold tag.

HUH? What 'offending comment' did I post?

Murron  posted on  2015-03-15   14:48:49 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#66. To: Murron (#65)

HUH? What 'offending comment' did I post?

I'll suggest that Pinguinite isn't saying you comment was offensive, in the literal term... but he/she is suggesting that your comment is the "offender" that caused the corrupt text to be continued down this thread.

He or she is saying you are guilty of Aggravated Font Change in the 1st degree. A LF Class B Misdemeanor. Sentence, already served.

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-15   14:58:13 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#67. To: GrandIsland, Murron (#66)

As much as I disagree with GI on many important issues, in this case s/he is correct. It's not offending in the literal sense, only "offending" in the context of the font spillover that damaged the thread display. Some how, a comment ended up with a stray Bold & Italic HTML codes that got through the normally tight HTML clean-up code that runs right before comments are posted. My hat's off to you if you managed that, and it's something to figure out.

But at the moment I posted the fix solution, "offending comment" was the first descriptor that came to mind, so that's what I called it. I think I was in a bit of a hurry at the time. I wrote that even without knowing in who's comment the stray HTML code was introduced.

Cheers...

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-15   16:55:13 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#68. To: Pinguinite (#67)

As much as I disagree with GI on many important issues

Say what... can't be true. lol

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-15   17:06:37 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#69. To: GrandIsland (#68)

Say what... can't be true. lol

Well, I was surprised to see you getting so hard lined about smoking rights, even to the point of telling neighbors they can go pound sand if they don't like smoke entering their homes. Why this wouldn't apply to say, marijuana smoke along with tobacco is a puzzle to me though. Seems you would object to all of your neighbors complaining about your smoking, but submissively give in to the demands of legislatures voted into power by the exact same neighbors that would put the exact same prohibition on a sheet of paper and call it a "law". Is that right?

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-15   18:56:46 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#70. To: Pinguinite (#69) (Edited)

Well, I was surprised to see you getting so hard lined about smoking rights, even to the point of telling neighbors they can go pound sand if they don't like smoke entering their homes. Why this wouldn't apply to say, marijuana smoke along with tobacco is a puzzle to me though. Seems you would object to all of your neighbors complaining about your smoking, but submissively give in to the demands of legislatures voted into power by the exact same neighbors that would put the exact same prohibition on a sheet of paper and call it a "law". Is that right?

No. I don't feel I'm hard lined about a smokers rights. I loath smoke like any other ex smoker.

I'm hard lined at the rights of legal activity INSIDE your home. I feel that if you are doing something legal inside your home, you shouldn't be restricted at all.

Obviously, living in row housing, apartment buildings, condos and trailer parks causes a closer habitat to your smelly and loud neighbors. If you might be bothered by what your neighbor LEGALLY does INSIDE their home, then buy a single family home with a large lot.

Look, by code, there is a brick or cinder block firewall between the two homes. There is no reason the complainer can't seal up every hole inside his house... to keep the smokers smoke out.

Telling a person they can't smoke in their own home is a slippery slope. It's the kind of slippery slope that has allowed big brother government to not only feel like they must exist or citizens can't survive... but the pathway that allows governmrnt rights and loss of citizen freedoms.

You can't possibly be against intrusive government and in the same breath support a court action telling a homeowner that they can't smoke in a house he's lives in for 50 years.

I feel the burden is on the smoke hating complainer for change... or even to move.

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-15   20:03:17 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#71. To: GrandIsland (#70)

You are apparently avoiding the point of my question, but... okay....

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-16   0:15:26 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#72. To: Pinguinite (#71) (Edited)

Why this wouldn't apply to say, marijuana smoke along with tobacco is a puzzle to me though.

It would if recreational marijuana was legal in the state in question. When you learn the difference between illegal and legal activity, well then your puzzle is solved.

No where in the constitution does it give you the right to break constitutional laws inside your home. Drug laws are constitutional.

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-16   0:44:04 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#74. To: GrandIsland (#72)

You still miss my point. Perhaps your time in law enforcement has biased your perspective.

For you, there's apparently a strong distinction between "legal" and "illegal" activity. But at the same time, you state that you have a moral right to tell everyone in your community to go fly a kite if they all came to you to tell you you can't smoke in your house.

But these people are also voters. If they *vote* to make smoking in your home illegal, would you then adhere to the "law" they enacted and comply with their demand, and agree that you no longer have a moral right to smoke in your house?

In one case, you refuse to adhere to the will of the people, and in the other, you would acquiesce to it. Does your moral right to do as you please in your own home change *solely* because of the degree of the formality taken by the majority of your neighbors to decree what is and is not legal activity?

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-16   1:41:56 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#75. To: Pinguinite (#74)

But these people are also voters. If they *vote* to make smoking in your home illegal, would you then adhere to the "law" they enacted and comply with their demand, and agree that you no longer have a moral right to smoke in your house?

If my aunt had balls, she'd be my uncle.

No law prohibiting smoking, inside your own home, would ever stand the test of constitutionality. When you compare it to marijuana, it isn't "smoking it" that's illegal in your home.... IT'S POSSESSING IT. it's a banned substance in most states, and that's a constitutionally tested law.

Yes, smoking marihuana, IN PUBLIC, is also against the law, in most states...but the inside of your home isn't public, now is it.

Your analogy, is ridiculous, at best.

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-16   6:25:42 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#76. To: GrandIsland (#75)

Okay, let me get this straight.

Drug laws are constitutional.

Tobacco is a drug.

Marijuana is a drug.

A ban on tobacco would be unconstitutional.

The ban on marijuana is constitutional.

Neither marijuana nor tobacco is mentioned or referred to in any way in the Constitution.

Laws are enacted by the will of the people as a whole.

You have a moral right to reject the will of the people with regard to tobacco, but not the will of the people with regard to marijuana.

Is there any item listed here that is incorrect?

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-16   13:30:52 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#77. To: Pinguinite (#76)

Tobacco is a drug.

Tobacco is not classified as a drug. I stopped reading your reply at the word "tobacco"

I don't entertain spin. Reword and resubmit your response

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-16   15:08:18 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#78. To: GrandIsland (#77)

Tobacco is not classified as a drug. I stopped reading your reply at the word "tobacco"

Had you continued reading, you would have seen:

Is there any item listed here that is incorrect?

No, this is not about "spin". Not by me, at least. This is about trying to understand your logic. I'm a bit puzzled that you have exhibited both a sense of freedom to do in your home what you please with regard to tobacco, but not with regard to marijuana. But okay, I'll reword:

* Drug laws are constitutional.

* Tobacco is not classified by law as a drug, and legislatures are constitutionally banned from classifying it as a drug, and therefore cannot ban tobacco.

* Marijuana is classified by law as a drug, though legislatures are free to classify it as a non-drug if they so choose.

* A ban on marijuana is constitutional because legislatures have decided to classify it as a drug.

* Neither marijuana nor tobacco is mentioned or referred to in any way in the Constitution.

* Laws are enacted by the will of the people as a whole.

* You have a moral and Constitutional right to reject the will of the people with regard to tobacco, but no moral or Constitutional right to reject the will of the people with regard to marijuana.

All in all, I find your position very arbitrary. Your moral foundation of what is right and wrong is based simply on what laws have been passed, and laws passed are simply the result of popular sentiment (or all too often, just lobbying by special interests). This includes what is and is not considered a drug. The medical establishment does indeed classify nicotine and alcohol as drugs.

