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Title: KP student charged with manslaughter in Fairhaven friend’s death; authorities say she encouraged him to commit suicide
Source:
Sun Chronicle
URL Source: http://www.thesunchronicle.com/news ... 30-11e4-ada1-7b43f5417c27.html
Published: Feb 27, 2015
Author: Jim Hand
Post Date: 2015-02-27 18:19:00 by cranky
Keywords: None
Views: 9553
Comments: 44
Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy III A King Philip Regional High School senior has been indicted for involuntary manslaughter, allegedly for urging a friend to commit suicide. She then raised money for mental illness in the name of her friend. Michelle Carter, 18, of Plainville was indicted as a “youthful offender” by a Bristol County grand jury, and was arraigned in New Bedford Juvenile Court. She is accused of urging Conrad Roy III, 18, of Fairhaven and Mattapoisett to kill himself, which he did while idling a truck last July in the parking lot of a Fairhaven Kmart. Authorities said he died of carbon monoxide poisoning. Police found Roy after his family reported him missing. Police went through Roy’s cellphone and allegedly found a number of text messages from Carter, right up until the time he died, when she allegedly urged Roy to go through with the suicide, according to court documents. Fairhaven police Detective Scott Gordon said in a police report: “Not only did Conrad tell Carter in several of his texts prior to his death that he was scared and didn’t want to leave his family, she continued to encourage him to take his own life, and when he actually started to carry out the act, he got scared again and exited his truck, but instead of telling him to stay out of the truck ... Carter told him to ‘get back in.’” The apparent suicide happened last July, but Carter was just indicted Feb. 5 and arraigned the following day. The case had not been previously publicized, and most news organizations don’t regularly cover juvenile court. Gregg Miliote, a spokesman for Bristol County District Attorney Quinn, issued a written statement Thursday outlining the basics of the case. “Based on the totality of the investigation, it is alleged that Ms. Carter had first-hand knowledge of Roy’s suicidal thoughts,” he said. “Instead of attempting to assist him or notify his family or school officials, Ms. Carter is alleged to have strongly influenced his decision to take his own life, encouraged him to commit suicide and guided him in his engagement of activities which led to his death.” He confirmed that Carter called and sent text messages to the victim encouraging him to go through with the suicide. Miliote also said Quinn, the district attorney, has recused himself from involvement in the case because he has a “familial relationship” to the victim. Calls and emails to the Carter family went unanswered Thursday night and no one answered the door at their Plainville home. Carter’s attorney, Joseph P. Cataldo of Franklin, told The Standard-Times of New Bedford Thursday night that she did not commit a crime and that the manslaughter charge probably will be dismissed. “This is terrible tragedy — a young man taking his own life,” he told the Standard-Times. He accused the district attorney’s office of “trying to pin the blame on someone.” “I can’t understand why they brought the charge,” Cataldo said. “They’re trying to claim there is manslaughter, when they freely admit the boy took his own life. You can’t have it both ways.” On Carter’s Facebook page and on the Plainville Athletic League website, postings say she organized a softball tournament last September to raise money for mental health awareness in honor of her friend, Roy. A press release advertising the fundraiser appeared in The Sun Chronicle. The event was called “Homers for Conrad,” and Carter wrote: “life can be tough, but helping others makes it easier.” She also posted several messages on Facebook saying how much she loved her friend and missed him. The Facebook page that was set up for the fundraising event has been taken down and is no longer an active page. However, Carter posted on her Twitter page about the outcome of the fundraiser. “Thank you so much to everyone who came out to support Homers for Conrad! I’m so happy to say that with your help, we raised over $2,300!” Carter posted the message on her Twitter page Sept. 13 under the account @michyc47. She wrote about suicide prevention often on her social media accounts. On Sept. 10, 2014, she posted on her Twitter page: “National Suicide Awareness day, I wish more people understood. I love you and miss you everyday Conrad. Help others #WeCanEndSuicide.” She retweeted the link to a suicide prevention hotline on Sept. 21, 2014. Carter was also a founding member of an organization called Connect-To-Cure, a fundraiser that sells $10 bracelets to raise money for cancer patients at Boston Children’s Hospital. She stopped by the hospital to participate in a charity event, according to an article published in The Plainville Times — three weeks after she was arraigned on the manslaughter charge. Carter was an honor roll student at King Philip Regional High School. The court set bail for Carter at $2,500 and ordered she have no access to the Internet, other than for school work. She must stay off social media and is not allowed to send text messages, other than to her parents. The youthful offender designation she was indicted under means she will be tried in juvenile court, but her trial will be open to the public, unlike typical juvenile cases. Carter was 17 at the time of her friend’s death. Meanwhile, the grandmother of the victim, Janice Roy, said Thursday night she did not want to say too much about the case because it is making the family relive the heartache of Conrad’s death. She did say Conrad was a good kid who had earned his boat captain’s license in only three weeks as he went to work for the family’s marine salvage business. King Philip High School officials today declined to comment on Carter and her indictment for involuntary manslaughter. “The circumstances surrounding this tragic loss are under investigation. Our deepest sympathy is extended to the family and school community of Conrad Roy,” Superintendent Elizabeth Zielinski said. “As an educational institution we are bound by regulations related to the privacy of student records. As such I will not comment on the situation, or discuss anything that is related to any student’s record.” The victim had graduated from Old Rochester Regional High School and was planning to attend Fitchburg State University. His father and paternal grandfather share his name and his love of the ocean. Conrad Roy Jr., the father, was working a tug boat Feb. 19, 2009, when US Airways Flight 1549 went down in the Hudson River. Roy Jr.’s tug was among the first to come to the rescue.
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#4. To: TooConservative (#1)
Maybe aiding or abetting a suicide is a crime in Massachusetts.
The problem is that you have to twist the assisted suicide laws to prosecute her under them. And it might get overturned on appeal.
Thank you for at least instructing him in a nice, CLEAN, peaceful venue for his permanent vacation. So many are selfish and leave a mess.
Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true is that every community gets the kind of law enforcement it insists on. Robert Kennedy
Perhaps a possible defense is a claim that she thought he was just bullshitting her to get attention and she did not believe his texts until after the fact when she found out he was dead.
Not sure if that was her idea. And it may not have been so peaceful. You don't get much carbon monoxide in vehicles built since the Seventies that have catalytic converters. It's likely a choking/smothering kind of death, not the classic falling asleep kind of death from carbon monoxide (where the CO replaces the oxygen in your blood).
