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International News Title: The American Education of Vladimir Putin: How Putin Figured Out America Is Evil and Stupid The American Education of Vladimir Putin How the Russian leader came to oppose a country he knows little about FIONA HILL AND CLIFFORD G. GADDYFEB 16 2015, 7:00 AM ET "The problem you Americans have in dealing with us is that you think you understand us, but you don't. You look at the Chinese and you think: 'They're not like us.' You look at us Russians, and you think, 'Theyre like us.' But you're wrong. We are not like you." ---snip--- Putin was head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the post-Soviet successor to the KGB, when the alliance went to war in response to Yugoslav military atrocities against ethnic Albanian civilians in Kosovo, which was still part of Yugoslavia. The intervention took place a mere two weeks after NATO had admitted Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The United States did not secure the usual authority from the United Nations to intervene. NATO warplanes bombed Belgrade, and NATO forces, with American troops in the lead, then moved into Kosovo to secure the territory and roll back the Yugoslav military. As Putin put it in a speech 15 years later: It was hard to believe, even seeing it with my own eyes, that at the end of the 20th century, one of Europes capitals, Belgrade, was under missile attack for several weeks, and then came the real [military] intervention. NATOs Kosovo campaign was a turning point for Moscow and for Putin personally. Russian officials interpreted the intervention as a means of expanding NATOs influence in the Balkans, not as an effort to deal with a humanitarian crisis. They began to revise their previous conclusions about the prospects for cooperating with NATO as well as with the United States as the leader of the alliance. As Putin noted in a March 2014 speech, the experience left him with a rather harsh view of Americans, who, he said, prefer in their practical politics to be guided not by international law, but by the law of force. The Americans had, as they would on numerous occasions, taken decisions behind our backs, presented us with accomplished facts. * * * In August 1999, Putin was appointed prime minister, and his immediate concern was Chechnya, where separatist violence was spilling over the border and into the rest of Russia. The considerable high-level Western attention to, and criticism of, the second outbreak of war in the republic stoked Russian fears of NATO or U.S. intervention in the conflict. In the United States, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor in the Carter administration, and retired general Alexander Haig, a former secretary of state in the Reagan administration who had also served in top positions in the U.S. military and in NATO, helped to set up an advocacy group to demand a diplomatic solution to the war and policies to protect civilians caught in the conflict. Given the Soviet leaderships neuralgia about officials like Brzezinski and Haig in the 1970s and 1980s, this group was viewed with alarm in Moscow. Russian political figures saw the risk of the Americans and NATO intervening in Chechnya to protect civilians, just as they had intervened in Kosovo. Putins response was to write an op-ed in The New York Times in November 1999, in an early foray into international PR. He explained that Moscow had launched its military campaign in Chechnya to respond to acts of terrorism. He praised the United States for its own strikes against terrorists, noting that when a societys core interests are besieged by violent elements, responsible leaders must respond and calling for the understanding of our friends abroad. The general message was conciliatory. Putin clearly hoped that the constructive atmosphere that had framed his interactions with Americans in St. Petersburg could be restored in some way. After September 11, he appeared convinced that Washington would come to see things from Moscows perspective and would recognize linkages between al- Qaeda in Afghanistan and terrorists in Chechnya. In a press conference in Brussels on October 2, 2001, Putin asserted that terrorists took advantage of Western institutions and Western conceptions of human rights and the protection of the civilian population ... not in order to defend Western values and Western institutions, but rather ... in a struggle against them. Their final goal is annihilation. All states would have to clamp down politically at home, as well as improve military postures abroad, to deal with this problem. Based on Russias experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya, Putin offered the United States concrete assistance in rooting out al-Qaeda. If Putin and the Kremlin hoped to create an international anti-terrorist coalition with Washington modeled on the U.S.-Soviet World War II alliance against Germanyone that would give Russia an equal say with the United Statesthat hope went unfulfilled. ---snip--- In the aftermath of 9/11, Putin was mystified by the actions of his U.S. counterparts. In the absence of countervailing information, Putin initially saw American failure to respond to his warnings about the common threat of terrorism as a sign of dangerous incompetence. In a series of speeches just after September 11, Putin said he was astonished at the Clinton administrations lack of reaction to his warnings of a terrorist plot brewing in Afghanistan. I feel that I personally am to blame for what happened," he lamented. Yes, I spoke a great deal about that threat. ... Apparently, I didnt say enough. I didnt find the words that could rouse people [in the U.S.] to the required system of defense. The 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq convinced Putin that the United States was up to no good and looking for pretexts to intervene against hostile regimes to enhance its geopolitical position. Putin and his