Slavery was once found to be Constitutional, but that didn't make it right. If tobacco was classified as a drug by statute, and then banned (something that actually could happen in the future if popular sentiment goes that far) would you then suddenly agree it's morally reasonable for a man to be prohibited by court order to not smoke tobacco in his home?

Is your moral compass simply in tune with laws, and nothing else? It seems from your postings that's precisely the case. I would say today's police officers have lost touch with the people they are supposed to serve and protect for that exact reason.

And I think we're called to be more than that.

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-17   4:00:01 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#80. To: Pinguinite (#78)

All in all, I find your position very arbitrary. Your moral foundation of what is right and wrong is based simply on what laws have been passed, and laws passed are simply the result of popular sentiment

Picking and choosing which constitutionally tested laws you will obey is worse than a slippery slope... It's a dangerous ideal. It will decay society (look around you, we are seeing it now and it's magnified in Ferguson). It's no different than officers that picks and chooses what laws they will enforce.

This concept I'll never waiver on... there are many laws I don't like. I'll obey them or I'll move to another state, like I did with the Adolf Cuomo's SafeAct.

Aside from that very essential ideal, we live in a free society. If we aren't breaking the law inside our castle... we need to be left alone. Regardless how much my activity inside my home bothers you. Obey my lawful activity freedom or MOVE like I did.

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-17   6:26:42 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#81. To: GrandIsland (#80)

Picking and choosing which constitutionally tested laws you will obey is worse than a slippery slope... It's a dangerous ideal.

A slippery slope is what we are already on. You claim drug laws have been "constitutionally tested" and yet the only drug that appears in the constitution is alcohol. Congress has never been constitutionally authorized to ban any other drug. But courts have invented this "living document" doctrine by which they claim some law is "constitutional" even though it clearly is not. Because of that, more and more rights are trashed every year, such as the 4th Amendment, and it's the police that are the tools of the state which are used to violate these rights. Those on the police force become mindless, robots of the state, and essentially religious fanatics of sorts, enforcing any and every statute against a peaceful people because "the law is the law", or worse, with civil asset forfeiture, themselves become greedy, legalized looters of law abiding citizens.

By your own ideals, tobacco can one day be banned along with marijuana and the ban can be called "constitutional", and you'll have no choice but to accept that as law inside the home of every American. That will always be a real possibility, and your stated belief that such a think is impossible probably is a lot like the founders belief that the numerous articles in the Bill of Rights couldn't possibly be violated. But that's the USA today. And you think my position is a slippery slope? No it's not. A slippery slope is what the US has been on for a long time.

My ideals are staying put right where they are. Thanks for playing....

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-17   14:24:57 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#82. To: Pinguinite (#81)

A slippery slope is what we are already on.

Even if that were true, two wrongs don't make a right.

Pick and choose what laws you'll follow AT YOUR OWN RISK... I can respect that. Respect the fact that you won't ever get my blessing.

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-17   14:46:34 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#91. To: Pinguinite, Y'ALL, grandIsland, misterwhite, gatlin, etc (#82)

GrandIsland (#80) --- Picking and choosing which constitutionally tested laws you will obey is worse than a slippery slope... It's a dangerous ideal.

A slippery slope is what we are already on. You claim drug laws have been "constitutionally tested" and yet the only drug that appears in the constitution is alcohol. Congress has never been constitutionally authorized to ban any other drug. But courts have invented this "living document" doctrine by which they claim some law is "constitutional" even though it clearly is not. ---- ---- By your own ideals, tobacco can one day be banned along with marijuana and the ban can be called "constitutional", and you'll have no choice but to accept that as law inside the home of every American. That will always be a real possibility, and your stated belief that such a think is impossible probably is a lot like the founders belief that the numerous articles in the Bill of Rights couldn't possibly be violated. But that's the USA today. And you think my position is a slippery slope? No it's not. A slippery slope is what the US has been on for a long time. --- Pinguinite

Even if that were true, two wrongs don't make a right. --- Pick and choose what laws you'll follow AT YOUR OWN RISK... -- GrandIsland

ALL citizens of the USA are bound by obligation to support and defend the Constitution. -- They do NOT have the ability to "pick and choose" what laws they'll follow. -- It is their duty to oppose unconstitutional ' law', -- as you say, at their own risk.

The pity is, that you, as a sworn officer of the law, and some others here at LF, will not admit that large sections of our statutory law dealing with drugs, guns, and non-violent behaviors, -- are obviously unconstitutional, and should be ignored and unenforced.

How do you fellas explain your ability to ignore your duty?

tpaine  posted on  2015-03-17   19:03:51 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#92. To: tpaine (#91)

- It is their duty to oppose unconstitutional ' law',

If it's unconstitutional, awesome. A jury or higher court will have your back. Like I said... at your own risk. Good luck.

It's why we are FREE. Do as you feel you feel is right. Roll the dice... gamble on 12 of your peers.

GrandIsland  posted on  2015-03-17   21:58:54 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#98. To: GrandIsland (#92)

If it's unconstitutional, awesome. A jury or higher court will have your back.

Juries will never hear any such argument that drug laws are unconstitutional because judges will not allow it as a defence.

It's one of those control tools the courts employ.

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-17   23:46:21 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#118. To: Pinguinite, GrandIsland (#98)

Juries will never hear any such argument that drug laws are unconstitutional because judges will not allow it as a defence.

Trial court judges do not have discretion to permit such a defense. Binding federal precedent prohibits any trial level court in the United States from entertaining such a defense.

The trial court judges need not agree with the Supremes but they are required to comply with all binding higher court precedent. SCOTUS holdings are binding in all jurisdictions.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/1/

SYLLABUS
OCTOBER TERM, 2004
GONZALES V. RAICH

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. RAICH et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit

No. 03–1454.Argued November 29, 2004—Decided June 6, 2005

California’s Compassionate Use Act authorizes limited marijuana use for medicinal purposes. Respondents Raich and Monson are California residents who both use doctor-recommended marijuana for serious medical conditions. After federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents seized and destroyed all six of Monson’s cannabis plants, respondents brought this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the extent it prevents them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal medical use. Respondents claim that enforcing the CSA against them would violate the Commerce Clause and other constitutional provisions. The District Court denied respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that they had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the claim that the CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority as applied to the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a patient’s physician pursuant to valid California state law. The court relied heavily on United States v. Lopez,514 U. S. 549, and United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, to hold that this separate class of purely local activities was beyond the reach of federal power.

Held: Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law. Pp. 6–31.

(a) For the purposes of consolidating various drug laws into a comprehensive statute, providing meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels, and strengthening law enforcement tools against international and interstate drug trafficking, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Title II of which is the CSA. To effectuate the statutory goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except as authorized by the CSA. 21 U. S. C. §§841(a)(1), 844(a). All controlled substances are classified into five schedules, §812, based on their accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body, §§811, 812.Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance, §812(c), based on its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment, §812(b)(1). This classification renders the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana a criminal offense. §§841(a)(1), 844(a). Pp. 6–11.

(b) Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce is firmly established. See, e.g., Perez v. United States,402 U. S. 146, 151. If Congress decides that the “ ‘total incidence’ ” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See, e.g., id., at 154–155. Of particular relevance here is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127–128, where, in rejecting the appellee farmer’s contention that Congress’ admitted power to regulate the production of wheat for commerce did not authorize federal regulation of wheat production intended wholly for the appellee’s own consumption, the Court established that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself “commercial,” i.e., not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity. The similarities between this case and Wickard are striking. In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity. In assessing the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, the Court need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. E.g., Lopez, 514 U. S., at 557. Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. §801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, the Court has no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Pp. 12–20.

