LEFT WING LOONS
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Title: war shilling for illegals.
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Published: Feb 17, 2015
Author: war
Post Date: 2015-02-17 17:13:47 by A K A Stone
Keywords: None
Views: 1721
Comments: 9
His *ruling* will be stayed as it's based upon a bastardized reading of the Administrative Procedures Act...an act that's based in the reserved powers of the Executive Branch and one in which the States should have been ruled to have no standing to bring suit... Then there's the general issue that States have no power to regulate immigration which this activist judge wholly ignored... --I Brake For The Invisible war posted on 2015-02-17
Poster Comment: As usual. The lightweight is standing against Americans and for invaders.
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#1. To: A K A Stone, Fred Mertz, war, 4um, dream students, guest workers (#0)
Courtesy ping for the defense team/significant others?
So where is Spandex Boy posting at these days?
“Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.”
If "Oh lookit...a *JEW*!..." is your argument then you have no argument... --I Brake For The Invisible It's people like war that give honkies a bad name. What a cracka!
So I.E. he's trying to pretend he's Upper Crust? LOL.... “Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.”
I don't know who that guy is in the pink,but his mamma sure does dress him funny.
Why is democracy held in such high esteem when it’s the enemy of the minority and makes all rights relative to the dictates of the majority? (Ron Paul,2012)
His *ruling* will be stayed as it's based upon a bastardized reading of the Administrative Procedures Act...an act that's based in the reserved powers of the Executive Branch and one in which the States should have been ruled to have no standing to bring suit... Then there's the general issue that States have no power to regulate immigration which this activist judge wholly ignored... --I Brake For The Invisible It is unclear if war is pitching a bitch about standing or the opinion on the merits. The ruling upheld four different claims on standing, (1) Article III standing, (2) Prudential standing, (3) APA Standing, and (4) "Assuming that the concept of abdication standing will be recognized in this Circuit, this Court finds that this is a textbook example." APA Reviewability on the merits (ruling on Standing given below) At 81: [footnotes omitted] Although the Court easily finds the agency action at issue here final and that the States fall within the relevant zone of interests in order to seek review, Defendants claim that review is nevertheless unavailable in this case because the APA exempts the DHS action from its purview. There are two exceptions to the general rule of reviewability under the APA. First, agency action is unreviewable "where the statute explicitly precludes judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). This exception applies when "Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review." Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830. Second, and arguably more relevant to the present case, even if Congress has not affirmatively precluded judicial review, courts are precluded from reviewing agency action that is "committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). This second exception was first discussed in detail by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). There, the Court interpreted the exception narrowly, finding it "applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.'" Id. at 410 (quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). Subsequently, in Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court further refined its interpretation of Section 701(a)(2). Distinguishing the exception in Section 701 (a)(1) from that in Section 701 (a)(2), the Court stated: 470 U.S. at 830 (emphasis added). Relevant to the present issue, the Supreme Court then exempted from the APA's "presumption of reviewability" non-enforcement decisions made by an agency. Id. at 831 [82] (disagreeing with the lower court's "insistence that the 'narrow construction' of § (a)(2) required application of a presumption of reviewability even to an agency's decision not to undertake certain enforcement actions"). The Court distinguished the availability of review for the type of agency action in Overton Park from the challenged agency decisions in Heckler: Id. (emphasis added). Thus, according to the Heckler Court, there is a "rebuttable presumption" that "an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion" and, consequently, unsuitable for judicial review. Id. An "agency's refusal to institute proceedings" has been "traditionally committed to agency discretion," and the enactment of the APA did nothing to disturb this tradition. Id. at 832. Underlying this presumption of unreviewability are three overarching concerns that arise when a court proposes to review an agency's discretionary decision to refuse enforcement. First, "an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are particularly within its expertise[,]" and the agency is "far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities." Id. at 831-32. These factors or variables that an agency must assess in exercising its enforcement powers include "whether a violation has occurred, ... whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the [83] particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all." Id. at 831. Due to circumstances beyond its control, an agency "cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing." Id. For obvious reasons, this has application in the criminal and immigration contexts. Consequently, the deference generally accorded to "an agency's construction of the statute it is charged with implementing" and the "procedures it adopts" for doing so (under general administrative law principles) is arguably even more warranted when, in light of the above factors, the agency chooses not to enforce the statute against "each technical violation." Id. at 831-32. Second, an agency's refusal to act generally does not "infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect[,]" including individual liberty or property rights. In other words, a non-enforcement decision ordinarily does not involve an exercise of governmental "coercive power" over an individual's rights. Id. at 832 (emphasis in original). By contrast, when an agency does take action exercising its enforcement power, the action in and of itself "provides a focus for judicial review." Id. Because the agency "must have exercised its power in some manner," its action is more