This girl has a real future in politics. I have no trouble at all seeing her as a intern on the Hillary for President campaign.
Why is democracy held in such high esteem when it’s the enemy of the minority and makes all rights relative to the dictates of the majority? (Ron Paul,2012)
Maybe that's why they settled on manslaughter.
I might give it a shot. But would that pass the 'reasonable man' standard? I guess it depends on the judge and jury.
All she has to do is go to court and claim he was a "Conservative or TEA Partier" and she'll walk out the door scot free, get a free college education and endorsement deals.
“Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.”
Maybe, maybe not. The question is whether it could sustain reasonable doubt in the mind of at least one juror. Without having seen the texts which may be mostly on a single day, or show a sustained effort, or explain motive, it's difficult to know the strength of the case. They took about 8 months to bring the case and presumably had the texts for about the whole time. The delay indicates it was not a slam dunk and I just threw something out there that could be a potential weakness in the case. I have looked a bit at Connecticut law. It would appear to be the actual charge would be Manslaughter in the Second Degree according to the Connecticut penal code. http://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_952.htm#sec_53a-56 (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: (1) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or (2) he intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide. (b) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony. The Connecticut penal code definition of Man2 appears to be what is commonly called involuntary manslaughter. Sec. 53a-56(a)(1) requires that the actions of the accused were the proximate cause of death. It must be "proved beyond a reasonable doubt that died as a result of the actions of the defendant." A difficulty for this charge would be to prove the suicide was as a direct result of the actions of the defendant. Did the accused contribute to the commission of suicide or did she cause the suicide? Is there proof beyond a reasonable doubt? Sec. 53a-56(a)(2) requires the accused intentionally cause or aid another to commit suicide. The prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, "that the defendant intentionally caused or aided to commit suicide. A person acts 'intentionally' with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such result." A difficulty for this charge would be to prove requisite intent to cause the result. There may well be a plea agreement down to Reckless Endangerment. They may have deliberately overcharged to encourage a plea agreement. Man 2 appears fraught with difficulty. Reckless Endangerment appears much easier to make. http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012-R-0134.htm A Connecticut Class C felony carries 1 to 10 years. Man 2 carries no mandatory minimum. Reckless Endangerment is a Class A misdemeanor and carries up to 1 year. Reckless Endangerment 2 is a Class B misdemeanor which carries up to 6 months. Connecticut law definitions of Reckless Endangerment 1 & 2 http://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_952.htm#sec_53a-63 (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person. (b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor. (1969, P.A. 828, S. 64.) http://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_952.htm#sec_53a-64 (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person. (b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor. (1969, P.A. 828, S. 65.) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endangerment Wikipedia discusses the crime of Reckless Endangerment in general terms. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manslaughter Wikipedia discusses Manslaughter in general terms. Attempted Involuntary Manslaughter was a charge resulting in a Connecticut conviction as a lesser included offense, only to be thrown out by the CT Supreme Court as being nonexistent and logically impossible. State v. Almeda, 189 Conn. 303, 309 (1983). State of Connecticut Jury Instructions re 1st and 2nd degree Reckless Endangerment http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part6/6.3-1.htm Revised to December 1, 2007 The defendant is charged [in count __] with reckless endangerment in the first degree. The statute defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows: For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element 1 - With extreme indifference to human life The first element is that the defendant acted with extreme indifference to human life. "Indifference" means simply not caring. It means lacking any interest in a matter one way or the other. Extreme means existing in the highest or greatest possible degree. Extreme indifference is more than ordinary indifference. It is synonymous with excessive and is the greatest departure from the ordinary. What evinces an extreme indifference to human life is a question of fact. Element 2 - Acted recklessly The second element is that the defendant acted recklessly. A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or circumstances when (he/she) is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstances exist. Element 3 - Created risk of serious physical injury The third element is that the defendant's recklessness created a risk of causing serious physical injury to another person. "Serious physical injury" is something more serious than mere physical injury, which is defined as "impairment of physical condition or pain." It is more than a minor or superficial injury. It is defined by statute as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." It is unnecessary for any person to have been injured by the defendant's conduct or for the defendant to have intended to injure or endanger any person. Conclusion In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant acted with extreme indifference to human life, 2) the defendant's conduct was reckless, and 3) the defendant posed a risk of causing serious physical injury to another person. If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of reckless endangerment in the first degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty. http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part6/6.3-2.htm Revised to December 1, 2007 The defendant is charged [in count __] with reckless endangerment in the second degree. The statute defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows: For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element 1 - Acted recklessly The first element is that the defendant acted recklessly. A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or circumstances when (he/she) is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstances exist. Element 2 - Created risk of physical injury The second element is that the defendant's recklessness created a risk of causing physical injury to another person.1 "Physical injury" means impairment of physical condition or pain. Conclusion In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant acted recklessly, and 2) created a risk of causing physical injury to another person. If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of reckless endangerment in the second degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty. _______________________________________________________ 1 There has to be proof that another person was actually put at risk of physical injury. State v. Thomas, 56 Conn. App. 573, 578, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 953 (2000) (defendant shot a pistol into the ground, but there was no evidence of the presence of other people in the vicinity). Commentary Reckless endangerment in the second degree is not a lesser included offense of assault in the first degree. State v. Fuller, 56 Conn. App. 592, 603-604, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 949, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 911, 121 S. Ct. 262, 148 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2000). Reckless endangerment in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a-64, and reckless driving, General Statutes § 14-222 (a), are separate offenses. "Reckless endangerment involves a risk of physical injury, and reckless driving involves endangering the life of another person. Reckless driving is limited to conduct solely involving the use of a motor vehicle. Reckless endangerment is not so limited." State v. Rudd, 62 Conn. App. 702, 710 (2001). State of Connecticut Jury Instructions re Man 2 http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part5/5.1-4.htm Revised to December 1, 2007 The defendant is charged [in count ___] with manslaughter in the second degree. The statute defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows: For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element 1 - Caused death The first element is that the defendant caused the death of . This means that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the decedent's death. You must find it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that died as a result of the actions of the defendant. Element 2 - Recklessness The second element is that the defendant's actions that resulted in the death of were reckless. A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or circumstances when (he/she) is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstances exist. Conclusion In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant caused the death of , and 2) the defendant's actions that resulted in the death were reckless. If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty. http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part5/5.1-7.htm Revised to December 1, 2007 The defendant is charged [in count ___] with manslaughter in the second degree. The statute defining this offense reads as follows: a person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when (he/she) intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide. For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element 1 - Suicide The first element is that committed suicide. Element 2 - Intent The second element is that the defendant intentionally caused or aided to commit suicide. A person acts "intentionally" with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such result. Conclusion In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) committed suicide, and 2) that the defendant intentionally caused or aided to commit suicide. If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.