(c) Respondents’ heavy reliance on Lopez and Morrison overlooks the larger context of modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases, while also reading those cases far too broadly. The statutory challenges at issue there were markedly different from the challenge here. Respondents ask the Court to excise individual applications of a concededly valid comprehensive statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and Morrison, the parties asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress’ commerce power in its entirety. This distinction is pivotal for the Court has often reiterated that “[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.” Perez, 402 U. S., at 154. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the laws at issue in Lopez and Morrison had nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise. See Lopez, 514 U. S., at 561; Morrison, 529 U. S., at 610. In contrast, the CSA regulates quintessentially economic activities: the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational means of regulating commerce in that product. The Ninth Circuit cast doubt on the CSA’s constitutionality by isolating a distinct class of activities that it held to be beyond the reach of federal power: the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in accordance with state law. However, Congress clearly acted rationally in determining that this subdivided class of activities is an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme. The case comes down to the claim that a locally cultivated product that is used domestically rather than sold on the open market is not subject to federal regulation. Given the CSA’s findings and the undisputed magnitude of the commercial market for marijuana, Wickard and its progeny foreclose that claim. Pp. 20–30.

352 F. 3d 1222, vacated and remanded.

Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part III. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/1/opinion.html

OPINION OF THE COURT
GONZALES V. RAICH
545 U. S. 1 (2005)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 03-1454

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., PETITIONERS v. ANGEL McCLARY RAICH et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit

[June 6, 2005]

Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.

[...]

Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Perez, 402 U. S., at 151; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 128–129 (1942). As we stated in Wickard, “even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Id., at 125. We have never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the “ ‘total incidence’ ” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See Perez, 402 U. S., at 154–155 (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 259 (1927)(“[W]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented it may do so”)). In this vein, we have reiterated that when “ ‘a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’ ” E.g.,Lopez, 514 U. S., at 558 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196, n. 27 (1968)).

Our decision in Wickard,317 U. S. 111, is of particular relevance. In Wickard, we upheld the application of regulations promulgated under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31, which were designed to control the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and consequent abnormally low prices. The regulations established an allotment of 11.1 acres for Filburn’s 1941 wheat crop, but he sowed 23 acres, intending to use the excess by consuming it on his own farm. Filburn argued that even though we had sustained Congress’ power to regulate the production of goods for commerce, that power did not authorize “federal regulation [of] production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.” Wickard, 317 U. S., at 118. Justice Jackson’s opinion for a unanimous Court rejected this submission. He wrote:

“The effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs. That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.” Id., at 127–128.

Wickard thus establishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself “commercial,” in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.

[...]

In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. Lopez, 514 U. S., at 557; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.,452 U. S. 264, 276–280 (1981); Perez, 402 U. S., at 155–156; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 299–301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 252–253 (1964). Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. §801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels,[Footnote 33] we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce … among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8. That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme.

nolu chan  posted on  2015-03-18   15:31:08 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#121. To: nolu chan (#118)

Trial court judges do not have discretion to permit such a defense. Binding federal precedent prohibits any trial level court in the United States from entertaining such a defense.

The trial court judges need not agree with the Supremes but they are required to comply with all binding higher court precedent. SCOTUS holdings are binding in all jurisdictions.

The reason lower courts will not permit arguments against the constitutionality of drug laws be made by the defence to juries is not pertinent to my response in this discussion. Only the fact that they will not permit it is.

My position is that the court system as a whole is basically a failure in serving the nation it is supposed to serve. I look not at the mechanics of operation to find fault, only the end result, which has all manner of failures, from cops that kill innocent people going unpunished even though they provoke confrontations to the point of making people flee out of fear for their lives, or even place illegal chokeholds on them. Fourth amendment protections have been all but completely gutted, all forms of electronic communications being secretly recorded, extra-judicial executions of US citizens, and the list goes on and on and on and on.

The US Constitution used to be construed as a document that gives limited power to the central government, but now is construed as a document that sets the limits the power of the central government. There is a massive difference. The US government in particular no longer serves the interests of the people, only the interests of those in it and those corporate interests able to milk it in whatever manner for their own benefit, whether it being spending or sponsoring a coup in Ukraine (which provides no benefit to any state of the union -- which the Fed gov is supposed to be a servant of -- in any way).

Every branch has it's share of the blame in destroying what was a great USA, but the courts, including the USSC, may well carry the most blame of the three.

Pinguinite  posted on  2015-03-18   16:00:02 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#132. To: Pinguinite (#121)

Juries will never hear any such argument that drug laws are unconstitutional because judges will not allow it as a defence.

It is not allowed as a defense because it is contrary to law and constitutes no defense. There is a difference between arguing to a jury and a defense.

The reason lower courts will not permit arguments against the constitutionality of drug laws be made by the defence to juries is not pertinent to my response in this discussion.

No law may be argued to the jury. Giving the LAW is the domain of the Court. The jury is the trier of FACT.

The law may not be argued to the jury as the jury is not empowered to decide what the law is. That has been an established part of United States common law since SCOTUS handed down its holding in Sparf and Hansen v. United States in 1895.

Case Law is the Common Law of the United States. It is law. The United States uses the Common Law system of law.

You must argue law to the Court. Arguing the law to a jury is forbidden as a matter of law.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/156/51/case.html

U.S. Supreme Court

Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)

Syllabus at 51:

In the courts of the United States, it is the duty of the jury, in criminal cases, to receive the law from the court, and to apply it as given by the court, subject to the condition that, by a general verdict, a jury of necessity determines both law and fact as compounded in the issue submitted to them in the particular case.

Opinion of the Court at 64:

The general question as to the duty of the jury to receive the law from the court is not concluded by any direct decision of this Court. But it has been often considered by other courts and by judges of high authority, and, where its determination has not been controlled by specific constitutional or statutory provisions expressly empowering the jury to determine both law and facts, the principle by which courts and juries are to be guided in the exercise of their respective functions has become firmly established.

Opinion of the Court at 98:

Mr. Justice Curtis well said,

"to carry the clearest implication that in this and all other criminal cases, the jury may be directed by the judge, and that while the object of the statute was to declare that there was other matter of fact besides publication and the innuendoes to be decided by the jury, it was not intended to interfere with the proper province of the judge to decide all matters of law."

http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/common_law.html

Law Library of Congress

Case Law (or Common Law)

When your legal research involves case law (or common law), it is important to know something about the significance of precedents or the doctrine of stare decisis, which refers to “adhering to or abiding by” settled decisions. Simply put, lower courts are bound to follow decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdiction. For example, a federal district court in Maryland is required to follow the decisions of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, but it is not bound by the decisions of other district courts or by the Maryland state courts.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law

Common law (also known as case law or precedent) is law developed by judges through decisions of courts and similar tribunals that decide individual cases, as opposed to statutes adopted through the legislative process or regulations issued by the executive branch.

nolu chan  posted on  2015-03-18   19:26:55 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#145. To: nolu chan (#132)

uries will never hear any such argument that drug laws are unconstitutional because judges will not allow it as a defence. It is not allowed as a defense because it is contrary to law and constitutes no defense. There is a difference between arguing to a jury and a defense.

The reason lower courts will not permit arguments against the constitutionality of drug laws be made by the defence to juries is not pertinent to my response in this discussion. No law may be argued to the jury. Giving the LAW is the domain of the Court. The jury is the trier of FACT.

The law may not be argued to the jury as the jury is not empowered to decide what the law is.

