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Title: FLUSH: ‘Conservative Hero’ Ben Carson To Beck: You Have No Right To Semi-Automatic Weapons In Large Cities
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URL Source: http://www.mediaite.com/tv/conserva ... matic-weapons-in-large-cities/
Published: Nov 12, 2014
Author: Andrew Kirell
Post Date: 2014-11-12 12:32:26 by A K A Stone
Keywords: None
Views: 40244
Comments: 99
Appearing on Glenn Beck‘s radio show this past week, Dr. Benjamin Carson took a vastly different stance from most conservatives on the issue of gun control, claiming you shouldn’t be able to own semi-automatic weapons in large cities. Carson became a newfound conservative hero last month when he spoke at the National Prayer Breakfast and laid out a series of criticisms of ObamaCare, political correctness, and tax policy right in front of the president himself. Many called the speech “inappropriate” given the apolitical nature of the event, but many conservatives lauded Carson for his “bold” and “sensible” suggestions for policy reform. Asked by Beck for his thoughts on the Second Amendment, Carson gave the popular pro-gun argument: “There’s a reason for the Second Amendment; people do have the right to have weapons.” But when asked whether people should be allowed to own “semi-automatic weapons,” the doctor replied: “It depends on where you live.” “I think if you live in the midst of a lot of people, and I’m afraid that that semi-automatic weapon is going to fall into the hands of a crazy person, I would rather you not have it,” Carson elaborated. However, if you live “out in the country somewhere by yourself” and want to own a semi-automatic weapon, he added, “I’ve no problem with that.” Watch below, via TheBlaze:
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#51. To: misterwhite (#49)
Your nonsense is based a a false premise. Not all citizens had all the rights held by others. 88 US 178 The people of the nation were not defined by all the differing State laws. The right to vote was not a Constitutional right. The Constitution did not confer that right to anyone. The people of the nation were its C-I-T-I-Z-E-N-S. 88 US 162, 166 (1875) My source is the U.S. Supreme Court. Yours appears to be some wingnut website you are too ashamed to cite.
Ok they gave women the right to vote with the 19th amendment. Or maybe they already had it. But let me add this. The constitution refers to who is elibible to be President. It only says "he". It never says she. So technically a woman isn't eligible to run for President. There is no amendment changing that.
No, they did not give women the right to vote with the 19th Amendment. The prohibited the States from prohibiting voting based upon sex. For example, nobody has the right to vote for Presidential electors unless the State decides to grant such right. From Bush v Gore: The right to vote is determined by State law. The Federal law prohibits certain forms of discrimination in the applicable State laws. So technically a woman isn't eligible to run for President. There is no amendment changing that. Common English usage provides that the masculine pronoun is used when a group includes both sexes. There is no question that women are eligible to run for President. A woman has already run for President, been officially on the ballot of several states, and received votes. The Constitution set the requirements for who could run and did not prohibit women. It requires one to be at least 35 years old, a natural born citizen, and fourteen years a resident in the U.S. Belva Ann Lockwood was officially on ballots in 1884, decades before the 19th Amendment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belva_Ann_Lockwood Lockwood graduated from law school in Washington, D.C. and became one of the first female lawyers in the United States. In 1879, she successfully petitioned Congress to be allowed to practice before the United States Supreme Court, becoming the first woman attorney given this privilege. Lockwood ran for president in 1884 and 1888 on the ticket of the National Equal Rights Party and was the first woman to appear on official ballots.[2] http://www.greatwomen.org/women-of-the-hall/search-the-hall/details/2/98-Lockwood Belva Ann Lockwood was nominated for President by the National Equal Rights Party in 1884 and gained ballot access in 6 States and received 4,149 recorded votes.
Some did. "The 19th Amendment was needed to prohibit sex discrimination which was not forbidden by the original Constitution." The 19th protected the right of women to vote. Prior to that, they couldn't vote in all the states. Are you saying women could vote in all the states in 1792?
I'm only discussing one right now -- the right to vote. Could women vote in all the states in 1792? Why won't you answer this very simple question?
More nonsense. Neither women, nor men, had a right to vote. Our rights are not granted to us by State governments. The 19th Amendment does not protect a right. It prohibits the States from discriminating on the basis of sex in laws passed that determine who is a qualified voter. The State government can equally deny men and women the "right" to vote in a presidential election. They can choose to have the legislature select the delegates to the Electoral College. Alternatively, the State legislature could appoint the Statehouse janitor to select the delegates. The State Legislature has plenary authority for that election. What law they pass cannot say the men can vote but not women or that Whites can vote but not Blacks.