The jury instruction makes this hard to get past in this case. Even so, the fact that he exited the pickup until she drove him back into it with further texts seems to demonstrate the reckless indifference. I think I'd flip the coin and put it to a jury. If it doesn't pass muster, so be it. The charges and her role in this matter would not be a secret she could run away from. It would always follow her.
There may be a 1st Amendment defense here, as her only action involved expressing herself.
Though I agree, i'll suggest that a judge or jury will look at this like screaming "fire" in a theater. Speech that can physically hurt someone is not apt to be protected. I look at it this way. The best safety on a firearm is the brain of the weapon holder. All the culpability should rest on the person pulling the trigger. After all, he was the last firearm safety. Whether he shoots himself or another. If he shoots another, charge him criminally. If he shoots himself... sentence served. If he was a child or mentally handicapped (and I mean really mentally handicapped, like drooling on himself retarded) then I'd feel different. This is a slippery slope ideal. If this is widely accepted, then when some nut shoots up a government building because he was told on LF that he should water the tree of liberty with RINO blood, Stone might be getting subpoenaed for IP information on certain posters. Making her culpable at any degree, with just verbal contact, is another venue to remove more freedoms
Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true is that every community gets the kind of law enforcement it insists on. Robert Kennedy
Let's examine it from another angle. They can always say "I didn't think they'd really kill themselves". Let's say you have someone who is suicidal and balanced on a ledge where they can't easily be grabbed or any nets/balloons positioned to catch them if they jump. It's a big skyscraper in NYC. Then, after hours of standoff with the cops trying to talk him down, it hits Twitter and Facebook and a mob of 500 ghouls shows up below him in the street but behind the police lines. They start chanting "Jump! Jump! Jump!...". And he does. Was that an exercise of free speech by a flash mob? You really want to let them get away with it and walk away laughing? You want to let them give an excuse like "I didn't know he was going to jump", "I thought it was a prank", etc.? I'm generally a free speech radical but I don't want to let the flash mob walk away from doing something like that. Free speech is always a slippery slope, as you mention.
That is the question for every defense in every trial. But at least your post explains the manslaughter charge.
It happened one time on LP.
This type thing actually happened, at least a couple of times. A net search turns up 2 instances. Interestingly, the term "ghoul" is also used in one of them. Is this a new internet term?
Yes... But they should stay and help clean the mess. lol
Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true is that every community gets the kind of law enforcement it insists on. Robert Kennedy
With all seriousness, I find it harder to prove any kind of culpability with a large "flash mob" type of group. If someone is ignorant enough to be talked into jumping from a skyscraper... I'm gonna fault just them.
Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true is that every community gets the kind of law enforcement it insists on. Robert Kennedy
I remember it, unless Goldi got another on her own. Got an email from some gov goon wanting IP info for a poster or two who posted something supposedly offensive to whatever level. It wasn't any formal subpoena, but was told one could be provided if necessary. I posted it to the forum. The request was subsequently cancelled. The 2 posters involved did not run away but were willing to defend what they had posted. I sent no information. To the best of my knowledge at the time, publicizing the email was not illegal at all (still the case today). It seems since the info request was withdrawn, that whatever was posted that was found offensive was not actually any true threat whatsoever. Just a case of gov bureaucrats practicing tyranny.
I think they can accompany the subpoena with a national security letter. And that does gag the email/website owner from letting anyone ever know about the subpoena. However, some wiseguys came up with the idea of publishing a list every month of every user that the website had not received a subpoena or national security letter for. So if you checked that list and your handle/email address was not on it, that meant the feds were targeting you. Stone could, for instance, copy this tactic and publish a list every month of all users of LF who had not had their info subpoenaed from him. You have to admire the deviousness and sheer smartassery of this geek maneuver. : ) Apparently there has been some sharp dropoff in the rampant use of these surveillance measures since. However, since the entire internet backbone is so wired at key junctures for full traffic capture, the NSA just drinks directly from the firehose and gobbles down and processes everything and stores the results in their big new datacenter in Utah (and its lesser-known sister facility in Texas). So they don't need the subpoenas and national security letters the way they once did.
If someone is ignorant enough to be talked into jumping from a skyscraper... I'm gonna fault just them. When are you NYC-dwelling Rolling-Stone-reading dirty hippie scofflaws finally going to recognize the public need for proper law enforcement?!?!?! You probably haven't been accused of that too often. Shoe on the other foot, eh? : ) Yeah, there is a slippery slope on free speech.
I wouldn't doubt it.
Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true is that every community gets the kind of law enforcement it insists on. Robert Kennedy
Actually, I was one of those officers that never liked stretching a charge or piling on unneeded charges. More often than not, if bust the balls of one of my subordinates for being a prick.
Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true is that every community gets the kind of law enforcement it insists on. Robert Kennedy
Ghoul was just the first thing that came to mind. Thanks for those links, I had no idea but I suppose it isn't so surprising.
I remember it, That was it, I didn't remember the details.