A K A Stone- It seems after Lincolns civil war that you were not in favor of. Fruit was born. In the fact that we now have a supreme court telling us to do things that are in violation of the constitution. We are supposed to judge the law also. That is what I will do if I am on a jury and no one can stop me. Mr. Chan do you support juries being told they can't judge the law? Or do you agree with the below where John Jay the first Supreme Court Justice says that we are supposed to judge the law. How dare the jury infringe on the fourth branch of government or the people or you might even consider us the first branch of government.

our first Chief Justice, John Jay, told jurors: "You have a right to take upon yourselves to judge [both the facts and law]." In 1805, one of the charges against Justice Samuel Chase in his impeachment trial was that he wrongly prevented an attorney from arguing to a jury that the law should not be followed.

Judicial acceptance of nullification began to wane, however, in the late 1800s. In 1895, in United States v Sparf, the U. S. Supreme Court voted 7 to 2 to uphold the conviction in a case in which the trial judge refused the defense attorney's request to let the jury know of their nullification power.

law2.umkc.edu/faculty/pro...zenger/nullification.html

A K A Stone  posted on  2015-03-18   22:17:20 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#157. To: A K A Stone (#145) (Edited)

In 1805, one of the charges against Justice Samuel Chase in his impeachment trial was that he wrongly prevented an attorney from arguing to a jury that the law should not be followed.

Justice Chase Impeachment Trial Statement re impeachment Article 1

8 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, Second Session

[101]

HISTORY OF CONGRESS.

Trial of Judge Chase.

TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE. Monday, February 4, 1805.

About a quarter before ten o’clock the Court was opened by proclamation, all the members of the Senate, thirty-four, attending.

The Chamber of the Senate, which is very extensive, was soon filled with spectators, a large portion of whom consisted of ladies, who continued, with little intermission, to attend during the whole course of the trial.

The oath prescribed was administered to Mr. Bayard, Mr. Cocke, Mr. Gaillard, and Mr. Stone, members of the Court, who were not present when it was before administered.

Ordered, That the Secretary give notice to the House of Representatives that the Senate are in their public chamber, and are ready to proceed on the trial of Samuel Chase; and that seats are provided for the accommodation of the members.

In a few minutes the Managers, viz: Messrs, J. Randolph, Rodney, Nicholson, Boyle, G. W. Campbell, Early, and Clark, accompanied by the House of Representatives in Committee of the Whole, entered and took their seats.

Samuel Chase being called to make answer to the articles of impeachment, exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, appeared, attended by Messrs. Harper, Martin, and Hopkisson, his counsel; to whom seats were assigned.

The President, after stating to Mr. Chase the indulgence of lime which had been allowed, inquired if he was prepared to give in his answer?

Mr. Chase said, he had prepared it, as well as circumstances would permit; and submitted the following motion:

“Samuel Chase moves for permission to read his answer, by himself and his counsel, at the bar of this honorable Court.”

The President asked him if it was the answer on which he meant to rely? to which he replied in the affirmative.

The motion being agreed to by a vote of the Senate, Mr. Chase commenced the reading of his answer, (in which he was assisted by Messrs. Harper, and Hopkinson,) as follows:

This respondent, in his proper person, comes into the said Court, and protesting that there is no high crime or misdemeanor particularly alleged in the said articles of impeachment, to which he is, or can be bound by law to make answer; and saving to himself now, and at all times hereafter, all benefit of exception to the insufficiency of the said articles, and each of them, and to the defects therein appearing in point of law, or otherwise; and protesting also, that he ought not to be injured in any manner, by any words, or by any want of form in this his answer; he submits the following facts and observations by way of answer to the said articles.

The first article relates to his supposed misconduct in the trial of John Fries, for treason, before the circuit court of the United States at Philadelphia, in April and May 1800; and alleges that he presided at that trial, and that “unmindful of the solemn duties of his office, and contrary to the [102] sacred obligation by which he stood bound to discharge them faithfully and impartially, and without respect to persons,” he did then, “in his judicial capacity, conduct himself in a manner highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust.”

This general accusation, too vague in itself for reply, is supported by three specific charges of misconduct:

1st “In delivering an opinion, in writing, on the question of law, on the construction of which, the defence of the accused materially depended:” which opinion, it is alleged, tended to prejudice the minds of the jury against the case of the said John Fries, the prisoner, before counsel had been heard in his favor.

2d. “In restricting the counsel for the said John Fries, from recurring to such English authorities, as they believed apposite; or from citing certain statutes of the United States, which they deemed illustrative of the positions, upon which they intended to rest the defence of their client.”

3d. “In debarring the prisoner from his Constitutional privilege of addressing the jury (through his counsel) on the law, as well as on the fact, which was to determine his guilt or innocence, and at the same time endeavoring to wrest from the jury their indisputable right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of law, as well as the question of fact, involved in the verdict which they were required to give.”

This first article then concludes, that in consequence of this irregular conduct of this respondent, ‘’ the said John Fries was deprived of the right secured to him by the eighth article amendatory of the Constitution, and was condemned to death, without having been heard by counsel, in his defence.”

By the eighth article amendatory of the Constitution, this respondent supposes is meant the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which secures to the accused, in all criminal prosecutions, the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.

In answer to these three charges, the respondent admits that the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, was held at Philadelphia, in that district, in the months of April and May, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred, at which court John Fries, the person named in the said first article, was brought to trial on an indictment for treason against the United States; and that this respondent then held a commission as one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, by virtue of which office he did, pursuant to the laws of the United States, preside at the above-mentioned trial, and was assisted therein by Richard Peters, Esq., then, and still district judge of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania; who, as directed by the laws of the United States, sat as assistant judge at the said trial.

With respect to the opinion, which is alleged to have been delivered by this respondent, at the above-mentioned trial, he begs leave to lay before this honorable Court the true state of that [103] transaction, and to call its attention to some facts and considerations, by which his c6nduct on that subject will, he presumes, be fully justified.

The Constitution of the United States, in the third section of the third article, declares that “treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.”

By two acts of Congress, the first passed on the third day of March, 1791, and the second on the eighth day of May, 1792, a duty was imposed on spirits distilled within the United States, and on stills; and various provisions were made for its collection.

In the year 1794, an insurrection took place in four of the western counties of Pennsylvania, With a view of resisting, and preventing by force the execution of these two statutes; and a circuit court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, for the district of Pennsylvania, in the month of April, in the year 1795, by William Patterson, Esq., then one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United Slates, and the above mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, two persons, who had been concerned in the above-named insurrection, namely, Philip Vigol and John Mitchel, were indicted for treason, of levying war against the United States, by resisting and preventing by force the execution of the two last mentioned acts of Congress; and were, after a full and very solemn trial, convicted of the indictments and sentenced to death. They were afterwards pardoned by George Washington, then President of the United States.

In the first of these trials, that of Vigol, the defence of the prisoner was conducted by very able counsel, one of whom, William Lewis, Esq., is the same person who appeared as counsel for John Fries, in the trial now under consideration. Neither that learned gentleman, nor his able colleague, than thought proper to raise the question of law, “whether resisting and preventing by armed force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, be a levying of war against the United States,” according to the true meaning of the Constitution? Although a decision of this question in the negative, must have acquitted the prisoner. But in the next trial, that of Mitchell, this question was asked on the part of the prisoner, and was very fully and ably discussed by his counsel; and it was solemnly determined by the court, both the judges concurring, “that to resist or prevent by armed force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, is a levying of war against the United States, and consequently is treason, within the true meaning of the Constitution.” The decision, according to the best established principles of our jurisprudence, became a precedent for all courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction; a precedent which, although not absolutely obligatory, ought to be viewed with very great respect, especially by the court in which it was made, and ought never to be departed from, but on the fullest and clearest conviction of its incorrectness.