Not all women and not all men qualified for the elective franchise in 1792 or now, or at any time in between. Neither women, nor men, had a right to vote. Our rights are not granted to us by State governments.
Let me throw a wrench in here. The Declaration of Independence gives you the right to vote. Because it is based on natural law. It says you can't be taxes without representation. Everyone is taxed. So you have a natural right to vote. Indirectly.
Correct. But they are protected by state governments. Which was what I said. And, prior to the 19th amendment, the right to vote was not protected for women. Meaning that those who voted in 1792 -- "the people" -- did not include women in all the states. Do you agree?
Each state decided who could vote, and it varied from state to state. Those voters (whoever they were) were called "the people". They were citizens with full rights, and they were the ones who were invested in the community and had the most to lose. They were freeholders -- older, white, male citizens with land. If there was a tax, they were the ones who paid it. There were some exceptions, but women and children did not own land or run for office. Voting issues didn't affect them, so there was no reaon for them to vote.
On that we agree. Do we also agree that those who could vote were "the people" referenced in Article I, Section 2?
The DOI did not give any rights to anybody. The DOI is a political declaration of the causes impelling a colonial secession of thirteen colonies from Great Britain. When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world. He has refused his assent to laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and, when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature, a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only. He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing, with manly firmness, his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise; the state remaining, in the mean time, exposed to all the dangers of invasions from without and convulsions within. He has endeavored to prevent the population of these states; for that purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands. He has obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers. He has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power. He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution and unacknowledged by our laws, giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation: For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us; For protecting them, by a mock trial, from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these states; For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world; For imposing taxes on us without our consent; For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury; For transporting us beyond seas, to be tried for pretended offenses; For abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighboring province, establishing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries, so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies; For taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments; For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated government here, by declaring us out of his protection and waging war against us. He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burned our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny already begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow-citizens, taken captive on the high seas, to bear arms against their country, to become the executioners of their friends and brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands. He has excited domestic insurrection among us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions. In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. Nor have we been wanting in our attentions to our British brethren. We have warned them, from time to time, of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity; and we have conjured them, by the ties of our common kindred, to disavow these usurpations which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too, have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our separation, and hold them as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends. We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of these colonies solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that, as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do. And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor. [Signed by] JOHN HANCOCK [President] [snip - additional signatures] Source: Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States. Government Printing Office, 1927. House Document No. 398. Selected, Arranged and Indexed by Charles C. Tansill Clearly, by the Articles of Confederation, the states continued to be free, sovereign and independent. They expressly entered into a league of friendship. As does the DOI, the Paris Peace Treaty refers to the United States in the plural, on their part, and refers to the individual states in the plural as free sovereign states and that the King treats with them as such. The free sovereign states were addressed individually, by name. For whatever reason, it seems Delaware was not individually listed in this agreement. The State political communities became recognized as free, sovereign, and independent states, plural. They organized with the people of each state being the sovereign of that state. The sovereign, by definition, is not subject to any higher power. IMHO only, any talk of divided sovereignty is political blasphemy. We are supposed to have divided powers, according to what the people chose to delegate to the Federal and State governments. The people delegated certain powers to the Federal government by the Article of Confederation. With ratification by nine states (11 by the time a government was seated), a new union was formed between the 11 states so ratifying. The Constitution delegated more power to the Federal government than had the Articles. In no case did the people delegate their sovereignty, or any part thereof, to anyone. The people of the several states delegated certain powers to their state governments. What they did not delegate, they retained to themselves. As the sovereigns, the people (the political communities organized and referred to as States) held all rights and powers not delegated. The powers of the Government are derived from the people. The rights of the people are not derived from the Government. The people are sovereign, the Government is not. Articles of Confederation, March 1, 1781 Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts-bay Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. I. The Stile of this Confederacy shall be II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled. III. The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever. IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them. If any person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the Governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offense. Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State. [snip] The Definitive Treaty of Peace 1783 In the name of the most holy and undivided Trinity. It having pleased the Divine Providence to dispose the hearts of the most serene and most potent Prince George the Third, by the grace of God, king of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, defender of the faith, duke of Brunswick and Lunebourg, arch-treasurer and prince elector of the Holy Roman Empire etc., and of the United States of America, to forget all past misunderstandings and differences that have unhappily interrupted the good correspondence and friendship which they mutually wish to restore, and to establish such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse , between the two countries upon the ground of reciprocal advantages and mutual convenience as may promote and secure to both perpetual peace and harmony; and having for this desirable end already laid the foundation of peace and reconciliation by the Provisional Articles signed at Paris on the 30th of November 1782, by the commissioners empowered on each part, which articles were agreed to be inserted in and constitute the Treaty of Peace proposed to be concluded between the Crown of Great Britain and the said United States, but which treaty was not to be concluded until terms of peace should be agreed upon between Great Britain and France and his Britannic Majesty should be ready to conclude such treaty accordingly; and the treaty between Great Britain and France having since been concluded, his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, in order to carry into full effect the Provisional Articles above mentioned, according to the tenor thereof, have constituted and appointed, that is to say his Britannic Majesty on his part, David Hartley, Esqr., member of the Parliament of Great Britain, and the said United States on their part, John Adams, Esqr., late a commissioner of the United States of America at the court of Versailles, late delegate in Congress from the state of Massachusetts, and chief justice of the said state, and minister plenipotentiary of the said United States to their high mightinesses the States General of the United Netherlands; Benjamin Franklin, Esqr., late delegate in Congress from the state of Pennsylvania, president of the convention of the said state, and minister plenipotentiary from the United States of America at the court of Versailles; John Jay, Esqr., late president of Congress and chief justice of the state of New York, and minister plenipotentiary from the said United States at the court of Madrid; to be plenipotentiaries for the concluding and signing the present definitive treaty; who after having reciprocally communicated their respective full powers have agreed upon and confirmed the following articles. Article 1: His Brittanic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, to be free sovereign and independent states, that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his heirs, and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety, and territorial rights of the same and every part thereof. [snip] D. HARTLEY (SEAL) Source: Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America. Edited by Hunter Miller Volume 2 Documents 1-40 : 1776-1818 Washington : Government Printing Office, 1931. Over the centuries, the Constitution and the American political organization has been reinterpreted into something where the people have delegated part of their sovereignty to the Federal government, and part of their sovereignty to the State governments, each of whom is sovereign within their separate spheres of "sovereignty." Being a little bit sovereign compares to being a little bit pregnant.
Do you agree? No. This remains unmitigated crap. The people of the United States are its citizens. The Court stated in Huber v. Reily, "Congress is, indeed, empowered to make regulations for the time, place and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, or to alter those made by the legislature of a state (except those in relation to the places of choosing senators), but here its power stops; the right of suffrage at a state election, is a state right, a franchise conferrable only by the state, which congress can neither give nor take away." Individual states decide meets, or fails to meet, the qualifications to be a voter in each state. Individual states do not decide who meets, or fails to meet, the qualifications to be a citizen of the United States. If you are a natural born citizen, you are one of the people of the United States. If you are naturalized, you are one of the people of the United States. By the Constitution, the people delegated to the Federal government the power to adopt a uniform rule of naturalization. It is a uniform rule, not fifty different rules, which determines naturalization. U.S. Supreme Court Wesberry V. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, Opinion of the Court 376 U.S. 8-9, Opinion of the Court 376 U.S. 12-14, Opinion of the Court The debates at the Convention make at least one fact abundantly clear: that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent "people" they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of the State's inhabitants. 30 The Constitution embodied Edmund Randolph's proposal for a periodic census to ensure "fair representation of the people," 31 an idea endorsed by Mason as assuring that "numbers of inhabitants" [376 U.S. 1, 14] should always be the measure of representation in the House of Representatives. 