CORRECTION: When I read the story before, I thought the case was in Connecticut. On further review, it appears to be clear that the case is in Massachusetts. I quoted Connecticut law which does not apply. I apologize for my error. Massachusetts does not define involuntary homicide in its statute law. It is common law as defined in court opinions. The statute defines the punishment for the crime without defining the crime. I cannot readily verify the current precedent in the court opinions. Below is the applicable statute, an excerpted court opinion, and a link to the classic 1944 Welansky opinion which defines one type of involuntary manslaughter, apparently the basis for the instant case. https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIV/TitleI/Chapter265/Section13 http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/407/407mass779.html COMMONWEALTH vs. LOUIS CATALINA. 407 Mass. 779 March 5, 1990 - July 3, 1990 Essex County Present: LIACOS, C.J., WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH, & GREANEY, JJ. Evidence presented to a grand jury that the defendant feloniously distributed heroin to a person who then died from injecting the drug could not, as matter of common law, support an indictment for involuntary manslaughter on the theory of "unlawful-act" manslaughter. [782-783] Discussion of the elements of involuntary manslaughter based on an unlawful act in light of this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 (1982). [783-787] Announcement of the abandonment of the common law crime of involuntary manslaughter based on an unlawful act, except for cases where an unintentional death results from the commission of a battery (Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 404 Mass. 774 [1989]) or from the commission of wanton and reckless conduct (Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 [1944]). [787-789] Evidence presented to a grand jury that the defendant feloniously distributed heroin to a known addict who then died from injecting the drug supported an indictment for involuntary manslaughter under the principles set forth in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (1944). [789-792] [...] GREANEY, J. A grand jury in Essex County returned indictments against the defendant for involuntary manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, Section 13 (1988 ed.), and for the unlawful distribution of a class A controlled substance, namely heroin, G. L. c. 94C, Section 32 (a) (1988 ed.). The indictments stemmed from testimony before the grand jury of the defendant’s sale of heroin to Grace Randazza and her death after use of the heroin. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the manslaughter indictment on various grounds, including an assertion that the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to justify the return of an indictment for involuntary manslaughter. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160 , 163 (1982). A judge of the Superior Court did not rule on the motion to dismiss. Instead, acting pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, 378 Mass. 905 -906 (1979), [Note 1] the judge reported the following two questions to the Appeals Court: “1. Was the evidence presented to the Grand Jury sufficient to support an indictment for manslaughter under the principle of ‘unlawful act-manslaughter’? “2. Was the evidence presented to the Grand Jury sufficient to support an indictment for manslaughter under the principles of Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (1944) (wanton and reckless conduct)?” [Note 2] [...] 1. Unlawful-act manslaughter. The first reported question asks whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to support the defendant’s prosecution for manslaughter under the theory of so-called unlawful-act manslaughter. The indictment, however, reads in relevant part as set forth below, [Note 3] and is framed in terms of whether the defendant committed manslaughter under the principles set forth in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (1944). There is an obvious reason for this. Under our common law, involuntary manslaughter cannot be charged under the theory of unlawful-act manslaughter when a death occurred during the commission of a felony. The distribution of heroin, a class A controlled substance is a felony. See G. L. Page 783 c. 94C, Section 32 (a) (1988 ed.); G. L. c. 274, Section 1 (1988 ed.). Involuntary manslaughter of the type mentioned in the first reported question presently pertains only to deaths occurring in the commission of misdemeanors or other acts malum in se, but not to the commission of felonies. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 352 Mass. 387 , 397 (1967). A defendant cannot be prosecuted for an act which was not a crime when it was performed, Lembersky v. Parole Bd. of the Dep’t of Correction, 332 Mass. 290 , 293 (1955). An indictment which is narrow and precise in scope cannot be read to encompass a new and different definition of the crime that did not exist at the time of the occurrence which gave rise to it. For these reasons, unlawful-act manslaughter cannot be used as a basis to prosecute the defendant in this case. The parties, however, have briefed and argued questions about the state of certain aspects of involuntary manslaughter after the decision in Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 (1982), which modified our common law of felony-murder. The issues they raise are important, and they deserve resolution in order to clarify the state of our manslaughter law. See Commonwealth v. Giang, 402 Mass. 604 , 608 (1988); Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722 , 731 (1943). We proceed to consider them. There is no statutory definition of manslaughter in Massachusetts; its elements are derived from common law. Commonwealth v. Godin, 374 Mass. 120 , 126 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978). We have said that “[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused (1) in the commission of an unlawful act, malum in se, [Note 4] not amounting to a felony nor likely to endanger life . . ., or (2) by an act which constitutes such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to constitute wanton or reckless conduct.” Commonwealth v. Campbell, supra at 397. The first type of manslaughter mentioned in Page 784 this passage is sometimes called unlawful-act manslaughter, while the second type is manslaughter according to the principles stated in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 , 399 (1944). We have also consistently stated that “‘[a] battery that causes death is manslaughter.’” Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 404 Mass. 774 , 776 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Bianco, 388 Mass. 358 , 362 (1983). See Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662 , 703 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. Campbell, supra; Commonwealth v. Sostilio, 325 Mass. 143 , 145 (1949); Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403 , 404 (1944); Commonwealth v. Welansky, supra at 401. [Note 5] This type of manslaughter recognizes the danger inherent in the intentional infliction of bodily harm associated with a criminal battery. [Note 6] [...] We believe that unlawful-act manslaughter should be abandoned in Massachusetts except for appropriate cases which are based on the principle that a battery that causes death is manslaughter. The latter principle has long been part of our common law and has been applied, as the Sheppard case illustrates, see note 6, supra, in circumstances in which the defendant is, or should be, cognizant of the fact that the battery he is committing endangers human life. Apart from this principle, unlawful-act manslaughter has Page 788 been rarely used as a basis for prosecution, and then in cases that are factually eccentric. [Note 11] Any effort to redefine the basis of culpability for unlawful-act manslaughter in terms of the various standards described above, see notes 8, 9, and 10, supra, would cast the offense in terms of a standard which comes close to duplicating the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Matchett, supra at 508, for felony-murder (conduct involving a “conscious disregard of the risk to human life”), or the standard for implied malice in murder described in Commonwealth v. Starling, 382 Mass. 423 , 426 (1981) (conduct which, according to common experience, involves a plain and strong likelihood of death). The resulting overlap would make it virtually impossible to instruct a jury in a manner which would enable them sensibly to differentiate between murder and manslaughter, and an unnecessary layer of confusion would be added to our already complicated common law of homicide. Further, negligence cannot be a proper common law basis for liability because “[t]here is in Massachusetts at common law no such thing as ‘criminal negligence’.” Commonwealth v. Welansky, supra at 400. Where the Legislature had determined that a negligently caused death, or a death occurring during the commission of a misdemeanor, should be punished as manslaughter it has enacted specific statutes. See, e.g., G. L. c. 90, Section 24G (a) and (b) (1988 ed.) (punishing motor vehicle homicide occurring as a result of negligent, reckless, and alcohol impaired driving). There is no doubt of the desirability of legislative consideration of the homicide law with a view toward simplification and modernization. See Commonwealth v. Starling, supra at 428-429. However, in the absence of definitive action by the Legislature, we must bring our involuntary manslaughter law in line with the Matchett decision. