[Home]  [Headlines]  [Latest Articles]  [Latest Comments]  [Post]  [Mail]  [Sign-in]  [Setup]  [Help]  [Register] 

AI is exhausting the power grid. Tech firms are seeking a miracle solution.

Rare Van Halen Leicestershire, Donnington Park August 18, 1984 Valerie Bertinelli Cameo

If you need a Good Opening for black, use this.

"Arrogant Hunter Biden has never been held accountable — until now"

How Republicans in Key Senate Races Are Flip-Flopping on Abortion

Idaho bar sparks fury for declaring June 'Heterosexual Awesomeness Month' and giving free beers and 15% discounts to straight men

Son of Buc-ee’s co-owner indicted for filming guests in the shower and having sex. He says the law makes it OK.

South Africa warns US could be liable for ICC prosecution for supporting Israel

Today I turned 50!

San Diego Police officer resigns after getting locked in the backseat with female detainee

Gazan Refugee Warns the World about Hamas

Iranian stabbed for sharing his faith, miraculously made it across the border without a passport!

Protest and Clashes outside Trump's Bronx Rally in Crotona Park

Netanyahu Issues Warning To US Leaders Over ICC Arrest Warrants: 'You're Next'

Will it ever end?

Did Pope Francis Just Call Jesus a Liar?

Climate: The Movie (The Cold Truth) Updated 4K version

There can never be peace on Earth for as long as Islamic Sharia exists

The Victims of Benny Hinn: 30 Years of Spiritual Deception.

Trump Is Planning to Send Kill Teams to Mexico to Take Out Cartel Leaders

The Great Falling Away in the Church is Here | Tim Dilena

How Ridiculous? Blade-Less Swiss Army Knife Debuts As Weapon Laws Tighten

Jewish students beaten with sticks at University of Amsterdam

Terrorists shut down Park Avenue.

Police begin arresting democrats outside Met Gala.

The minute the total solar eclipse appeared over US

Three Types Of People To Mark And Avoid In The Church Today

Are The 4 Horsemen Of The Apocalypse About To Appear?

France sends combat troops to Ukraine battlefront

Facts you may not have heard about Muslims in England.

George Washington University raises the Hamas flag. American Flag has been removed.

Alabama students chant Take A Shower to the Hamas terrorists on campus.

In Day of the Lord, 24 Church Elders with Crowns Join Jesus in His Throne

In Day of the Lord, 24 Church Elders with Crowns Join Jesus in His Throne

Deadly Saltwater and Deadly Fresh Water to Increase

Deadly Cancers to soon Become Thing of the Past?

Plague of deadly New Diseases Continues

[FULL VIDEO] Police release bodycam footage of Monroe County District Attorney Sandra Doorley traffi

Police clash with pro-Palestine protesters on Ohio State University campus

Joe Rogan Experience #2138 - Tucker Carlson

Police Dispersing Student Protesters at USC - Breaking News Coverage (College Protests)

What Passover Means For The New Testament Believer

Are We Closer Than Ever To The Next Pandemic?

War in Ukraine Turns on Russia

what happened during total solar eclipse

Israel Attacks Iran, Report Says - LIVE Breaking News Coverage

Earth is Scorched with Heat

Antiwar Activists Chant ‘Death to America’ at Event Featuring Chicago Alderman

Vibe Shift

A stream that makes the pleasant Rain sound.


Status: Not Logged In; Sign In

United States News
See other United States News Articles

Title: No, a public university may not expel students for racist speech
Source: [None]
URL Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ ... el-students-for-racist-speech/
Published: Mar 10, 2015
Author: Eugene Volokh
Post Date: 2015-03-10 12:28:51 by A K A Stone
Keywords: None
Views: 6092
Comments: 43

Some Oklahoma University students in the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity were videorecorded singing (as best I and others can tell),

There will never be a nigger at SAE There will never be a nigger at SAE You can hang him from a tree But he’ll never sign with me There will never be a nigger at SAE

Oklahoma University president David Boren said, “If I’m allowed to, these students will face suspension or expulsion.” But he is not, I think, allowed to do that.

1. First, racist speech is constitutionally protected, just as is expression of other contemptible ideas; and universities may not discipline students based on their speech. That has been the unanimous view of courts that have considered campus speech codes and other campus speech restrictions — see here for some citations. The same, of course, is true for fraternity speech, racist or otherwise; see Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University (4th Cir. 1993). (I set aside the separate question of student speech that is evaluated as part of coursework or class participation, which necessary must be evaluated based on its content; this speech clearly doesn’t qualify.)