32 Readers surely could have fairly taken this to mean, "one person, one vote." Cf. Gary v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381. 376 U.S. 1, 25-26 (From dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan) 376 U.S. 27 (From dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan) Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, Opinion of the Court 376 U.S. 8-9, Opinion of the Court 376 U.S. 12-14, Opinion of the Court The debates at the Convention make at least one fact abundantly clear: that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent "people" they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of the State's inhabitants. 30 The Constitution embodied Edmund Randolph's proposal for a periodic census to ensure "fair representation of the people," 31 an idea endorsed by Mason as assuring that "numbers of inhabitants" [376 U.S. 1, 14] should always be the measure of representation in the House of Representatives. 32 Readers surely could have fairly taken this to mean, "one person, one vote." Cf. Gary v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381. 376 U.S. 1, 25-26 (From dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan) 376 U.S. 27 (From dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan) United States v Quinn, 2nd Cir, 8 Blatchford 48, 57-58. United States v Quinn, 2nd Cir, 8 Blatchford 48, 61. Section 4, subdivision 1. "The times, places, aud manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators." Section 5, subdivision 1. "Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members." Section 8, last subdivision. "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Does the Act in question infringe the provision of the Constitution which I have read, which provides that the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature? It is argued with great ingenuity and ability, that the Act in question infringes that clause of the Constitution, because it seeks to establish a test of qualification -- seeks to affirm the evidence of qualification -- and, by so doing, ex vi termini, imposes qualification itself. We apprehend that that argument rests upon no solid basis. The Act in question neither professes, nor, by any implication, can it, we think, be construed to affect the qualification of any elector anywhere. It imposes no duty to register. It prohibits no registration that is required in the State in which the elector seeks to exercise his franchise. It touches no qualification of the elector in any other respect. It leaves the power of the State to prescribe the qualifications of electors for the most numerous. branch of the State Legislature, in the largest and fullest extent, untouched and unaffected. It says, and only says, that, when the qualification of registration is imposed by the State law, (leaving the expediency or wisdom of such a law entirely to the judgmeut of the State), it shall be an offense against the laws of the United States to contribute, by fraud and violation of the State registry laws, to the seuding of a representative to the Congress of the United States who is not clothed with the authority which a true expression of the popular will would give; and that is all. U.S. Supreme Court, 60 U. S. 393, 404 (1856) Huber v Reilly, 53 Penn. St. Reports 112 (1866)
No, I still think that is a load of crap. It is very clear that the people of the United States are its C-I-T-I-Z-E-N-S. United States v Quinn, 2nd Cir, 8 Blatchford 48, 57-58. Wesberry V. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, Opinion of the Court Id. at 17-18: Huber v Reilly, 53 Penn. St. Reports 112 (1866)
Thereby protecting the right of women to vote. Look. Call it whatever you want. The point is that women couldn't vote before the 19th amendment. Meaning, not all citizens were allowed to vote. Do you agree with that?
Article I, Section 2 says "the people" are the voters. In 1792 women didn't vote. How could they belong to "the people"?
Words mean things. The U.S. Constitution refers to "persons", "citizens", and "the people". THOSE ARE THREE DIFFERENT GROUPS. You're saying they all mean the same thing. You're wrong.
Do you agree with that? As a result of voter qualifications imposed by certain state or local laws, some men and women could not vote because they did not meet said non-federal requirements which had nothing to do with the Constitution or Federal law. It is historical fact that women did, in fact, vote prior to the 19th Amendment. It is historical fact that a woman ran for President, appeared on official ballots, and gained officially recorded votes to be President before the 19th Amendment. Also, it is historical fact that a woman was admitted to practice law before the U.S. Supreme Court, and did so practice law, before the 19th Amendment.
THOSE ARE THREE DIFFERENT GROUPS. You're saying they all mean the same thing. You're wrong. I do not, and have not, said persons, citizens, and the people connote the same thing. Of course, you know that and are just making your best effort to repeat your incessant nonsense sourced to nothing but your vivid imagination. Not all persons are citizens. Most idiots know that. Not all persons are American people. Ditto. Not all voters have been American people. Historically, aliens could vote if state or local laws permitted. Ditto. Not all American people are voters. For example, incarcerated prisoners or freed felons are disenfranchised in multiple states. Ditto. Not all citizens are voters. For example, encarcerated prisoners or freed felons are disenfranchised in multiple states. Ditto. All U.S. citizens are American people. All of them, without exception. Ditto.
Article 1, Section 2 only says that in your spider infested mind. You are free to live within your vivid imagination. Please provide your proof that women did not vote in 1792? U.S. Supreme Court Wesberry V. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, Opinion of the Court 376 U.S. 8-9, Opinion of the Court 376 U.S. 12-14, Opinion of the Court Readers surely could have fairly taken this to mean, "one person, one vote." Cf. Gary v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381.