[104] On the 9th of July, an act of Congress was passed, providing for a valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, and an enumeration of slaves throughout the United States; and directing the appointment of commissioners and assessors for carrying it into execution: and on the 4th day of July, in the same year, a direct tax was laid by another act of Congress of that date, on the lands, dwelling-houses, and slaves, so to be valued and enumerated.

In the months of February and March, A. D. 1799, an insurrection took place in the counties of Bucks and Northampton, in the State of Pennsylvania, for the purpose of resisting and preventing by force, the execution of the two last mentioned acts of Congress, and particularly that for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses. John Fries, the person mentioned in the article of impeachment now under consideration, was apprehended and committed to prison, as one of the ringleaders of this insurrection; and at a circuit court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, in the month of April, A, D. 1799, he was brought to trial for this offence, on an indictment for treason, by levying war against the United States, before James Iredell, Esq., then one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, who presided in the said court, according to law, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States; for the district of Pennsylvania, who sat in the said circuit court as assistant judge.

In this trial, which was conducted with great solemnity, and occupied nine days, the prisoner was assisted by William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, Esqs., two very able and eminent counsellors; the former of whom, William Lewis, is the person who assisted, as above mentioned in conducting the defence “of Vigol, on a similar indictment. These gentlemen, finding that the facts alleged were fully and undeniably proved, by a very minute and elaborate examination of witnesses, thought proper to rest the case of the prisoner on the question of law which had been determined in the cases of Vigol and Mitchel, above-mentioned, and had then been acquiesced in, but which they thought proper again to raise. They contended, “that to resist by force of arms a particular law of the United States, does not amount to levying war against the United States, within the true meaning of the Constitution, and therefore is not treason, but a riot only.” This question they argued at great length and with all the force of their learning and genius; and after a full discussion at the bar, and the most mature deliberation by the court, the learned and excellent judge who then presided, and who was no less distinguished by his humanity and tenderness towards persons tried before him, than by his extensive knowledge and great talents as a lawyer, pronounced the opinion of himself and his colleague, “that to resist, or prevent by force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, does amount to levying war against them, within the true meaning of the Constitution, and does, [105] therefore, constitute the crime of treason:” thereby adding the weight of another and more solemn decision to the precedent which had been established in the above-mentioned cases of Vigol and Mitchel.

Under this opinion of the court on the question of law, the jury, having no doubt as to the facts, found the said John Fries guilty of treason on the above-mentioned indictment. But a new trial was granted by the court, not by reason of any doubt as to the correctness of the decision on the question of law, but solely on the ground, as this respondent hath understood and believes, that one of the jurors of the petit jury, after he was summoned, but before he was sworn on the trial, had made some declaration unfavorable to the prisoner.

The yellow fever having appeared in Philadelphia in the Summer of the year 1799, the above mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, did, according to law, appoint the next circuit court of that district, to be held at Norristown therein: Pursuant to which appointment, a circuit court was held at Norristown aforesaid, in and for the said district, on the 11th day of October, in the last mentioned year, before Bushrod Washington. Esq., then one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the above mentioned Richard Peters; at which court no proceedings were had on the aforesaid indictment against John Fries, because, as this respondent hath been informed and believes, the commission of the marshal of the district had expired before he summoned the jurors to attend at the said court, and had not been renewed; by reason of which no legal panel of jurors could be formed.

On the 11th day of April, 1800, and from that day until the 2d day of May in the same year, a circuit court of the United States was held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, before this respondent, then one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the above mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United Slates for the district of Pennsylvania. At this court the indictment on which the said John Fries had been convicted as above-mentioned, was quashed ex officio by William Rawle, Esq., then attorney of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, and a new indictment was by him preferred against the said John Fries, for treason of levying war against the United States, by resisting and preventing by force in the manner above set forth, the execution of the above-mentioned acts of Congress, for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, and the enumeration of slaves, and for levying and collecting a direct tax. This indictment of which a true copy, marked No. 1, is herewith exhibited by this respondent, who prays that it may be taken as part of this his answer, being found by the grand jury on the 16th day of April, 1800, the said John Fries was on the same day arraigned thereon, and plead not guilty. William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, Esqrs., the same [106] persons who had conducted his defence at his former trial, were again at his request assigned by the court as his counsel; and his trial was appointed to be had on Tuesday the 22d day of the last mentioned month of April.

After this indictment was found by the grand jury, this respondent considered it with great care and deliberation, and finding from the three overt acts of treason which it charged, that the question of law arising upon it was the same question which had already been decided twice in the same court, on solemn argument and deliberation, and once in that very case, he considered the law as settled by those decisions, with the correctness of which, on full consideration, he was entirely satisfied; and by tbe authority of which he should have deemed himself bound, even had he regarded the question as doubtful in itself. They are moreover in perfect conformity with the uniform tenor of decisions in the courts of England and Great Britain, from the Revolution in 1688 to the present time, which, in his opinion, added greatly to their weight and authority.

And surely he need not urge to this honorable Court, the correctness, the importance, and the absolute necessity of adhering to principles of law once established, and of considering the law as finally settled, after repeated and solemn decisions by courts of competent jurisdiction. A contrary principle would unsettle the basis of our whole system of jurisprudence, hitherto our safeguard and our boast; would reduce the law of the land, and subject the rights of the citizen to the arbitrary will, the passions, or the caprice, of the judge in each particular case, and would substitute the varying opinions of various men, instead of that fixed, permanent rule, in which the very essence of law consists. If this respondent erred in regarding this point as settled, by the repeated and solemn adjudications of his predecessors in the same court and in the same case; if he erred in supposing that a principle established by two solemn decisions was obligatory upon him, sitting in the same court where those decisions had been made; if he erred in believing that it would be the highest presumption in him to set up his opinion and judgment over that of his colleague, who had twice decided the same question, and of two of his predecessors, who justly rank among the ablest judges that have ever adorned a court; if in all this he erred, it is an error of which he cannot be ashamed, and which he trusts will not be deemed criminal in the eyes of this honorable Court, of his country, or of that posterity by which he, his accusers, and his judges, must one day be judged.

Under the influence of these considerations this respondent drew up an opinion on the law, arising from the overt acts stated in the said indictment, which was conformable to the decisions before given as above-mentioned, and which he sent to his colleague the said Richard Peters for his consideration. That gentleman returned it to this respondent, with some amendments affecting the form only, but not in any manner touching the substance.

[107] The opinion, thus agreed to, this respondent thought it proper to communicate to the prisoner’s counsel; several reasons concurred in favor of this communication. In the first place this respondent considered himself and the court as bound by the authority of the former decisions, especially the last of them, which was on the same case. He considered the law as settled, and had every reason to believe that his colleague viewed it in the same light. It was not suggested or understood that any new evidence was to be offered; and he knew that if any should be offered, which could vary the case, it would render wholly inapplicable both the opinion and the former decisions on which it was founded. And he could not and did not suppose that the prisoner’s counsel would be desirous of wasting very precious time, in addressing to the court an useless argument on a point which that court held itself precluded from deciding in their favor. He therefore conceived that it would be rendering the counsel a service, and a favor to apprize them beforehand of the view which the court had taken of the subject, so as to let them see in time the necessity of endeavoring to produce new testimony, which might vary the case, and take it out of the authority of former decisions.