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law 602 (1972 ed.). For the reasons stated above, Page 789 a person henceforth may be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter only for causing an unintentional death (1) during the commission of wanton or reckless conduct, as defined in Commonwealth v. Welansky, supra, or (2) during the commission of battery, under the principles set forth in Sheppard, supra, and the other cases cited therein. For the reasons previously stated, the answer to the first reported question is “no.” 2. Welansky manslaughter. The second reported question asks whether the evidence before the grand jury supports the defendant’s indictment for manslaughter under the principles set forth in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (1944). Welansky holds that involuntary manslaughter includes an unlawful homicide unintentionally caused by wanton or reckless conduct. “The essence of wanton or reckless conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.” Id. at 399. See Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659 , 665 (1981). Moreover, we have approved jury instructions which stated that “even if a particular defendant is so stupid [or] so heedless . . . that in fact he did not realize the grave danger, he cannot escape the imputation of wanton or reckless conduct in his dangerous act or omission, if an ordinary normal man under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.” Commonwealth. Welansky, supra at 398-399. See Commonwealth v. Godin, 374 Mass. 120 , 129, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 917 (1977). Thus, under Welansky, a defendant’s subjective awareness of the reckless nature of his conduct is sufficient, but not necessary, to convict him of involuntary manslaughter. Conduct which a reasonable person, in similar circumstances, would recognize as reckless will suffice as well. We inquire whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to support the defendant’s indictment for involuntary manslaughter under the Welansky theory as described above. The defendant has not yet been tried on this charge, so we are not concerned with whether sufficient evidence Page 790 exists to warrant a finding of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, we consider only whether the information before the grand jury was adequate to establish his identity and probable cause to arrest him for the crime charged. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160 , 163 (1982). Probable cause requires facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1923). [...] The defendant’s contention that the causal link between the heroin sale and Randazza’s death was broken by Randazza’s intervening conduct of injecting herself lacks merit. Intervening conduct that is reasonably foreseeable will not relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Askew, 404 Mass. 532 , 534 (1989). It is untenable to suggest that heroin consumption is not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of selling that drug to a known addict. We conclude that “the act of the customer in injecting [her]self is not necessarily so unexpected, unforeseeable or remote as to insulate the seller from criminal responsibility as a matter of law.” State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tenn. 1984). See State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 380 (1972). See also Ureta v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 2d 672, 676 (1962) (“The person who furnished [her] Page 792 the narcotic is liable even though deceased did the actual administering of it”). The evidence before the grand jury furnishes probable cause to believe that the defendant committed involuntary manslaughter under the principles stated in the Welansky case. It follows that our answer to the second reported question is “yes.” [snip] http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/316/316mass383.html 316 Mass. 383 February 7, 1944 - June 5, 1944 [full opinion at link] http://www.massmurderdefense.com/pages/manslaughter-in.html Involuntary Manslaughter As with voluntary manslaughter Massachusetts statutory law does not define involuntary manslaughter. Rather, Massachusetts common law, as pronounced by the courts, provides the definition for involuntary manslaughter: One can commit involuntary manslaughter through: (1) an unintentional killing occasioned by an act which constitutes such a disregard of the probable harmful consequences to another as to be wanton or reckless; or (2) an unintentional killing resulting from a battery. The first theory under which a person may face conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires an unintentional, yet unlawful killing resulting from the wanton or reckless conduct of the defendant. This theory of involuntary manslaughter is sometimes called "Welansky manslaughter," after the 1944 case in which the owner of a nightclub was convicted of involuntary manslaughter when a fire in his club caused the death of over 400 patrons. That case also established that wanton or reckless conduct includes both affirmative acts and failures to act where a duty to act exists. Such acts or omissions must embody a disregard for the probable harmful consequences to another. The conduct must involve a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another. The law requires that the defendant have knowledge of the circumstances and the intent to do the act that caused the death, and also requires that the circumstances presented a danger of serious harm such that a reasonable man would have recognized the nature and degree of danger. Wanton and reckless conduct is distinct from negligence or gross negligence for which, in the common law of Massachusetts, there is no criminal liability. The second theory on which a defendant may face conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires that the defendant commit a battery, not amounting to a felony, which causes death. A person who uses a level of force against another that is likely to cause harm and which produces death is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The law requires that the prosecution establish that the defendant knew, or should have known that his conduct created a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm would result to another. This means that the same standards of proof apply to both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The punishment for both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, as set by statute, is the same. The maximum sentence for an involuntary manslaughter conviction is imprisonment for twenty years, except in circumstances where the voluntary manslaughter involves explosives or infernal machines, in which cases the maximum punishment is life imprisonment.
Good info. As for the girl's knowledge of his intent and likelihood to carry through on his threats to off himself, she was his ex-girlfriend and knew full well of his attempt to kill himself 1.5 years ago. There are also a lot of very damning texts from this merry widow to that poor kid.
So it would appear the case hinges on whether or not the defendant 'would have recognized the nature and degree of danger' and if so, had a affirmative 'duty to act'?
There are three kinds of people in the world: those that can add and those that can't
They can demostrate this little ghoul knew full well he had attempted suicide 1.5 years ago. I'd say they have a hell of a case against her. Let her spend a few years thinking about what she did in a women's prison in MA instead of flitting off to college.
They very well may but that doesn't mean a jury will convict. Judging solely from the pics, I'd say she has a chance of swaying at least one juror.
There are three kinds of people in the world: those that can add and those that can't
That depends on how well the prosecution picks a jury and seats them. Put some mothers on that jury and show them those texts and replay those events, minute by minute with photos of that boy and the account of how well she knew he had tried to kill himself. I think you'd get a conviction. Or the prosecutor could go for a plea bargain which may be what is happening.