conducive to review "to determine whether the agency exceeded its statutory powers." Id. (citing FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929)). [84] Lastly, the Heckler Court compared agency non-enforcement decisions to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context--decisions that plainly fall within the express and exclusive province of the Executive Branch, which is constitutionally charged to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." See id. ("Finally, we recognize that an agency's refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 'to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."') (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). While the Court recognizes (as discussed above) that the DRS possesses considerable discretion in carrying out its duties under the INA, the facts of this case do not implicate the concerns considered by Heckler such that this Court finds itself without the ability to review Defendants' actions. First, the Court finds an important distinction in two terms that are commonly used interchangeably when discussing Heckler's presumption of unreviewability: "non-enforcement" and "inaction." While agency "non-enforcement" might imply "inaction" in most circumstances, the Court finds that, in this case, to the extent that the DAPA Directive can be characterized as "non-enforcement," it is actually affirmative action rather than inaction. The Supreme Court's concern that courts lack meaningful focus for judicial review when presented with agency inaction (see Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832) is thus not present in this situation. Instead of merely refusing to enforce the INA's removal laws against an individual, the DRS has enacted a wide-reaching program that awards legal presence, to individuals Congress has deemed deportable or removable, as well as the ability to obtain Social Security numbers, work [85] authorization permits, and the ability to travel. Absent DAPA, these individuals would not receive these benefits. The DHS has not instructed its officers to merely refrain from arresting, ordering the removal of, or prosecuting unlawfully-present aliens. Indeed, by the very terms of DAPA, that is what the DHS has been doing for these recipients for the last five years — whether that was because the DHS could not track down the millions of individuals they now deem eligible for deferred action, or because they were prioritizing removals according to limited resources, applying humanitarian considerations, or just not removing these individuals for "administrative convenience." Had the States complained only of the DHS' mere failure to (or [86] decision not to) prosecute and/or remove such individuals in these preceding years, any conclusion drawn in that situation would have been based on the inaction of the agency in its refusal to enforce. In such a case, the Court may have been without any "focus for judicial review." See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832. Exercising prosecutorial discretion and/or refusing to enforce a statute does not also entail bestowing benefits. Non-enforcement is just that—not enforcing the law. Nonenforcement does not entail refusing to remove these individuals as required by the law and then providing three years of immunity from that law, legal presence status, plus any benefits that may accompany legal presence under current regulations. This Court seriously doubts that the Supreme Court, in holding non-enforcement decisions to be presumptively unreviewable, anticipated that such "non-enforcement" decisions would include the affirmative act of bestowing multiple, otherwise unobtainable benefits upon an individual. Not only does this proposition run afoul of traditional exercises of prosecutorial discretion that generally receive judicial deference, but it also flies in the face of the very concerns that informed the Heckler Court's holding. This Court finds the DHS Directive distinguishable from the non-enforcement decisions to which Heckler referred, and thus concludes that Heckler's presumption of unreviewability is inapplicable in this case. - - - - - - - - - - At 19-20: The APA provides that a "person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702. This right of judicial review extends to agency actions "for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. § 704. To demonstrate standing under the APA, the plaintiff must show that it has suffered or will suffer a sufficient injury in fact. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat 'I Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998). The plaintiff must also demonstrate prudential standing under the APA, which requires showing that "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [is] arguably within [20] the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question." Id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152). For this prudential standing inquiry, it is not necessary for a court to ask "whether there has been a congressional intent to benefit the would-be plaintiff." Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 522 U.S. at 488-89. Rather, if the plaintiffs interests are "arguably within the 'zone of interests' to be protected by a statute," the prudential showing requirement is satisfied. Id. at 492. This requisite showing is not made, however, if the plaintiffs interests are "so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit." Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass 'n, 479 U.S. 388,399 (1987). When seeking review of agency action under the APA's procedural provisions, Plaintiffs are also operating under a favorable presumption. They are presumed to satisfy the necessary requirements for standing. See Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Specifically, as stated by the D.C. Circuit, "[plaintiffs asserting a procedural rights challenge need not show the agency action would have been different had it been consummated in a procedurally valid manner-the courts will assume this portion of the causal link." Id. At 36: Relying on the APA, Plaintiffs assert not only a basis for standing but also an argument on the merits. Because these concepts are closely intertwined, the Court will address both in its discussion of the merits. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated above and the reasons articulated below, the States have APA standing as well. Regarding Article III standing, at 34: Regarding Prudential Standing at 36: Regarding Abdication Standing at 67:
Would you rather have war here or the retard jew haters and their enablers from that shithole here?