Secondly, there were more than one hundred civil causes then depending in the said court, as appears by the exhibit marked No. 1, which this respondent prays may be taken as part of this, his answer. Many of those causes had already been subjected to great delay, and it was the peculiar duty of this respondent, as presiding judge, to take care that as little time as possible should be unnecessarily consumed, and that every convenient and proper dispatch should be given to the business of the citizens. He did believe that an early communication of the court’s opinion might tend to the saving of time, and consequently to the dispatch of business.

Thirdly, as the court held itself bound by the former decisions, and could not therefore alter its opinion in consequence of any argument; and as it was the duty of the court to charge the jury on the law in all cases submitted to their consideration, he knew that this opinion must not only be made known at some period or other of the trial, but must at the end of the trial be expressly delivered to the jury by him in a charge from the bench: and he could not suppose and cannot yet imagine, that an opinion, which was to be thus solemnly given in charge to the jury at the close of the trial, could make any additional impression on their minds from the circumstance of its being intimated to the counsel before the trial began, in the hearing of those who might be afterwards sworn on the jury.

And lastly, it was then his opinion, and still is, that it is the duty of every court of this country, and was his duty on the trial now under consideration, to guard the jury against erroneous impressions respecting the laws of the land. He well knows that it is the right of juries in criminal cases to give a general verdict of acquittal, which cannot be set aside on account of its being [108] contrary to law, and that hence results the power of juries to decide on the law as well as on the facts in all criminal cases. This power he holds to be a sacred part of our legal privileges, which he never has attempted, and never will attempt to abridge or to obstruct. But he also knows, that in the exercise of this power, it is the duty of the jury to govern themselves by the laws of the land, over which they have no dispensing power; and their right to expect and receive from the court all the assistance which it can give for rightly understanding the law. To withhold this assistance in any manner whatever; to forbear to give it in that way which may be most effectual for preserving the jury from error and mistake, would be an abandonment or forgetfulness of duty, which no judge could justify to his conscience or to the laws. In this case, therefore, where the question of law arising on the indictment had been finally settled by authoritative decisions, it was the duty of the court, and especially of this respondent as presiding judge, early to apprize the counsel and the jury of these decisions, and their effect, so as to save the former from the danger of making an improper attempt to mislead the jury in a matter of law, and the jury from having their minds preoccupied by erroneous impressions.

It was for these reasons that on the 22d day of April, 1800, when the said John Fries was brought into court, and placed in the prisoners’ box for trial, but before the petit jury were empanelled to try him, this respondent informed the above-mentioned William Lewis, one of his counsel, the aforesaid Alexander James Dallas not being then in court, “that the court had deliberately considered the indictment against John Fries for treason, and the three several overt acts of treason; stated therein: That the crime of treason was defined by the Constitution of the United States. That as the Federal Legislature had the power to make, alter, or repeal laws, so the judiciary only had the power, and it was their duty, to declare, expound and interpret the Constitution and laws of the United States, That it was the duty of the Court, in all criminal cases, to state to the petit jury their opinion of the law arising on the facts; but the petit jury, in all criminal cases, were to decide both the law and the facts, on a consideration of the whole case. That there must be some constructive exposition of the terms used in the Constitution, “levying war against the United States.” That the question, what acts amounted to levying war against the United States, or the Government thereof, was a question of law, and had been decided by Judges Patterson and Peters, in the cases of Vigol and Mitchel, and by Judges Iredell and Peters, in the case of John Fries, prisoner at the bar, in April 1799. That Judge Peters remained of the same opinion, which he had twice before delivered, and he, this respondent, on long and great consideration, concurred in the opinion of Judges Patterson, Iredell, and Peters. That to prevent unnecessary delay, and to save time on the trial of John Fries, and to prevent a delay of justice, in the great number of civil causes depending [109] for trial at that terra, the court had drawn up in writing, their opinion of the law, arising on the overt acts stated in the indictment against John Fries; and had directed David Caldwell, their clerk, to make out three copies of their opinion, one to be delivered to the attorney of the district, one to the counsel for the prisoner, and one to the petit jury, after they shall have been empanelled and heard the indictment read to them by the clerk, and after the district attorney should have stated to them the law on the overt acts alleged in the indictment, as it appeared to him.”

After these observations, this respondent delivered one of the above mentioned copies to the aforesaid William Lewis, then attending as one of the prisoner’s counsel; who read part of it, and then laid it down on the table before him. Some observations were then made on the subject, by him and the above-mentioned Alexander James Dallas, who had then come into court; but this respondent doth not now recollect those observations, and cannot undertake to state them accurately.

And this respondent further saith, that the paper marked exhibit No. 2, and herewith exhibited, which, he prays leave to make part of this his answer, is a true copy of the original opinion, drawn up by him and concurred in by the said Richard Peters, as above set forth, which original opinion is now in the possession of this respondent, ready to be produced to this honorable Court. He may have erred in forming this opinion, and in the time and manner of making it known to the counsel for the prisoner. If he erred in forming it, he erred in common with his colleague and with two of his predecessors; and he presumes to hope that an error which has never been deemed criminal in them, will not be imputed as a crime to him who was led into it by their example and their authority. If he erred in the time and manner of making known his opinion, he feels a just confidence, that when the reasons which he has alleged for his conduct, and by which it seemed to him to be fully justified, shall come to be carefully weighed, they will be sufficient to prove, if not that this conduct was perfectly regular and correct, yet that he might sincerely have considered it as right; and that in a case where so much doubt may exist, to have committed a mistake, is not to have committed a crime.

And this respondent further answering insists, that the opinion thus delivered to the prisoner’s counsel, viz: that “any insurrection or rising of any body of people within the United States, for the purpose of resisting or preventing by force or violence, under any pretence whatever, the execution of any statute of the United States, for levying or collecting taxes, or for any other object of a general or national concern, is levying war against the United States, within the contemplation and true meaning of the Constitution of the United States,” is a legal and correct opinion, supported not only by the two previous decisions above-mentioned, but also by the plainest principles of law and reason, and by the uniform tenor of legal adjudications in England and Great Britain, from the Revolution in 1688 to this time.

[110] It ever was, and now is his opinion, that the peace and safety of the National Federal Government must be endangered by any other construction of the terms “levying war against the United States,” used by the Federal Constitution; and be is confident that no judge of the Federal Government, no judge of a superior State court, nor any gentleman of established reputation for legal knowledge, would or could deliberately give a contrary opinion.

If, however, this opinion were erroneous, this respondent would be far less censurable than his predecessors, by whose example he was led astray, and by whose authority he considered himself bound. Was it an error to consider himself bound by the authority of their previous decisions? If it were, he was led into the error by the uniform course of judicial proceedings, in this country and in England, and is supported in it, by one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence. Can such an error be a crime or misdemeanor?

If, on the other hand, the opinion be in itself correct, as he believes and insists that it is, could the expression of a correct opinion on the law, wherever and however made, mislead the jury, infringe their rights, or give an improper bias to their judgments? Could truth excite improper prejudice? Could the jury be less prepared to hear the law discussed, and to decide on it correctly, because it was correctly stated to them by the court? And is not that a new kind of offence, in this country at least, which consists in telling the truth, and giving a correct exposition of the law?