Article I, Section 2: The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states ... NOTE: It does not say "chosen every second year by all persons of the several states ..." Nor does it say "chosen every second year by the citizens of the several states ..." The Founders could have written that, but they chose not to. They wrote "the people" -- citizens with full rights. And that did NOT include women and children. Meaning, in 1792, "the people" did not include all citizens. Agreed?
You exhibit a profound grasp of the absurd, and the ability to repeat it endlessly. There is no such thing as citizens with less than full rights. Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155 (1909) At 159: At 162:
I agree that you exhibit a profound grasp of the absurd, and the ability to repeat it endlessly. Do you get this crap from some Jedi? Since there has been a United States, and there have been a people of the United States, the C-I-T-I-Z-E-N-S of the United States have been the people of the United States. That would be before, during, and at all times since 1792. http://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/art1frag14_user.html#art1_sec2 [Footnotes omitted] ARTICLE I LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Section 2. Clause 1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING A major innovation in constitutional law in recent years has been the development of a requirement that election districts in each State be so structured that each elected representative should represent substantially equal populations. While this requirement has generally been gleaned from the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in Wesberry v. Sanders, the Court held that “construed in its historical context, the command of Art. 1, Sec. 2, that Representatives be chosen ‘by the People of the several States’ means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.” James Madison to Edward Everett Montpelier, August 28, 1830. DEAR SIR, — [EXTRACT] 1. It was formed, not by the governments of the component states, as the federal government for which it was substituted was formed. Nor was it formed by a majority of the people of the United States, as a single community, in the manner of a consolidated government. It was formed by the states, that is, by the people in each of the states, acting in their highest sovereign capacity; and formed consequently by the same authority which formed the state constitutions. Constitution, Article VII The Constitution formed a union of STATES which ratified it. States are political communities comprised of the people of the state.
A child is a citizen but doesn't have full rights. Correct? And back in 1792, only white, male citizens with property had full rights. They were called freeholders and were "the people".
Not "people". Not "a people". Nowhere does the U.S. Constitution refer to "people" or "a people". Always "the people". You have absolutely no idea what you're talking about.
No. Your concept is just plain stupid. For example, a one year old has the same right of free speech as an adult. A typical one year old might exhibit your same difficulty with expressing his right in a coherent manner. The right, nevertheless, exists. At what age do you think a child is magically endowed with the right to free speech?
Nowhere does the U.S. Constitution refer to "people" or "a people". Always "the people". You have absolutely no idea what you're talking about. You have no idea what you are talking about. Provide a source to support your wingnut nonsense. The following addresses The Preamble and The People. Abel Upshur, A Brief Enquiry, 1840 A Brief Enquiry into the True Nature and Character of Our Federal Government: Being a Review of Judge Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, by Abel Upshur, Petersburg, Va, 1840. The opinion, that the constitution was formed by “the people of the United States,” as contradistinguished from the people of the several states, that is, as contradistinguished from the states as such, is founded exclusively on the particular terms of the preamble. The language is, “We, the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.” “The people do ordain and establish, not contract and stipulate with each other. The people of the United States, not the distinct people of a particular state, with the people of the other states.” In thus relying on the language of the preamble, the author rejects the lights of history altogether. I will endeavor in the first place to meet him on his own ground. It is an admitted rule, that the preamble of a statute may be resorted to in the construction of it; and it may, of course, be used to the same extent in the construction of a constitution, which is a supreme Law. But the only purpose for which it can be used is to aid in the discovery of the true object and intention of the law, where these [51] would otherwise be doubtful. The preamble can, in no case, be al· lowed to contradict the law, or to vary the meaning of its plain language. Still less can it be used to change the true character of the law-making power. If the preamble of the Constitution had declared that it was made by the people of France or England, it might, indeed, have been received as evidence of that fact, in the absence of all proof to the contrary; but surely it would not be so received against the plain testimony of the instrument itself, and the authentic history of the transaction. If the convention which formed the Constitution was not, in point of fact, a convention of the people of the United States, it had no right to give itself that title; nor had it any right to act in that character, if it was appointed by a different power. And if the Constitution, when formed, was adopted by the several states, acting through their separate conventions, it is historically untrue that it was adopted by the aggregate people of the United States. The preamble, therefore, is