This is a subtle invitation to war. Bait. Because it would be good to have war back posting. Even if he is mostly wrong. He is like mosquito's.
He would come here except for one minor problem....you!
The D&R terrorists hate us because we're free, to vote second party
"We (government) need to do a lot less, a lot sooner" ~Ron Paul
#2. To: A K A Stone (#0)
#3. To: CZ82, *Border Invasion* (#2)
I'm a WASP whose direct ancestors, on both sides, were here, i.e. America, before the end of the 17th century...
The D&R terrorists hate us because we're free, to vote second party
"We (government) need to do a lot less, a lot sooner" ~Ron Paul
#4. To: hondo68 (#3)
I'm a WASP
#5. To: CZ82 (#4)
#6. To: A K A Stone (#0)
[war]
(3) Exceptions to Review
The former [§ 701 (a)(1)] applies when Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review. The latter [§701(a)(2)] applies in different circumstances; even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. In such a case, the statute ("law") can be taken to have "committed" the decisionmaking to the agency's judgment absolutely. This construction avoids conflict with the "abuse of discretion" standard of review in § 706--if no judicially manageable standards are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion, then it is impossible to evaluate agency action for "abuse of discretion."
Overton Park did not involve an agency's refusal to take requested enforcement action. It involved an affirmative act of approval under a statute that set clear guidelines for determining when such approval should be given. Refusals to take enforcement steps generally involve precisely the opposite situation, and in that situation we think the presumption is that judicial review is not available.
3. Standing Under the Administrative Procedure Act
3. Standing under the APA
Plaintiffs-or at least Texas-have clearly met their burden of showing that their alleged injuries have been and will be directly "traceable" to the actions of the Defendants. Far from a generalized injury or "pie in the sky" guesswork, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a direct, finite injury to the States that is caused by the Government's actions. Given that Plaintiffs have shown that they stand to suffer concrete and particularized consequences from Defendants' actions, they have pled an injury sufficient to demonstrate standing in this Court.
Finally, Plaintiffs are not resting their claim for relief solely on the rights and interests of third-parties. Rather, the States are seeking to protect their own proprietary interests, which they allege will be directly harmed by the implementation of DAPA. Thus Plaintiffs have similarly satisfied their burden to show prudential standing.
In the present case, Congress has clearly stated that illegal aliens should be removed. Like that at issue in Adams, the DHS program clearly circumvents immigration laws and allows individuals that would otherwise be subject to removal to remain in the United States. The policy in Adams purported to seek voluntary compliance with Title VI. In contrast, the DHS does not seek compliance with federal law in any form, but instead establishes a pathway for non-compliance and completely abandons entire sections of this country's immigration law. Assuming that the concept of abdication standing will be recognized in this Circuit, this Court finds that this is a textbook example.
#7. To: A K A Stone (#0)
#8. To: Biff Tannen (#7)
#9. To: A K A Stone (#8)
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