As to the second specific charge adduced in support of the first article of impeachment, which accuses this respondent, “of restricting the counsel for the said Fries, from recurring to such English authorities as they believed apposite, or from citing certain statutes of the United States, which they deemed illustrative of the positions upon which they intended to rest the defence of their client,” this respondent admits that he did, on the above-mentioned trial, express it as his opinion to the aforesaid counsel for the prisoners, that the decisions in England, in cases of indictments for treason at common law, against the person of the King, ought not to be read to the jury, on trials for treason under the Constitution and statutes of the United States; because such decisions could not inform, but might mislead and deceive the jury: that any decisions on cases of treason, in the courts of England, before the Revolution of 1688, ought to have very little influence in the courts of the United States; that he would permit decisions in the courts of England or of Great Britain, since the said Revolution, to be read to the court or jury, for the purpose of showing what acts have been considered by those courts, as a constructive levying of war against the King of that country, in his legal capacity, but not against his person; because levying war against his Government was of the same nature as levying war against the Government of the United States: but that such decisions, nevertheless, [111] were not to be considered as authorities binding on the courts and juries of this country, but merely in the light of opinions entitled to great respect, as having been delivered after full consideration, by men of great legal learning and ability.

These are the opinions which he did, on that occasion, deliver to the counsel for the prisoner, and which he then thought, and still thinks, it was his duty to deliver. The counsellors admitted to practice in any court of justice are, in his opinion, and according to universal practice, to be considered as officers of such courts, and ministers of justice therein, and as such subject to the direction and control of the court, as to their conduct in its presence, and in conducting the defence of criminals on trial before it. As counsel, they owe to the person accused, diligence, fidelity, and secrecy, and to the court and jury, due and correct information, according to the best of their knowledge and ability, on every matter of law which they attempt to adduce in argument. The court, on the other hand, hath power, and is bound in duty, to decide and direct what evidence, whether by record or by precedents of the decisions in courts of justice, is proper to be admitted for the establishment of any matter of law or fact. Consequently, should counsel attempt to read to a jury, as a law still in force, a statute which had been repealed, or a decision which had been reversed, or the judgments of courts in countries whose laws have no connexion with ours, it would be the duty of the court to interpose, and prevent such an imposition from being practised on the jury. For these reasons, this respondent thinks that his conduct was correct, in expressing to the counsel for Fries, the opinions stated above. He is not bound to answer here for the corectness of those principles, though he thinks them incontestable; but merely for the correctness of his motives in delivering them. A contrary opinion would convert this honorable Court, from a Court of Impeachment into a Court of Appeals; and lead directly to the strange absurdity, that whenever the judgment of an inferior court should be reversed on appeal or writ of error, the judges of that court must be convicted of high crimes and misdemeanors, and turned out of office: that error in judgment is a punishable offence, and that crimes may be committed without any criminal intention. Against a doctrine so absurd and mischievous, so contrary to every notion of justice hitherto entertained, so utterly subversive of all that part of our system of jurisprudence, which has been wisely and humanely established for the protection of innocence, this respondent deems it his duty now, and on every fit occasion, to enter his protest and lift up his voice; and he trusts that in the discharge of this duty, infinitely more important to his country than to himself, he shall find approbation and support in the heart of every American, of every man throughout the world, who knows the blessings of civil liberty, or respects the principles of universal justice.

It is only, then, for the correctness of his motives in delivering these opinions, that he can now be called to answer; and this correctness ought to [112] be presumed, unless the contrary appear by some direct proof, or some violent presumption, arising from his general conduct on the trial, or from the glaring impropriety of the opinion itself. For he admits that cases may be supposed, of an opiuion delivered by a judge, so palpably erroneous, unjust, and oppressive, as to preclude the possibility of its having proceeded from ignorance or mistake.

Do the opinions now under consideration bear any of these marks? This honorable Court need not be informed that there has existed in England no such thing as treason at common law, since the year 1350, when the statute of the 25th Edward III, chap. 2, declaring what alone should in future be judged treason, was passed. Is it perfectly clear that decisions made before that statute, four hundred and fifty years ago, when Eugland, together with the rest of Europe, was still wrapped in the deepest gloom;of ignorance and barbarism—When the system of English jurisprudence was still in its infancy—when law, justice, and reason, were perpetually trampled under foot by feudal oppression and feudal anarchy—when, under an able and vigorous monarch, everything was adjudged to be treason which he thought fit to call so, and, under a weak one, nothing was considered as treason which turbulent, powerful, and rebellious nobles thought fit to perpetrate—is it perfectly clear that decisions, made at such a time, and under such circumstances, ought to be received by the courts of this country as authorities to govern their decisions, or lights to guide the understanding of juries? Is it perfectly clear that decisions made in England, on the subject of treason, before the Revolution of 1688, by which alone the balance of the English constitution was adjusted, and the English liberties were fixed on a firm basis; decisions made either during the furious civil wars in which two rival families contended for the Crown; when in the vicissitudes of war, death and confiscation, in the forms of law, continually walked in the train of the victors, and actions were treasonable or praiseworthy, according to the preponderance of the party by whose adherents they were perpetrated; during the reigns of three able and arbitrary monarchs who succeeded this dreadful conflict, and relaxed or invigorated the law of treason, according to their anger, their policy, or their caprice; or during those terrible struggles between the principles of liberty, not yet well defined or understood, on one hand, and arbitrary power, insinuating itself under the forms of the constitution, on the other; struggles which presented at some times the wildest anarchy, at others, the extremes of servile submission, and, after having brought one king to the scaffold, ended in the expulsion of another from his throne;—is it clear that decisions on the law of treason, made in times like those, ought not only to be received as authorities, in the courts of this country, but also to have great influence on their decisions? Is it clear that; decisions made in England, as to what acts will amount to levying war against the king, personally, and not against his government, are applicable to the Constitution and laws of this country?

[113] Is it clear that such English decisions on the subject of treason as are applicable to our Constitution and laws, are to be received in our courts, not merely as the opinions of learned and able men, which may enlighten their judgment, but as authorities which ought to govern absolutely their decisions? Is all this so clear that a judge could not honestly and sincerely have thought the contrary? that he could not have expressed an opinion to the contrary without corrupt and improper motives? If it be not thus clear, then must it be admitted that this respondent, sincerely and honestly, and in the best of his judgment, considered these decisions as wholly inadmissible, or admissible only for the purposes and to the extent which he pointed out.

And if he did not so consider them, was it not his duty to prevent them from being read to the jury, except under those restrictions, and for those purposes? Would his duty-permit him to sit silently, and see the jury imposed on and misled? To sit silently and hear a book read to them as containing the law, which he knew did not contain the law? Such silence would have rendered him a party to the deception, and would have justly subjected him to all the contumely which a conscientious and courageous discharge of his duty has so unmeritedly brought on his name.

With respect to the statutes of the United States, which he is charged with having prevented the prisoner’s counsel from citing on the aforesaid trial, he denies that he prevented any act of Congress from being cited either to the court or jury on the said trial, or declared at any time that he would not permit the prisoner’s counsel to read to the jury or to the court any act of Congress whatever. Nor does he remember or believe that he expressed on the said trial any disapprobation of the conduct of the circuit court, before whom the said case was first tried, in permitting the act of Congress relating to crimes less than treason commonly called the Sedition Act, to be read to the jury. He admits indeed that he was then and still is of opinion that the said act of Congress was wholly irrelevant to the issue, in the trial of John Fries, and therefore ought not to have been read to the jury, or regarded by them. This opinion may be erroneous, but he trusts that the following reasons on which it was founded will be considered by this honorable court as sufficiently strong to render it possible, and even probable, that such an opinion might be sincerely held and honestly expressed: 1. That Congress, did not intend by the Sedition law to define the crime of treason by “levying war.” Treason and sedition are crimes very distinct in their nature, and subject to very different punishments—the former by death, and the latter by fine and imprisonment. 2. The Sedition law makes a combination or conspiracy, with intent to impede the operation of any law of the United States, or the advising or attempting to procure any insurrection or riot, a high misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment; but a combination or conspiracy with intent to prevent the execution of a law, or with intent to raise an insurrection for that purpose, or even with [114] intent to commit treason, is not treason by “levying war” against the United States, unless it be followed by an attempt to carry such combination or conspiracy into effect, by actual force or violence. 3. The Constitution of the United States is the fundamental and supreme law, and, having defined the crime of treason, Congress could not give any Legislative interpretation or exposition of that crime, or of the part of the Constitution by which it is defined. 4. The Judicial authority of the United States is alone vested with power to expound their Constitution and laws.