Would a reasonable person have realized that the texts caused grave danger to the decedent? If someone talks about it for 1.5 years and does not do it every time, does one consider it a grave danger? How many times had the decedent told the ex-girlfriend that he was considering suicide? With emphasis on ex-girlfriend, was she telling him she did not want to hear it anymore? Did she have a reasonable belief that the boy was calling wolf for attention? If the reasonable person considered the suicide possibility a grave danger, what were the family and medical personnel doing to protect against the grave danger? The opinion in Welansky may clarify the situation or just render it incomprehensible. Welansky involves an omission of action where there was a duty to act. In the current case, the accused affirmatively acted. Welansky opines, But, Welansky continues, Would a reasonable person have realized that the texts caused grave danger to the decedent? If so found, then a conviction could result. https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/collages/13777 2 COMMONWEALTH 3 vs. 4 BARNETT WELANSKY 5 (and a companion case against the same defendant). 6 June 5, 1944 7 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk [* * *] 64 The Commonwealth disclaimed any contention that the defendant intentionally killed or injured the persons named in the indictments as victims. It based its case on involuntary [397] manslaughter through wanton or reckless conduct. The judge instructed the jury correctly with respect to the nature of such conduct. [1] 65 Usually wanton or reckless conduct consists of an affirmative act, like driving an automobile or discharging a firearm, in disregard of probable harmful consequences to another. But where, as in the present case, there is a duty of care for the safety of business visitors invited to premises which the defendant controls, [2] wanton or reckless conduct may consist of intentional failure to take such care in disregard of the probable harmful consequences to them or of their right to care. Aiken v. Holyoke Street Railway, 184 Mass. 269 , 271. Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367 , 369. Queen v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q. B. 283. State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1. Am. Law Inst. Restatement: Torts, Section 500. 26 Am. Jur. Homicide, Sections 205-208. 29 C. J. 1154, et seq. 66 To define wanton or reckless conduct so as to distinguish it clearly from negligence and gross negligence is not easy. Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367, 370. Commonwealth v. Arone, 265 Mass. 128 , 132. Sometimes the word "wilful" is prefaced to the words "wanton" and "reckless" in expressing the concept. That only blurs it. Wilful means intentional. In the phrase "wilful, wanton or reckless conduct," if "wilful" modifies "conduct" it introduces [398] something different from wanton or reckless conduct, even though the legal result is the same. Wilfully causing harm is a wrong, but a different wrong from wantonly or recklessly causing harm. If "wilful" modifies "wanton or reckless conduct" its use is accurate. What must be intended is the conduct, not the resulting harm. Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588 , 592. Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367, 369. The words "wanton" and "reckless" are practically synonymous in this connection, although the word "wanton" may contain a suggestion of arrogance or insolence or heartlessness that is lacking in the word "reckless." But intentional conduct to which either word applies is followed by the same legal consequences as though both words applied. 67 The standard of wanton or reckless conduct is at once subjective and objective, as has been recognized ever since Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165. Knowing facts that would cause a reasonable man to know the danger is equivalent to knowing the danger. Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367, 369. Romana v. Boston Elevated Railway, 218 Mass. 76 , 83. Commonwealth v. Peach, 239 Mass. 575. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377. Arizona Employer's Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 432. Am. Law Inst. Restatement: Torts, Section 500, and also comments c and f. See also Brennan v. Schuster, 288 Mass. 311. The judge charged the jury correctly when he said, "To constitute wanton or reckless conduct, as distinguished from mere negligence, grave danger to others must have been apparent, and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than alter his conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which caused the harm. If the grave danger was in fact realized by the defendant, his subsequent voluntary act or omission which caused the harm amounts to wanton or reckless conduct, no matter whether the ordinary man would have realized the gravity of the danger or not. But even if a particular defendant is so stupid [or] so heedless ... that in fact he did not realize the grave danger, he cannot escape the imputation of wanton or reckless conduct in his dangerous act or omission, if an ordinary normal [399] man under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger. A man may be reckless within the meaning of the law although he himself thought he was careful." 68 The essence of wanton or reckless conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another. Am. Law Inst. Restatement: Torts, Section 500. LeSaint v. Weston, 301 Mass. 136 , 138. Wanton or reckless conduct amounts to what has been variously described as indifference to or disregard of probable consequences to that other (Aiken v. Holyoke Street Railway, 184 Mass. 269 , 271; Freeman v. United Fruit Co. 223 Mass. 300 , 302; Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367 , 369; Yancey v. Boston Elevated Railway, 205 Mass. 162 , 171; Burns's Case, 218 Mass. 8 , 10; Romana v. Boston Elevated Railway, 218 Mass. 76 , 83; Sullivan v. Napolitano, 277 Mass. 341 , 344) or the rights of that other. Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 347. Commonwealth v. Horsfall, 213 Mass. 232 , 235. Cohen v. Davies, 305 Mass. 152 , 155, 156. But we are not prepared to give unqualified approval to a further statement found in some of our reported decisions, for example in Query v. Howe, 273 Mass. 92 , 96, that to constitute wanton or reckless conduct, disregard of the rights of another must be as complete or utter as though such rights did not exist. If taken literally, that statement would permit a trifling regard for the rights of another to exonerate a defendant from the criminal consequences of flagrant wrongdoing. 69 The words "wanton" and "reckless" are thus not merely rhetorical or vituperative expressions used instead of negligent or grossly negligent. They express a difference in the degree of risk and in the voluntary taking of risk so marked, as compared with negligence, as to amount substantially and in the eyes of the law to a difference in kind. Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367 . Cotter, petitioner, 237 Mass. 68 , 72. Adamowicz v. Newburyport Gas & Electric Co. 238 Mass. 244 , 246. Prondecka v. Turners Falls Power & Electric Co. 238 Mass. 239 , 242; S. C. 241 Mass. 100 , 102. McIntyre v. Converse, [400] 238 Mass. 592 , 594. Young v. Worcester, 253 Mass. 481 , 484. Potter v. Gilmore, 282 Mass. 49 , 57. Am. Law Inst. Restatement: Torts, Section 500, comment g. For many years this court has been careful to preserve the distinction between negligence and gross negligence, on the one hand, and wanton or reckless conduct on the other. Prondecka v. Turners Falls Power & Electric Co. 238 Mass. 239 ; S. C. 241 Mass. 100 . Compare Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635; Alpha Steamship Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642. In pleadings as well as in statutes the rule is that "negligence and wilful and wanton conduct are so different in kind that words properly descriptive of the one commonly exclude the other." Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 291 Mass. 445 , 447. Romana v. Boston Elevated Railway, 226 Mass. 532 , 536. 70 Notwithstanding language used commonly in earlier cases, and occasionally in later ones, [3] it is now clear in this Commonwealth that at common law conduct does not become criminal until it passes the borders of negligence and gross negligence and enters into the domain of wanton or reckless conduct. There is in Massachusetts at common law no such thing as "criminal negligence." Commonwealth v. Guillemette, 243 Mass. 346. Commonwealth v. Arone, 265 Mass. 128 . Commonwealth v. Jones, 288 Mass. 150 , 152. [401] Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 295 Mass. 1, 5. Commonwealth v. Maguire, 313 Mass. 669. 71 Wanton or reckless conduct is the legal equivalent of intentional conduct. Aiken v. Holyoke Street Railway, 184 Mass. 269 , 271. Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367 , 369. McIntyre v. Converse, 238 Mass. 592 , 594. Sullivan v. Napolitano, 277 Mass. 341 . Isaacson v. Boston, Worcester & New York Street Railway, 278 Mass. 378 , 387. Baines v. Collins, 310 Mass. 523 , 526. Am. Law Inst. Restatement: Torts, Section 282, comment d. If by wanton or reckless conduct bodily injury is caused to another, the person guilty of such conduct is guilty of assault and battery. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551. Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 299. Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199 , 203. State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, affirmed 88 N. J. L. 396. Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522; 53 Am. L. R. 231. Woodward v. State, 164 Miss. 468. Davis v. Commonwealth, 150 Va. 611. And since manslaughter is simply a battery that causes death (Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 295 Mass. 1 , 5; Commonwealth v. Velleco, 272 Mass. 94 , 99), if death results he is guilty of manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Hartwell, 128 Mass. 415 , 417. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 . Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551 , 553. Commonwealth v. Parsons, 195 Mass. 560 , 569. Commonwealth v. Peach, 239 Mass. 575 . Commonwealth v. Guillemette, 243 Mass. 346 . Commonwealth v. Arone, 265 Mass. 128 . Commonwealth v. Jones, 288 Mass. 150 , 152. Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 295 Mass. 1 , 5. Commonwealth v. Maguire, 313 Mass. 669. 72 To convict the defendant of manslaughter, the Commonwealth was not required to prove that he caused the fire by some wanton or reckless conduct. Fire in a place of public resort is an ever present danger. It was enough to prove that death resulted from his wanton or reckless disregard of the safety of patrons in the event of fire from any cause.
He didn't just talk about it for 1.5 years. He made a serious attempt to kill himself 1.5 years ago. And, being an ex-girlfriend with an ongoing relationship with him, she knew this full well. And she exchanged thousands of text messages with this kid. The prosecutors have all of them. There are several damning ones besides the ones where she urged him to get back into the truck to finish the job. And then turned around to text her girlfriend about it. Very cold-blooded stuff. Add his weeping mother to the courtroom gallery and you'd get a conviction of this heartless little bitch.
It only takes one juror for an acquittal.
There are three kinds of people in the world: those that can add and those that can't
Was there such a duty to act in this case?
There are three kinds of people in the world: those that can add and those that can't
Really? I had absolutely no idea. You would almost think convictions require a unanimous jury or something.
I don't know where this case may go. http://nbweb.ot.atl.publicus.com/article/20150228/News/150229439 * * * “Mr. Roy then explained that the first time Conrad had attempted suicide he was talking to a girl that he had met in a group and she called the police right away, and she saved his life because the police were right on it, and if it had gone unnoticed he could have died.” He was in a Kmart parking lot. In his first attempt, whatever it was, he was talking to another girl. The prior "serious" attempt may have led the current accused to disbelieve his seriousness. "It is alleged" is less than certain. FWIW, the DA is a third cousin of the decedent and reportedly has now recused himself because of the familial relationship.
Just as trivia, I note that in Military Courts-Martial, it takes two-thirds to convict. And, if you are enlisted, you have the right to have one-third enlisted on the panel (jury).
Third cousin? Seems silly to recuse over such genetic distance to me. A lot of people barely know who their first cousins are any more. I'm trying to think of a single third cousin I even know, let alone would care about since I could care less about my second cousins. I did have one good friend that I learned years after we became friends that my great-grandmother and his great-grandfather (or was it the other way around?) were brother and sister. Is that a third cousin? Supposedly, your degree of cousinship is one less than the number of generations back to a common ancestor. By that measure he and I would have shared a great-great-great-grandparent and that would make us third cousins. About which I could have cared less if we hadn't been good friends for the last 30+ years. Perhaps in places like MA, the bluebloods keep track of shirttail relatives better than they do here.
It's a little known technicality.
There are three kinds of people in the world: those that can add and those that can't
I'm not sure how you criminalize this as a matter of law in a way that isn't counterproductive.
#5. To: cranky (#4)
#6. To: cranky (#0)
She is accused of urging Conrad Roy III, 18, of Fairhaven and Mattapoisett to kill himself, which he did while idling a truck last July in the parking lot of a Fairhaven Kmart. Authorities said he died of carbon monoxide poisoning.
#7. To: TooConservative, cranky (#1)
I'm not sure how you criminalize this as a matter of law in a way that isn't counterproductive. But I understand how outraged people are that a vulnerable young man was virtually driven to complete his suicide by this girl for no good reason.
#8. To: GrandIsland (#6)
Thank you for at least instructing him in a nice, CLEAN, peaceful venue for his permanent vacation.
#9. To: cranky (#0)
A King Philip Regional High School senior has been indicted for involuntary manslaughter, allegedly for urging a friend to commit suicide. She then raised money for mental illness in the name of her friend.
#10. To: TooConservative (#5)
The problem is that you have to twist the assisted suicide laws to prosecute her under them.
#11. To: nolu chan (#7)
Perhaps a possible defense is a claim that she thought he was just bullshitting her to get attention and she did not believe his texts until after the fact when she found out he was dead.
#12. To: cranky (#0)
#13. To: cranky, TooConservative, GrandIsland (#11)
But would that pass the 'reasonable man' standard?
Sec. 53a-56. Manslaughter in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
The illogic of attempted involuntary manslaughter is easily demonstrated. Manslaughter, as herein involved, requires that an individual having the intent to cause serious physical injury to another person causes the death of such person. Involuntary manslaughter is a homicide unintentionally caused. Commonwealth v. Hebert, 373 Mass. 535, 537, 368 N.E.2d 1204 (1977). Attempt liability requires that the defendant entertain the intent required for the substantive crime. General Statutes § 53a-49 (a). Unless death results there can be no crime of involuntary manslaughter. Thus, the crime of attempted involuntary manslaughter requires a logical impossibility, namely, that the actor in his attempt intend that an unintended death result. Such an anomaly the legislature could scarcely have intended. Accordingly, we hold that attempted manslaughter in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (1) is not a crime cognizable under our law.