intelligence officials knew that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was bluffing about his possession of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the invasion of Iraq, and the U.S. failure to find any WMD, a comment attributed to Putin was passed around European diplomatic circles: Pity about the WMD. I would have found some. In other words, the U.S. intelligence services and government were beyond incompetentif youre going to use a pretext, do your homework; make sure it's a good one. The opinion Putin and his security team seem to have formed over this periodthat the United States was not just incompetent but dangerous, and intent on inflicting harm on Russiawas strikingly at odds with the conclusion in the United States that the collapse of Soviet communism meant the disappearance of the military threat from Moscow. As in the 1980s, U.S. officials had a hard time believing that Russia could genuinely see the United States as a threat. As a result, Washington made decisions that were consistently misinterpreted in Moscowincluding a second major NATO enlargement in 2004. The color revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 further darkened Putins view of U.S. activities. For Moscow, Georgia was a tiny failed state, but Ukraine was a smaller version of Russia. In Putins view the Orange Revolution demonstrations in Ukraine in 2004, and their scale, could only have been orchestrated from the outside. This was especially the case when the color revolutions became conceptually tied to the Bush administrations Freedom Agenda and its efforts to support the development of civil society and the conduct of free elections in Afghanistan and Iraq two countries that the United States had invaded and occupied. The color revolutions, Putin argued in his March 2014 speech, were not spontaneous. The West inflicted them on a whole array of countries and people. The West, Putin argued, tried to impose a set of standards, which were in no way suitable for either the way of life, or the traditions, or the cultures of these peoples. As a result, instead of democracy and freedom there was chaos and the outbreak of violence, a series of revolutions. The Arab Spring was replaced by the Arab Winter. Russia's 2008 war with Georgia marked the end of Putins relationship with George W. Bush and his administration. The Obama administration came into office shortly afterward, intent on a reset that seemed to address Putins main stated desire for Russia to be approached by the United States with pragmatism on issues of mutual interest and importance. But once again, Putin and the Kremlin took their policy cues from U.S. actions rather than words. U.S. offers of modernization partnerships to boost bilateral trade and help secure Russias accession to the World Trade Organization were combined with bilateral presidential commissions for human rights and civil-society development. The repeal of Cold War-era restrictions on U.S. trade with Russia was accompanied by the introduction of a new raft of sanctions in the form of the Sergei Magnitsky Act, which targeted a list of Russian officials who had been complicit in the death of a crusading Russian lawyer. Disagreements with the United States and NATO over interventions in the civil wars that erupted in Libya and then Syria in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings marred U.S. and Russian cooperation on negotiating with Iran over the future of its nuclear program. Putin was especially angered by the violent death of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi at the hands of rebels who found him hiding in a drainage pipe during an attempt to flee Tripoli following NATOs intervention in Libya. In Putins interpretation, the 2011-2012 Russian political protests were just part of this one long sequence of events, with the hand of the West barely concealed. On September 11, 2013, on the anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Putin returned to a public format that he had not used since 1999. He again wrote an op-ed in The New York Times, directed at the American public and calling for U.S. caution as it contemplated a military strike on Syria. The tone was anything but conciliatory. The prose was bold, not cautious. Putin observed: It is alarming that military intervention in internal conflicts in foreign countries has become commonplace for the United States. Is it in Americas long-term interest? I doubt it. Millions around the world increasingly see America not as a model of democracy but as relying solely on brute force, cobbling coalitions together under the slogan youre either with us or against us. With this op-ed, Putin effectively declared that his American education was complete. By 2013, as the crisis in Ukraine began to unfold, Putins view of America had become dark indeed. As he concluded in his March 2014 speech: Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We constantly propose cooperation on every critical question, want to strengthen the level of trust, want our relations to be equal, open, and honest. But we have not seen reciprocal steps. Limited by a lack of direct contacts with the United States, and driven by his perception of the threat it posed, Putin believed that he had been rebuffed or deceived at every turn by the West. Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread Top Page Up Full Thread Page Down Bottom/Latest
#1. To: A Pole, TooConservative, Vicomte13 (#0)
The opinion Putin and his security team seem to have formed over this periodthat the United States was not just incompetent but dangerous -------------------------------------- Putin has a better understanding of America and American government than Americans do.
Why do American authorities keep ignoring Russian warnings about Muslim terrorists? See Boston.
Perhaps because they don't really care?
Perhaps because they don't really care? That or worse....
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