2. Likewise, speech doesn’t lose its constitutionally protection just because it refers to violence — “You can hang him from a tree,” “the capitalists will be the first ones up against the wall when the revolution comes,” “by any means necessary” with pictures of guns, “apostates from Islam should be killed.”

3. To be sure, in specific situations, such speech might fall within a First Amendment exception. One example is if it is likely to be perceived as a “true threat” of violence (e.g., saying “apostates from Islam will be killed” or “we’ll hang you from a tree” to a particular person who will likely perceive it as expressing the speaker’s intention to kill him); but that’s not the situation here, where the speech wouldn’t have been taken by any listener as a threat against him or her. Another is if it intended to solicit a criminal act, or to create a conspiracy to commit a criminal act, but, vile as the “hang him from a tree” is, neither of these exceptions are applicable here, either.

4. Some people have suggested that the speech may be evidence of discriminatory decisionmaking by the fraternity in admitting members. A university may demand that groups to which it provides various benefits not discriminate in admissions. See Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010). Indeed, nondiscrimination rules are applicable to groups generally, even apart from any benefits they get; much depends on whether the groups are seen as small and selective enough to be covered by a right to “intimate association,” and on whether apply antidiscrimination law to the groups would interfere with the groups’ expression of their ideas, and thus burden their right to “expressive associations.” See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees (1983); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000). The university might thus be able to discipline students who (a) are involved in a fraternity’s admissions decisions, and (b) can be shown to have denied membership to people based on race, or intentionally tried to communicate to potential members that they would deny them membership that way. I don’t think that a discussion saying that discrimination ought to take place, or even that at some unspecified time it will take place, would suffice to constitute a violation of the antidiscrimination rules, though it might be used as evidence in a future case where discrimination against a particular applicant might be alleged.

But even if the group is found to have discriminated against black applicants, and some particular members were found to have participated in that decision, the penalty for that has to be based on the penalties that are actually meted out to people who violate this rule. If discrimination by a group generally leads to a fine against the group, or a reprimand of the participants, or even derecognition of the group, the university can’t then expel students who engage in the same action but who also engage in constitutionally protected speech — that sort of disparate treatment shows that the school is really punishing people for their speech, not for their conduct.

This is a familiar principle from antidiscrimination law: if a black student is expelled based on conduct for which white students are generally just mildly reprimanded, the law recognizes that the expulsion was based on the student’s race, not just the student’s punishable conduct. The conduct in that situation is being used in large part as a pretext for race discrimination. Likewise, if SAE members are expelled based on conduct for which people who didn’t engage in SAE’s speech would generally just be mildly reprimanded, the expulsion would be based on the speech, not the members’ punishable conduct, which would just be pretext for punishing students for the ideas they were expressing to each other.

5. Of course, this just applies to the university. It certainly makes sense that the national fraternity may suspend the student chapter, and that other fraternity or sorority organizations refuse to deal with the chapter (or even its students). Fraternities, at least in principle, aim to promote certain principles of morality and behavior, such as the national SAE’s True Gentleman creed:

The True Gentleman is the man whose conduct proceeds from good will and an acute sense of propriety, and whose self-control is equal to all emergencies; who does not make the poor man conscious of his poverty, the obscure man of his obscurity, or any man of his inferiority or deformity; who is himself humbled if necessity compels him to humble another; who does not flatter wealth, cringe before power, or boast of his own possessions or achievements; who speaks with frankness but always with sincerity and sympathy; whose deed follows his word; who thinks of the rights and feelings of others, rather than his own; and who appears well in any company, a man with whom honor is sacred and virtue safe.

SAE may quite rightly insist that people who so sharply depart from such principles no longer use SAE’s name. (I don’t think a university may suspend a fraternity just based on its speech, but that question is likely rendered moot by national SAE’s actions here.) Likewise, I imagine that the fraternity members’ speech will more generally affect their social lives and their professional lives, as some people choose not to do business with them in the future. (In some states, even private employers are limited in their ability to discriminate against employees or job applicants based on their speech, but that’s true only in some states and generally only as to employment; and, rightly or wrongly, such discrimination often happens without the applicant’s even knowing that it’s happening.) How long this sort of misbehavior should dog a person is an interesting ethical question, but in any event it’s pretty clear that the offending students are going to pay a substantial social and likely economic price for their actions.

Under the First Amendment, though, the government — including Oklahoma University — generally cannot add to this price, whether the offensive speech is racist, religiously bigoted, pro-revolutionary, or expressive of any other viewpoint, however repugnant it might be.

Post Comment   Private Reply   Ignore Thread  


TopPage UpFull ThreadPage DownBottom/Latest

Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 17.