And this respondent further answering saith, that after the above-mentioned proceedings had taken place in the said trial, it was postponed until the next day, (Wednesday, April 23, 1800,) when, at the meeting of the court, this respondent told both the above-mentioned counsel for the prisoner, that, “to prevent any misunderstanding of anything that had passed the day before, he would inform them, that, although the court retained the same opinion of the law, arising on the overt acts charged in the indictment against Fries, yet the counsel would be permitted to offer arguments to the court, for the purpose of showing them that they were mistaken in the law; and that the court, if satisfied that they had erred in opinion, would correct it; and also that the counsel would be permitted to argue before the petit jury that the court were mistaken in the law.” And this respondent added, that the court had given no opinion as to the facts in the case, about which both the counsel had declared that there would be no controversy. After some observations by the said William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, they both declared to the court, “that they did not any longer consider themselves as the counsel for John Fries, the prisoner.” This respondent then asked the said John Fries, whether he wished the court to appoint other counsel for his defence? He refused to have other counsel assigned; in which he acted, as this respondent believes and charges, by the advice of the said William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas: whereupon, the court ordered the trial to be had on the next day, Thursday, the 24th of April, 1800.

On that day the trial was proceeded in; and before the jurors were sworn, they were, by the direction of the court, severally asked on oath, whether they were in any way related to the prisoner, and whether they had ever formed or delivered any opinion as to his guilt or innocence, or that he ought to be punished? Three of them answering in the affirmative, were withdrawn from the panel. The said John Fries was then informed by the court, that he had a right to challenge thirty-five of the jury, without showing any cause of challenge against them, and as many more as he could show cause of challenge against. He did accordingly challenge peremptorily thirty-four of the jury, and the trial proceeded. In the evening, the Court adjourned till the next day, Friday, the 25th of April; when after the district attorney had stated the principal facts proved by the witnesses, and had applied the law to those [115] facts, this respondent, with the concurrence of his colleague, the said Richard Peters, delivered to the jury the charge contained and expressed in exhibit marked No. 3, and herewith filed, which he prays may be taken as part of this his answer.

Immediately after the petit jury had delivered their verdict, this respondent informed the said Fries, from the bench, that if he, or any person for him, could show any legal ground, or sufficient cause to arrest the judgment, ample time would be allowed him for that purpose. But no cause being shown, sentence of death was passed on the said Fries, on Tuesday, the 2d day of May, 1800, the last day of the term; and he was afterwards pardoned by John Adams, then President of the United States.

And this respondent further answering saith, that if the two instances of misconduct, first stated in support of the general charge, contained in the first article of impeachment, were true as alleged, yet the inference drawn from them, viz: “that the said Fries was thereby deprived of the benefit of counsel for his defence,” is not true. He insists that the said Fries was deprived of the benefit of counsel, not by any misconduct of this respondent, but by the conduct and advice of the above-mentioned William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, who having been, with their own consent, assigned by the court as counsel for the prisoner, withdrew from his defence, and advised him to refuse other counsel when offered to him by the court, under pretence that the law had been prejudged, and their liberty of conducting the defence, according to their own judgment, improperly restricted by this respondent; but in reality because they knew the law and the facts to be against them, and the case to be desperate, and supposed that their withdrawing themselves under this pretence, might excite odium against the court; might give rise to an opinion that the prisoner had not been fairly tried; and in the event of a conviction, which from their knowledge of the law and the facts they knew to be almost certain, might aid the prisoner in an application to the President for a pardon. That such was the real motive of the said prisoner’s counsel, for depriving their client of legal assistance on his trial, this respondent is fully persuaded, and expects to make appear, not only from the circumstances of the case, but from their own frequent and public declarations.

As little can this respondent be justly charged with having, by any conduct of his, endeavored to “wrest from the jury their indisputable right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of law as well as the question of fact involved in the verdict which they were required to give.” He denies that he did at any time declare that the aforesaid counsel should not at any time address the jury, or did in any manner hinder them from addressing the jury on the law as well on the facts arising in the case. It was expressly stated in the copy of his opinion delivered as above set forth to William Lewis, that the jury had a right to determine the law as well as the fact; and the said William Lewis and Alexander James [116] Dallas were expressly informed, before they declared their resolution to abandon the defence, that they were at liberty to argue the law to the jury. This respondent believes that the said William Lewis did not read the opinion delivered to him as aforesaid, except a very small part at the beginning of it, and of course, acted upon it without knowing its contents; and that the said Alexander James Dallas read no part of the said opinion until about a year ago, when he saw a very imperfect copy, made in court by a certain W. S. Biddle.

And this respondent further answering, saith; that according to the Constitution of the United States, civil officers thereof, and no other persons, are subject to impeachment; and they only for treason, bribery, corruption, or other high crime or misdemeanor, consisting in some act done or omitted, in violation of some law forbidding or commanding it; on conviction of which act, they must be removed from office; and may, after conviction, be indicted and punished therefor, according to law. Hence, it clearly results, that no civil officer of the United States can be impeached, except for some offence for which he may be indicted at law: and that no evidence can be received on an impeachment, except such as on an indictment at law, for the same offence, would be admissible. That a judge cannot be indicted or punished according to law, for any act whatever, done by him in his judicial capacity, and in a matter of which he has jurisdiction, through error of judgment merely, without corrupt motives, however manifest his error may be, is a principle resting on the plainest maxims of reason and justice, supported by the highest legal authority, and sanctioned by the universal sense of mankind. He hath already endeavored to show, and he hopes with success, that all the opinions delivered by him in the course of the trials now under consideration were correct in themselves, and in the time and manner of expressing them; and that even admitting them to have been incorrect, there was such strong reason in their favor, as to remove from his conduct every suspicion of improper motives. If these opinions were incorrect, his mistake in adopting them, or in the time or manner of expressing them, cannot be imputed to him as an offence of any kind, much less as a high crime and misdemeanor, for which he ought to be removed from office; unless it can be shown by clear and legal evidence, that he acted from corrupt motives. Should it be considered that some impropriety is attached to his conduct, in the time and mode of expressing any of these opinions; still he apprehends, that a very wide difference exists between such impropriety, the casual effect of human infirmity, and a high crime and misde meanor for which he may be impeached, and must, on conviction, be removed from office.

Finally, this respondent having thus laid before this honorable Court a true state of his case, so far as respects the first article of impeachment, declares, upon the strictest review of his conduct during the whole trial of John Fries for treason, that he was not on that occasion unmindful of [117] the solemn duties of his office as judge; that he faithfully and impartially, and according to the best of his ability and understanding, discharged those duties towards the said John Fries; and that he did not in any manner, during the said trial, conduct himself arbitrarily, unjustly, or oppressively, as he is accused by the honorable the House of Representatives.

And the said Samuel Chase, for the plea to the said first article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said first article is alleged; and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

nolu chan  posted on  2015-03-19   19:21:40 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


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