of no sort of value in settling this question; and it is matter of just surprise that it should be so often referred to, and so pertinaciously relied on, for that purpose. History alone can settle all difficulties upon this subject. The history of the preamble itself ought to have convinced our author, that the inference which he draws from it could not be allowed. On the 6th of August, 1787, the committee appointed for that purpose reported the first draft of a constitution. The preamble was in these words: “We, the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the following constitution, for the government of ourselves and our posterity:” (1 Elliott’s Debates, 255.) On the very next day this preamble was unanimously adopted; and the reader will at once perceive, that it carefully preserves the distinct sovereignty of the states, and discountenances all idea of consolidation. (Ib. 263.) The draft of the constitution thus submitted was discussed, and various alterations and amendments adopted, (but without any change in the preamble,) until the 8th of September, 1787, when the following resolution was passed: “It was moved and seconded to appoint a committee of five, to revise the style of, and arrange the articles agreed to, by the house; which passed in the affirmative.” (Ib. 324.) It is manifest that this committee had no power to change the meaning of any thing which had been adopted, but were authorized merely to “revise the style,” and arrange the matter in proper order. On the 12th of the same [52] month they made their report. The preamble, as they reported it, is in the following words: “We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.” (Ib. 326.) It does not appear that any attempt was made to change this phraseology in any material point, or to reinstate the original. The presumption is, therefore, that the two were considered as substantially the same, particularly as the committee had no authority to make any change, except in the style. The difference in the mere phraseology of the two was certainly not overlooked; for on the 13th September, 1787, “it was moved and seconded to proceed to the comparing of the report from the committee of revision, with the articles which were agreed to by the house, and to them referred for arrangement; which passed in the affirmative. And the same was read by paragraphs, compared, and, in some places, corrected and amended.” (Ib. 338.) In what particulars these corrections and amendments were made, we are not very distinctly informed. The only change which was made in the preamble was by striking out the word “to,” before the words “establish justice;” and the probability is, that no other change was made in any of the articles, except such as would make “the report of the committee of revision” “correspond with the articles agreed to by the house.” The inference, therefore, is irresistible, that the convention considered the preamble reported by the committee of revision, as substantially corresponding with the original draft, as unanimously “agreed to by the house.” There is, however, another and a perfectly conclusive reason for the change of phraseology, from the states by name, to the more general expression “the United States;” and this, too, without supposing that it was intended thereby to convey a different idea as to the parties to the constitution. The revised draft contained a proviso, that the constitution should go into operation when adopted and ratified by nine states. It was, of course, uncertain whether more than nine would adopt it, or not; and if they should not, it would be altogether improper to name them as parties to that instrument. As to one of them, Rhode Island, she was not even represented in the convention, and, consequently, the others had no sort of right to insert her as a party. Hence it became necessary to adopt a form of expression which would apply to those who should ratify the constitution, and [53] not to those who should refuse to do so. The expression actually adopted answers that purpose fully. It means simply, “We, the people of those states who have united for that purpose, do ordain,” &c. This construction corresponds with the historical fact, and reconciles the language employed with the circumstances of the case. Indeed, similar language was not unusual, through the whole course of the revolution. “The people of his majesty’s colonies,” “the people of the united colonies,” “the people of the United States,” are forms of expression which frequently occur, without intending to convey any other idea than that of the people of the several colonies or states.
That is ahistorical nonsense. New Jersey Constitution of 1776 (in effect in 1792 and until 1844) Any inhabitant of full age with fifty pounds proclamation money, resident twelve months, had the right to vote per the state constitution. As noted previously, women voted there for over thirty years, including before, during, and after 1792. It had absolutely nothing to do with the Federal constitution or Federal law. Voting rights were a state matter, left to the states to regulate. It is an absurdity to maintain that the Federal government determined who was part of the people of the United States based on conflicting State voting regulations.
Correct. "It is an absurdity to maintain that the Federal government determined who was part of the people of the United States based on conflicting State voting regulations." Who said that? I said the U.S. Constitution held that only "the people" were allowed to vote. Whoever the state allowed were "the people". With rare exceptions made by one or two states, "the people" were white, male citizens with property -- the point being, not all citizens were "the people".
Here ya go. Here's your We The People ... See any women? Children? Blacks? Foreigners? Illegals? Green Cards? I see white, male citizen landowners. They were "the people". They were the ones with the most to lose.