#3. To: A K A Stone (#0)

The university did just expel those students.

So, as an act of power, they certainly can do it.

Now, the question is whether they can make it stick. And the answer is: probably. For what can the students do to force their way back in, other than sue?

And when they do, that will be the center of attention on them for the next 5 years. If they take the expulsion and disappear, they will be able to rehabilitate themselves somewhere, eventually. But if they sue, then this event will be the center of their lives for the next several years, and their chances of ever overcoming it will be vastly diminished.

So, they've been expelled, and they won't sue, and that will be that.

There will be no civil rights organization ready to take on THIS tar-baby of a case.

Constitutional? Unconstitutional? It will never be tested in court. Fait accompli: the students are expelled, and that is that.

Vicomte13  posted on  2015-03-10   14:59:27 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#7. To: Vicomte13 (#3)

I'm sure the school has a code of conduct which addresses this. Based on that, the expulsions will stick.

redleghunter  posted on  2015-03-11   0:17:23 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#10. To: redleghunter, Vicomte13, A K A Stone (#7)

I'm sure the school has a code of conduct which addresses this. Based on that, the expulsions will stick.

I am sure the school has a code of conduct as well. The students apparently violated it. Whoever recorded the video/audio may have done so as well.

Expulsion for disciplinary reasons triggers the constitutional right to notice and a hearing. Government imposition of a stigma accompanied by an expulsion or dismissal meets the stigma plus requirement to trigger the constitutional due process rights as well.

The summary expulsion may not stick. The issue will be due process. Has the student been afforded timely notice and the constitutional right to be heard at a hearing? Does the student's presence endanger persons or property or threaten disruption of the academic process justifying immediate removal from school, (with the necessary notice and hearing to follow as soon as practicable).

It's a State school. The accused must be given a hearing with notice and an opportunity to be heard. If the school has not provided due process, this expulsion will fail. They must afford the required due process.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/419/565/case.html

U.S. Supreme Court

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)

Goss v. Lopez

No. 73-898

Argued October 16, 1974

Decided January 22, 1975

419 U.S. 565

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Syllabus

Appellee Ohio public high school students, who had been suspended from school for misconduct for up to 10 days without a hearing, brought a class action against appellant school officials seeking a declaration that the Ohio statute permitting such suspensions was unconstitutional and an order enjoining the officials to remove the references to the suspensions from the students' records. A three-judge District Court declared that appellees were denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because they were "suspended without hearing prior to suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter," and that the statute and implementing regulations were unconstitutional, and granted the requested injunction.

Held:

1. Students facing temporary suspension from a public school have property and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 419 U. S. 572-576.

(a) Having chosen to extend the right to an education to people of appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred, and must recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause, and that may not be taken away for misconduct without observing minimum procedures required by that Clause. Pp. 419 U. S. 573-574.

(b) Since misconduct charges, if sustained and recorded, could seriously damage the students' reputation, as well as interfere with later educational and employment opportunities, the State's claimed right to determine unilaterally and without process whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the Due Process Clause's prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Pp. 419 U. S. 574-575.

(c) A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis and may not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process

Page 419 U. S. 566

Clause. Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation is so insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary. Pp. 419 U. S. 575-576.

2. Due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his version. Generally, notice and hearing should precede the student's removal from school, since the hearing may almost immediately follow the misconduct, but if prior notice and hearing are not feasible, as where the student's presence endangers persons or property or threatens disruption of the academic process, thus justifying immediate removal from school, the necessary notice and hearing should follow as soon as practicable. Pp. 419 U. S. 577-584.

372 F.Supp. 1279, affirmed.

Re free speech, see:

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/410/667/case.html

U.S. Supreme Court

Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)

Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri

No. 72-794

Decided March 19, 1973

410 U.S. 667

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Expulsion of student for distributing on campus a publication assertedly containing "indecent speech" proscribed by a bylaw of a state university's Board of Curators held an impermissible violation of her First Amendment free speech rights, since the mere dissemination of ideas on a state university campus cannot be proscribed in the name of "conventions of decency."

Certiorari granted; 464 F.2d 136, reversed.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, a graduate student in the University of Missouri School of Journalism, was expelled for distributing on campus a newspaper "containing forms of indecent speech" [Footnote 1] in violation of a bylaw of the Board of Curators. The newspaper, the Free Press Underground, had been sold on this state university campus for more than four years pursuant to an authorization obtained from the University Business Office. The particular newspaper issue in question was found to be unacceptable for two reasons. First, on the front cover, the publishers had reproduced a political cartoon previously printed in another newspaper depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. The caption under the cartoon read: ". . . With Liberty and Justice for All." Secondly, the issue contained an article entitled "M___f___ Acquitted," which discussed the trial and acquittal on an assault

Page 410 U. S. 668

charge of a New York City youth who was a member of an organization known as "Up Against the Wall, M___f___."

