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Opinions/Editorials Title: Avoiding constitutional avoidance Avoiding constitutional avoidance Randy Barnett From questioning today in King v. Burwell, there is quite a buzz that Justice Kennedy appears concerned about whether interpreting the ACA to deny subsidies to citizens of states with federal exchanges would unconstitutionally coerce states to set up their own exchanges. The alleged coercion would result from the damage caused to the insurance markets of these states by the other mandates in the ACA — for example, by “community rating” that restricts the ability of insurance companies to set their rates according to actuarial risk, and “guaranteed issue,” that is, preventing carriers from refusing insurance based on pre-existing conditions. The concern is that, because these provisions absent a subsidy would cause a “death spiral” in those states, states would be unconstitutionally coerced to setting up their own exchanges lest their insurance markets be destroyed. Therefore, it is contended, under the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance,” the ACA should be interpreted to avoid this unconstitutional result and allow the IRS regulation to stand so subsidies will flow to the states. Readers may note that I have not previously opined here on the merits of King v. Burwell. I have remained silent because there were no constitutional issues involved upon which I considered myself expert, and I was not prepared to offer an expert opinion on the statutory construction question presented by the case. I freely admit that I hoped and believed that the challengers of the IRS regulation had the better argument, but I remained open to arguments to the contrary, and was unprepared to take a public position on the question presented. Nor did I file or join any amicus brief in the case. But the invocation of the constitutional avoidance doctrine starts to trench into the constitutional domain in a particularly annoying way. Here are just some of the concerns raised by employing this doctrine now to save the IRS regulation. 1) As a threshold matter, this constitutional concern seems misplaced in the case that is before the Court. First, 8 States filed amicus briefs in support of petitioners, saying they don’t want exchanges OR subsidies — so obviously those States aren’t being “coerced.” Second, neither party in this case has ever raised the constitutional concern, so we lack adversarial briefing on this issue. Third, if the relevant wording of the statute is unambiguous and this wording exposes the statute to constitutional attack in some later case, then so be it. This is similar to later Origination Clause challenges to the “individual insurance mandate” cum “option to buy insurance or pay a modest tax” that could only be brought once it was established that what looked like a Commerce Clause “penalty” was really a noncoercive tax. We must take up these matters one step at a time. 2) But suppose that a State later raises a constitutional coercion claim: How does that support the IRS regulation making the subsidies available on federal exchanges at issue in this case? Assuming there is a “constitutional concern,” what’s the proper remedy? Do you rewrite the statute to make subsidies available in states that don’t establish exchanges, or do you strike down the federal insurance regulations that allegedly create the “death spiral” and threaten to “destroy” state insurance markets unless states set up exchanges? It is the latter expressed and unambiguous regulations that will cause the “coercive” death spiral. To remedy the adverse affect of these regulations, should the Supreme Court judicially authorize billions of dollars in subsidies that Congress refused to authorize? What the Court should not do is decide the case on an issue without the benefit of full briefing and argument. What the Court should not do is rewrite one part of a statute to avoid the “coercion” that is allegedly cause by unambiguous parts of the law that are not presently before the Court. What the Court should not do is refuse to enforce the ACA as written to uphold an IRS regulation that is contrary to the meaning of the ACA in context to redress the onerous consequences of other clear and unambiguous provisions of the ACA.
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#1. To: tpaine (#0)
The Court should strike down the subsidies as contrary to the law as written. Then the Court should just strike down the provision as unconstitutionally coercing states to set up their own exchanges. (What they failed to do in the first place.) Actually, the Feds already tried to coerce the States. The result is the Fed running 37 exchanges. Rather than admit defeat, the Feds violated the law to offer subsidies. SCOTUS will invent a way to uphold the law. This was is lurking and should not be forgotten. The individual mandate as a penalty was found unconstitutional. It was found constitutional as a modest, non-coercive tax. The ACA provides that the non-coercive tax increases automatically. If it increases to a point that it is deemed coercive, then it is unconstitutional.
I don't see any reason why the Court should not expect Congress to fix the problem themselves. Is this not part and parcel of a legislature's duties? If something doesn't work or has problems, they have to fix it. When the Court starts slapping band-aids on badly-written legislation, they've turned themselves into politicians. Worse, they are pols we can't vote out of office and who serve for decades and they are only 9 members, some of whom have been rotting away on the Court for 20-30 years. Beyond that, they lead a life more insular than that of Congress, completely out of touch with the lives that Americans lead day-to-day. By acting as Congress' "fixer", the Court only encourages Congress to drop more half-baked steaming piles of legislation into their laps. The Court was never intended to operate as the final editor of legislation. Nor to rewrite the legislation that was voted on by Congress, the sole basis of the law's legitimacy.
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