6.3-1 Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree -- § 53a-63
a person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme indifference to human life, (he/she) recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person.
6.3-2 Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree -- § 53a-64
a person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when (he/she) recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person.
5.1-4 Manslaughter in the Second Degree -- § 53a-56 (a) (1)
a person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when (he/she) recklessly causes the death of another person.
5.1-7 Manslaughter in the Second Degree (Aiding Suicide) -- § 53a-56 (a) (2)
a person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when (he/she) intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide.
#14. To: nolu chan (#13)
The first element is that the defendant caused the death of . This means that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the decedent's death. You must find it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that died as a result of the actions of the defendant.
#15. To: TooConservative (#14)
The jury instruction makes this hard to get past in this case.
#16. To: Pinguinite (#15)
(Edited)
There may be a 1st Amendment defense here, as her only action involved expressing herself.
#17. To: GrandIsland, Pinguinite (#16)
If he was a child or mentally handicapped (and I mean really mentally handicapped, like drooling on himself retarded) then I'd feel different.
#18. To: nolu chan (#13)
The question is whether it could sustain reasonable doubt in the mind of at least one juror.
#19. To: GrandIsland (#16)
Stone might be getting subpoenaed for IP information on certain posters.
#20. To: TooConservative (#17)
Then, after hours of standoff with the cops trying to talk him down, it hits Twitter and Facebook and a mob of 500 ghouls shows up below him in the street but behind the police lines. They start chanting "Jump! Jump! Jump!..."
#21. To: TooConservative (#17)
Was that an exercise of free speech by a flash mob? You really want to let them get away with it and walk away laughing?
#22. To: TooConservative (#17)
I'm generally a free speech radical but I don't want to let the flash mob walk away from doing something like that.
#23. To: Gatlin (#19)
It happened one time on LP.
#24. To: Pinguinite, Gatlin, A K A Stone (#23)
I sent no information. To the best of my knowledge at the time, publicizing the email was not illegal at all (still the case today).
#25. To: GrandIsland (#22)
With all seriousness, I find it harder to prove any kind of culpability with a large "flash mob" type of group.
#26. To: Gatlin (#19)
It happened one time on LP.
#27. To: TooConservative (#25)
You probably haven't been accused of that too often. Shoe on the other foot, eh? : )
#28. To: Pinguinite (#20)
This type thing actually happened, at least a couple of times. A net search turns up 2 instances. Interestingly, the term "ghoul" is also used in one of them. Is this a new internet term?
#29. To: Pinguinite (#23)
It happened one time on LP.
#30. To: cranky, TooConservative, GrandIsland (#13)
[nolu chan #13]It would appear to be the actual charge would be Manslaughter in the Second Degree according to the Connecticut penal code.
Section 13. Whoever commits manslaughter shall, except as hereinafter provided, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail or a house of correction for not more than two and one half years. Whoever commits manslaughter while violating the provisions of sections 102 to 102C, inclusive, of chapter 266 shall be imprisoned in the state prison for life or for any term of years.
Massachusetts v Catalina, 407 Mass 779 (1990)
COMMONWEALTH vs. BARNETT WELANSKY (and a companion case against the same defendant).
Massachusetts Murder Defense
#31. To: nolu chan, GrandIsland (#30)
#32. To: nolu chan (#30)
That case also established that wanton or reckless conduct includes both affirmative acts and failures to act where a duty to act exists. Such acts or omissions must embody a disregard for the probable harmful consequences to another. The conduct must involve a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another. The law requires that the defendant have knowledge of the circumstances and the intent to do the act that caused the death, and also requires that the circumstances presented a danger of serious harm such that a reasonable man would have recognized the nature and degree of danger.
#33. To: cranky, nolu chan, GrandIsland (#32)
#34. To: TooConservative (#33)
I'd say they have a hell of a case against her.
#35. To: cranky (#34)
Judging solely from the pics, I'd say she has a chance of swaying at least one juror.
#36. To: TooConservative, Cranky, GrandIsland (#31)
[TooConservative #31] As for the girl's knowledge of his intent and likelihood to carry through on his threats to off himself, she was his ex-girlfriend and knew full well of his attempt to kill himself 1.5 years ago.
"To constitute wanton or reckless conduct, as distinguished from mere negligence, grave danger to others must have been apparent, and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than alter his conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which caused the harm."
"If the grave danger was in fact realized by the defendant, his subsequent voluntary act or omission which caused the harm amounts to wanton or reckless conduct, no matter whether the ordinary man would have realized the gravity of the danger or not. But even if a particular defendant is so stupid [or] so heedless ... that in fact he did not realize the grave danger, he cannot escape the imputation of wanton or reckless conduct in his dangerous act or omission, if an ordinary normal [399] man under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger. A man may be reckless within the meaning of the law although he himself thought he was careful."
1 316 Mass. 383
#37. To: nolu chan (#36)
(Edited)
If someone talks about it for 1.5 years and does not do it every time, does one consider it a grave danger?
#38. To: TooConservative (#35)
Put some mothers on that jury and show them those texts and replay those events, minute by minute with photos of that boy and the account of how well she knew he had tried to kill himself. I think you'd get a conviction.
#39. To: nolu chan (#36)
The essence of wanton or reckless conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to act
#40. To: cranky (#38)
It only takes one juror for an acquittal.
#41. To: TooConservative (#37)
He didn't just talk about it for 1.5 years. He made a serious attempt to kill himself 1.5 years ago. And, being an ex-girlfriend with an ongoing relationship with him, she knew this full well.
Fairhaven Patrol Officer David Correia found Roy, dead of carbon monoxide poisoning, in his black Ford truck parked in a Kmart parking lot off Route 6, late in the afternoon of July 13.
“It is alleged that Ms. Carter had firsthand knowledge of Roy’s suicidal thoughts,” the district attorney’s office told the station.
#42. To: TooConservative, cranky (#40)
You would almost think convictions require a unanimous jury or something.
#43. To: nolu chan (#41)
FWIW, the DA is a third cousin of the decedent and reportedly has now recused himself because of the familial relationship.
#44. To: TooConservative (#40)
Really? I had absolutely no idea.
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