Following a hearing, the Student Conduct Committee found that petitioner had violated Par. B of Art. V of the General Standards of Student Conduct, which requires students "to observe generally accepted standards of conduct," and specifically prohibits "indecent conduct or speech." [Footnote 2] Her expulsion, after affirmance first by the Chancellor of the University and then by its Board of Curators, was made effective in the middle of the spring semester. Although she was then permitted to remain on campus until the end of the semester, she was not given credit for the one course in which she made a passing grade. [Footnote 3]

After exhausting her administrative review alternatives within the University, petitioner brought an action

Page 410 U. S. 669

for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. She claimed that her expulsion was improperly premised on activities protected by the First Amendment. The District Court denied relief, 331 F.Supp. 1321, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 464 F.2d 136. Rehearing en banc was denied by an equally divided vote of all the judges in the Eighth Circuit.

The District Court's opinion rests, in part, [Footnote 4] on the conclusion that the banned issue of the newspaper was obscene. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide that question. Instead, assuming that the newspaper was not obscene and that its distribution in the community at large would be protected by the First Amendment, the court held that, on a university campus, "freedom of expression" could properly be "subordinated to other interests, such as, for example, the conventions of decency in the use and display of language and pictures." Id. at 145. The court concluded that "[t]he Constitution does not compel the University . . . [to. allow] such publications as the one in litigation to be publicly sold or distributed on its open campus." Ibid.

This case was decided several days before we handed down Healy v. James,408 U. S. 169 (1972), in which, while recognizing a state university's undoubted prerogative

Page 410 U. S. 670

to enforce reasonable rules governing student conduct, we reaffirmed that "state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment." Id. at 408 U. S. 180. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,393 U. S. 503 (1969). We think Healy makes it clear that the mere dissemination of ideas -- no matter how offensive to good taste -- on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of "conventions of decency." Other recent precedents of this Court make it equally clear that neither the political cartoon nor the headline story involved in this case can be labeled as constitutionally obscene or otherwise unprotected. E.g., Kois v. Wisconsin,408 U. S. 229 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson,405 U. S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California,403 U. S. 15 (1971). [Footnote 5] There is language in the opinions below which suggests that the University's action here could be viewed as an exercise of its legitimate authority to enforce reasonable regulations as to the time, place, and manner of speech and its dissemination. While we have repeatedly approved such regulatory authority, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 192-193, the facts set forth in the opinions below show clearly that petitioner was expelled because of the disapproved content of the newspaper, rather than the time, place, or manner of its distribution. [Footnote 6]

Page 410 U. S. 671

Since the First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to the content of speech, and because the state University's action here cannot be justified as a nondiscriminatory application of reasonable rules governing conduct, the judgments of the courts below must be reversed. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the case is remanded to the District Court, and that court is instructed to order the University to restore to petitioner any course credits she earned for the semester in question and, unless she is barred from reinstatement for valid academic reasons, to reinstate her as a student in the graduate program.

[...]

nolu chan  posted on  2015-03-12   0:26:16 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#12. To: nolu chan (#10)

The summary expulsion may not stick. The issue will be due process.

The issue will really be whether or not the students seek a process at all.

If they don't fight, there's no issue. There's only an issue if they fight.

If they fight and win, the victory will be Pyrrhic.

Vicomte13  posted on  2015-03-12   9:00:04 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#14. To: Vicomte13, redleghunter (#12)

If they don't fight, there's no issue. There's only an issue if they fight.

If they fight and win, the victory will be Pyrrhic.

It will not be a fight. It will be ritual slaughter in the courtroom if due process was denied. The violation of the rights of the students will be the only material issue.

The plaintiff prevailing on a complaint of violation of constitutional rights would not by a Pyrrhic victory. The expulsion would be null and void upon summary judgment. The merits of the charge against the students will not be an issue.

The speech, regardless of how repulsive, is protected by the First Amendment. The expulsion must be based on their conduct and not on the content of their speech. Boren said, I hope that students involved in this incident will learn from this experience and realize that it is wrong to use words to hurt, threaten, and exclude other people. A racist chant on a Kappa Kappa Kappa bus cannot be construed as being to hurt, threaten, or exclude any of the OU members of KKK. The chant was apparently heard live only by those on the bus. The chant allegedly impacted the entire university community because some unidentified person distributed a video through social media. Legislator cum executive Boren appeared to indicate he was offended by the content of their speech. That was a death blow to his own case.

In Iota XI v George Mason University, the District Court granted summary judgment against GMU on the grounds that they had violated the protected free speech rights of the students. GMU appealed, claiming there remained factual issues which should have been weighed. In affirming, the Circuit Court stated, "the district court was correct in concluding that there was no outstanding issue of material fact."

The Circuit Court stated, citing GMU affidavits, "Importantly, the affidavits establish that the punishment was meted out to the Fraternity because its boorish message had interfered with the described University mission. It is manifest from these circumstances that the University officials thought the Fraternity intended to convey a message. The Fraternity members' apology and post-conduct contriteness suggest that they held the same view."

Importantly, OU statements go to the same point and the students apoligized with post-conduct contriteness, almost as if they were aware of this court opinion.

The Court also stated, "We must emphasize, as have other courts, that "the manner of [its action] cannot consist of selective limitations upon speech." And, "The University should have accomplished its goals in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its viewpoint. The decision of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED."

Iota XI v George Mason University, 4th Cir 91-2684, 993 F2d 386 (1993)

993 F.2d 386 (1993)

IOTA XI CHAPTER OF SIGMA CHI FRATERNITY; John Howlin; John Singsank, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY; Kenneth E. Bumgarner, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 91-2684.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 4, 1992.
Decided May 10, 1993.

[387] Paul Joseph Forch, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, VA, argued (Mary Sue Terry, Atty. Gen., H. Lane Kneedler, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., R. Claire Guthrie, Deputy Atty. Gen., Martha M. Parrish, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), for defendants-appellants.

Victor Michael Glasberg, Victor M. Glasberg & Associates, Alexandria, VA, argued, Jeanne Goldberg, Victor M. Glasberg & Associates, Alexandria, VA, Michael P. McDonald, Center for Individual Rights, Washington, DC, Stephen B. Pershing, ACLU of Virginia, Richmond, VA, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before WIDENER and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge.

OPINION

SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge:

George Mason University appeals from a summary judgment granted by the district court to the IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity[1] in its action for declaratory judgment and an injunction seeking to nullify sanctions imposed on it by the University because it conducted an "ugly woman contest" with racist and sexist overtones. We affirm.

I

Sigma Chi has for two years held an annual "Derby Days" event, planned and conducted both as entertainment and as a source of funds for donations to charity. The "ugly woman contest," held on April 4, 1991, was one of the "Derby Days" events. The Fraternity staged the contest in the cafeteria of the student union. As part of the contest, eighteen Fraternity members were assigned to one of six sorority teams cooperating in [388] the events. The involved Fraternity members appeared in the contest dressed as caricatures of different types of women, including one member dressed as an offensive caricature of a black woman. He was painted black and wore stringy, black hair decorated with curlers, and his outfit was stuffed with pillows to exaggerate a woman's breasts and buttocks. He spoke in slang to parody African-Americans.

There is no direct evidence in the record concerning the subjective intent of the Fraternity members who conducted the contest. The Fraternity, which later apologized to the University officials for the presentation, conceded during the litigation that the contest was sophomoric and offensive.

Following the contest, a number of students protested to the University that the skit had been objectionably sexist and racist. Two hundred forty-seven students, many of them members of the foreign or minority student body, executed a petition, which stated: "[W]e are condemning the racist and sexist implications of this event in which male members dressed as women. One man in particular wore a black face, portraying a negative stereotype of black women."

On April 10, 1991, the Dean for Student Services, Kenneth Bumgarner, discussed the situation with representatives of the objecting students. That same day, Dean Bumgarner met with student representatives of Sigma Chi, including the planners of and participants in the "ugly woman contest." He then held a meeting with members of the student government and other student leaders. In this meeting, it was agreed that Sigma Chi's behavior had created a hostile learning environment for women and blacks, incompatible with the University's mission.

The Dean met again with Fraternity representatives on April 18, and the following day advised its officers of the sanctions imposed. They included suspension from all activities for the rest of the 1991 spring semester and a two-year prohibition on all social activities except pre-approved pledging events and pre-approved philanthropic events with an educational purpose directly related to gender discrimination and cultural diversity. The University's sanctions also required Sigma Chi to plan and implement an educational program addressing cultural differences, diversity, and the concerns of women. A few weeks later, the University made minor modifications to the sanctions, allowing Sigma Chi to engage in selected social activities with the University's advance approval.

On June 5, 1991, Sigma Chi brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[2] against the University and Dean Bumgarner. It requested declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to nullify the sanctions as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Sigma Chi moved for summary judgment on its First Amendment claims on June 28, 1991, filing with its motions numerous affidavits explaining the nature of the "ugly woman contest." Also submitted were large glossy photographs of the participants as they appeared in the skits, including photographs of the Fraternity member depicting the offensive caricature of the black woman.

In addition to the affidavit of Dean Bumgarner explaining his meetings with student leaders, the University submitted the affidavits of other officials, including that of University President George W. Johnson and Vice-President Earl G. Ingram. President Johnson, by his affidavit, presented the "mission statement" of the University:

(3) George Mason University is committed to promoting a culturally and racially diverse student body.... Education here is not limited to the classroom.

(4) We are committed to teaching the values of equal opportunity and equal treatment, respect for diversity, and individual dignity.

(5) Our mission also includes achieving the goals set forth in our affirmative action [389] plan, a plan incorporating affirmative steps designed to attract and retain minorities to this campus.

.... (7) George Mason University is a state institution of higher education and a recipient of federal funds.

Vice President Earl G. Ingram's affidavit represented:

(6) The University's affirmative action plan is a part of an overall state plan designed, in part, to desegregate the predominately "white" and "black" public institutions of higher education in Virginia.... The behavior of the members of Sigma Chi that led to this lawsuit was completely antithetical to the University's mission, as expressed through its affirmative action statement and other pertinent University policies, to create a non-threatening, culturally diverse learning environment for students of all races and backgrounds, and of both sexes.

(7) While the University has progressed in attracting and retaining minority students, it cannot expect to maintain the position it has achieved, and make further progress on affirmative action and minority issues that it wishes to make, if behavior like that of Sigma Chi is perpetuated on this campus.

The district court granted summary judgment to Sigma Chi on its First Amendment claim, 773 F.Supp. 792 (E.D.Va.1991).

II

The University urges that the district court's grant of summary judgment was premature. It stresses that there remain factual issues which the district court should have weighed in its conclusion. According to the University, the Fraternity's intent in staging the contest is crucial to the issue of whether its conduct was expressive. The University also stresses that if given time it could demonstrate more completely the harm the contest caused to its educational mission. It is, of course, beyond cavil that summary judgment should not be granted while a viable issue of material fact remains. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment principles require the court to find that the evidence is such that a jury could not reasonably find for the party opposing summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of a suit under the applicable law preclude entry of summary judgment.

In our view, for the reasons that follow, the district court was correct in concluding that there was no outstanding issue of material fact.

III

We initially face the task of deciding whether Sigma Chi's "ugly woman contest" is sufficiently expressive to entitle it to First Amendment protection. From the mature advantage of looking back, it is obvious that the performance, apart from its charitable fund-raising features, was an exercise of teenage campus excess. With a longer and sobering perspective brought on by both peer and official disapproval, even the governing members of the Fraternity recognized as much. The answer to the question of whether the First Amendment protects the Fraternity's crude attempt at entertainment, however, is all the more difficult because of its obvious sophomoric nature.

A

First Amendment principles governing live entertainment are relatively clear: short of obscenity, it is generally protected. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2460, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (nude dancing); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1245-47, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975) (musical "Hair"); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 999 (4th Cir.1985) (blackface performance), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2278, 90 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986). As the Supreme Court announced in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), "[e]ntertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment ... fall [390] within the First Amendment guarantee." Id. at 65, 101 S.Ct. at 2180. Expression devoid of "ideas" but with entertainment value may also be protected because "[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S.Ct. 665, 667, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948).

Thus, we must determine if the skit performed by Sigma Chi comes within the constitutionally protected rubric of entertainment. Unquestionably, some forms of entertainment are so inherently expressive as to fall within the First Amendment's ambit regardless of their quality. For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), the Supreme Court flatly ruled that "[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment." Id. at 790, 109 S.Ct. at 2753. Justice Kennedy explained:

Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato's discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state. The Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order.

Id. (citations omitted).

Motion pictures, too, are included within the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment. The Court emphasized in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952), that "[t]he importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform." Id. at 501, 72 S.Ct. at 780; see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (motion picture theaters involve communication protected by the First Amendment, but the state can regulate their secondary effects).

Even crude street skits come within the First Amendment's reach. In overturning the conviction of an amateur actor for wearing a military uniform in violation of a federal statute, the Supreme Court discussed the statute's "theatrical production" exception.[3] Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61-62, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 1558-59, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 (1970). Responding to the Government's argument that the amateur skit was not a "theatrical production," Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated:

It may be that the performances were crude and amateurish and perhaps unappealing, but the same thing can be said about many theatrical performances. We cannot believe that when Congress wrote out a special exception for theatrical productions it intended to protect only a narrow and limited category of professionally produced plays.

Id. Although this part of the opinion related to interpretation of the involved statute, Justice Black proceeded to declare that an actor participating in even a crude performance enjoys the constitutional right to freedom of speech. Id. at 63, 90 S.Ct. at 1559.

Bearing on this dichotomy between low and high-grade entertainment are the Supreme Court's holdings relating to nude dancing. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., ___ U.S. at ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2460, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2180-81, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-33, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2568-69, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116-18, 93 S.Ct. 390, 395-97, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972). Most recently, in Barnes, the Supreme Court conceded that nude dancing is expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment protection.[4] Barnes, ___ U.S. at ___, [391] 111 S.Ct. at 2460. In Barnes, the Court reviewed a Seventh Circuit opinion authored by Judge Flaum, Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991), which thoroughly analyzed the questions of whether and how nude dancing is expression entitled to First Amendment protection. The Miller opinion noted that dance is inherently expressive entertainment, as it conveys emotions and ideas. Judge Flaum refused to distinguish "high" art from "low" entertainment on the asserted basis that low entertainment "fail[s] to communicate a defined intellectual thought." Id. at 1086. Applying the test enunciated in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2539, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989),[5] he concluded that nude dancing communicated a message of eroticism and sensuality, understood by its viewers as such. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1087. Thus, notwithstanding its artistic quality, nude dancing was sufficiently expressive to entitle it to First Amendment protection. Justice White's dissent in Barnes echoed Judge Flaum's opinion:

"[W]hile the entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it may not differ in substance from the dance viewed by the person who ... wants some `entertainment' with his beer or shot of rye."

Barnes, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2475, 115 L.Ed.2d at 529 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21 n. 3 (2d Cir.1974), modified sub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975)).

In sum, although the Barnes plurality did not explore these views, it appears that the low quality of entertainment does not necessarily weigh in the First Amendment inquiry. It would seem, therefore, that the Fraternity's skit, even as low-grade entertainment, was inherently expressive and thus entitled to First Amendment protection. See Barnes, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2460; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2180-81, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61-62, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 1558, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 (1970).

B

The University nevertheless contends that discovery will demonstrate that the contest does not merit characterization as a skit but only as mindless fraternity fun, devoid of any artistic expression. It argues further that entitlement to First Amendment protection exists only if the production was intended to convey a message likely to be understood by a particular audience. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2539, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). From the summary judgment record, the University insists, it is impossible to discern the communicative intent necessary to imbue the Fraternity's [392] conduct with a free speech component.

As indicated, we feel that the First Amendment protects the Fraternity's skit because it is inherently expressive entertainment. Even if this were not true, however, the skit, in our view, qualifies as expressive conduct under the test articulated in Texas v. Johnson. It is true that the Johnson test for determining the expressiveness of conduct requires "'[a]n intent to convey a particularized message'" and a great likelihood "`that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.'" Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 2730, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974)). As Johnson and Spence point out, however, the intent to convey a message can be inferred from the conduct and the circumstances surrounding it. Thus viewed, the University's argument is self-defeating. The affidavit from the University's Vice-President, Earl Ingram, stated that the message conveyed by the Fraternity's conduct — that racial and sexual themes should be treated lightly — was completely antithetical to the University's mission of promoting diversity and providing an educational environment free from racism and sexism. Dean Bumgarner, in his affidavit, stated that the University

does not and cannot condone this type of on-campus behavior which perpetuated derogatory racial and sexual stereotypes, tends to isolate minority students, and creates a hostile and distracting learning environment. Such behavior is incompatible with, and destructive to, the University's mission of promoting diversity within its student body [and] sends a message to the student body and the community that we ... are not serious about hurtful and offensive behavior on campus.

Importantly, the affidavits establish that the punishment was meted out to the Fraternity because its boorish message had interfered with the described University mission. It is manifest from these circumstances that the University officials thought the Fraternity intended to convey a message. The Fraternity members' apology and post-conduct contriteness suggest that they held the same view. To be sure, no evidence suggests that the Fraternity advocated segregation or inferior social status for women. What is evident is that the Fraternity's purposefully nonsensical treatment of sexual and racial themes was intended to impart a message that the University's concerns, in the Fraternity's view, should be treated humorously. From the Fraternity's conduct and the circumstances surrounding it, we have no difficulty in concluding that it intended to convey a message.

As to the second prong of the Johnson test, there was a great likelihood that at least some of the audience viewing the skit would understand the Fraternity's message of satire and humor. Some students paid to attend the performance and were entertained. What the Fraternity did not anticipate was the reaction to their crude humor by other students on campus and University officials who opposed the racist and sexist implications of the Fraternity's skit.

Even considering, therefore, the sparsity of the evidentiary record, we are persuaded that the Fraternity's "ugly woman contest" satisfies the Johnson test for expressive conduct.[6]

IV

If this were not a sufficient response to the University's argument, the principles relating to content and viewpoint discrimination recently emphasized in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), provide a definitive answer. Although the Court in St. Paul reviewed the constitutional effect of a city "hate speech" ordinance, and we review the constitutionality of sanctions imposed for violating University policy, St. Paul's rationale applies here with equal force. Noting that St. Paul's city ordinance prohibited displays [393] of symbols that "arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender," but did not prohibit displays of symbols which would advance ideas of racial or religious equality, Justice Scalia stated: "The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." Id. at ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2541, 2547.

As evidenced by their affidavits, University officials sanctioned Sigma Chi for the message conveyed by the "ugly woman contest" because it ran counter to the views the University sought to communicate to its students and the community.[7] The mischief was the University's punishment of those who scoffed at its goals of racial integration and gender neutrality, while permitting, even encouraging, conduct that would further the viewpoint expressed in the University's goals and probably embraced by a majority of society as well. "The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing ... expressive conduct because of disapproval of the ideas expressed." Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2542 (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406, 109 S.Ct. at 2540).

The University, however, urges us to weigh Sigma Chi's conduct against the substantial interests inherent in educational endeavors. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). The University certainly has a substantial interest in maintaining an educational environment free of discrimination and racism, and in providing gender-neutral education. Yet it seems equally apparent that it has available numerous alternatives to imposing punishment on students based on the viewpoints they express.[8] We agree wholeheartedly that it is the University officials' responsibility, even their obligation, to achieve the goals they have set. On the other hand, a public university has many constitutionally permissible means to protect female and minority students. We must emphasize, as have other courts, that "the manner of [its action] cannot consist of selective limitations upon speech." St. Paul, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2548; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2295, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (invalidating a ban on residential picketing that exempted labor picketing); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 1559, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 (1970) (invalidating a law that allowed wearing military uniforms only in dramatic portrayals that did not "tend to discredit the military"). The First Amendment forbids the government from "restrict[ing] expression because of its message [or] its ideas." Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2289, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). The University should have accomplished its goals in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its viewpoint.

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

nolu chan  posted on  2015-03-12   18:32:08 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#15. To: nolu chan (#14)

Any victory will be Pyrrhic for the individuals. Right now, they're obscure. Fight this in federal court, and they won't be. Walk away, start anew, they will be able to go on with their lives. "Win" and force their way back into the university…and what comes next, for years and years and years, will make the game not worth the candle for them.

Do you know any whistleblowers? I do. They fought. In the end, they "won". Now they can't get employment in anything like what they once had.

An "ugly woman context" is not the same thing as "no niggers will ever get in here". It's fundamentally different. The former is related to the latter by analogy only. The latter IS the issue in our national closet, it IS the birth defect. It's the same in abstract legal thinking. In the real world, it isn't even close.

Vicomte13  posted on  2015-03-12   19:15:23 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#17. To: Vicomte13 (#15)

"Win" and force their way back into the university…and what comes next, for years and years and years, will make the game not worth the candle for them.

Can you calculate that in damages due to the unconstitutional actions of David Boren acting in his official capacity as President of the University? Boren screwed the pooch. He might have to welcome the fraternity back if they want to return.

nolu chan  posted on  2015-03-12   23:43:59 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


Replies to Comment # 17.

#20. To: nolu chan (#17)

Can you calculate that in damages due to the unconstitutional actions of David Boren acting in his official capacity as President of the University? Boren screwed the pooch. He might have to welcome the fraternity back if they want to return.

Nobody can, or will. He didn't force out the fraternity; the fraternity's parent organization shut the chapter. They cannot be forced to reopen it.

If they win, they'll be reinstated at the school, after a bitter public fight, and there names and faces will be known forever, and they'll be doomed.

Disappear into the twilight and be forgotten and move on. The right to sing racist songs is not a hill worth dying on.

Vicomte13  posted on  2015-03-13 08:19:14 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


End Trace Mode for Comment # 17.

TopPage UpFull ThreadPage DownBottom/Latest

[Home]  [Headlines]  [Latest Articles]  [Latest Comments]  [Post]  [Mail]  [Sign-in]  [Setup]  [Help]  [Register] 

Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com