You are so full of crap. [...] The regulation of the suffrage is thereby conceded to the states as a state's right. [...] second, that a right of the character here involved is not one connected with citizenship of the United States. (Case No. 14,459) U. S. v. ANTHONY [24 Fed. Gas. page 829] Case No. 14,459. UNITED STATES v. ANTHONY. [11 Blatchf. 200; 5 Chi. Leg. News. 462, 493; 17 Int. Rev. Rec. 197; 30 Leg. Int. 266; 5 Leg. Op. 63; 20 Pittsb. Leg. J. 199.]1 Circuit Court, N. D. New York. June 18, 1873. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT —RIGHT TO VOTE—WOMEN—QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS IN NEW YORK. 1. A female voted, at an election in the state of New York for a representative in the congress of the United States. Under the constitution and laws of the state of New York, none but males were authorized to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. She possessed all the qualifications entitling a person to vote at such election, except that she was not a male. She was indicted, under section 19 of the act of May 31st, 1870 (16 Stat. 144), for knowingly voting at such election without having a lawful right to vote. On the trial it was contended, in defence, that, as she had all the qualifications required for electors of representatives in congress, by article 1, § 2, subd. 1, of the constitution of the United States (namely the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature), except that of being a male, the restriction of voting to males, by the constitution and laws of New York, was void, as a violation of the 14th amendment of the constitution of the United States, which provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Held, that such restriction was not void. [Cited in State v. Howard Co. Ct., 90 Mo. 598. 2 S. W. 790.] 2. The 13th, 14th and 15th amendments of the constitution of the United States, considered. 3. The 14th amendment defines and declares who shall be citizens of the United States, and protects only such rights as are rights belonging to persons as citizens of the United States, and not rights belonging to persons as citizens of a state. 4. The rights of citizens of a state defined. 5. The right or privilege of voting is one arising under the constitution of the state, and not under the constitution of the United States. [Cited in Kinneer v. Weds, 144 Mass. 498, 11 N. E. 919.] 6. It is no defence to such indictment, that the defendant believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance on that belief. [Cited in U S. v. Watkinds, 6 Fed. 154; The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed 426.] 7. The defendant, knowing that she was a female, and that the constitution of New York prohibited her from voting, and having voted, the court refused to submit to the jury the question whether she intended, by voting, to violate the statute, or any other question, and directed the jury to find a verdict of guilty, and denied a request, by the defendant's counsel, that the jury be polled. Held, on a motion for a new trial, that such direction was proper, and not a violation of the right of trial by jury. 8. On the trial of an indictment, the court has the power, and it is its duty, to direct a verdict 1 [Reported by Hon. Samuel Blatchford, District Judge, and here reprinted by permission. 17 Int. Rev. Rec. 197, 5 Chi. Leg. News, 462, 30 Leg. Int. 266, and 20 Pittsb. Leg. J. 199, contain only partial reports.] - - - - - of guilty, whenever the facts constituting guilt are undisputed. [Cited in U. S. v. Babcock, Case No. 14,486. Disapproved in U. S. v. Taylor, 11 Fed. 471.] [Cited in State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 3, 25 Atl. 964. Disapproved in Territory v. Kee (N. M.) 25 Pac. 926.] The defendant [Susan B. Anthony], a female, was indicted for a violation of the 19th section of the act of May 31st, 1870 (16 Stat. 144), which provides, "that if, at any election for representative * * in the congress of the United States, any person shall knowingly * * vote without having a lawful right to vote, * * every such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime, and shall, for such crime, be liable to prosecution in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, and, on conviction thereof, shall he punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or both, in the discretion of the court, and shall pay the costs of prosecution." The trial took place before HUNT, Circuit Justice, and a jury. There was no dispute that the defendant had voted for a representative in the congress of the United States at an election therefor, in Rochester, Monroe county, New York, and that, under the constitution and laws of the state of New York, none but males were authorized to vote at an election for members of the most numerous branch of the state legislature, and that the defendant possessed all the qualifications entitling a person to vote at such election, except that she was not a male. Richard Crowley, Dist. Atty., for the United States. Henry R. Selden, for defendant. HUNT, Circuit Justice, after argument had been heard on the legal questions involved, ruled as follows: The defendant is indicted under the act of congress of May 31st, 1870, for having voted for a representative in congress, in November, 1872. Among other things, that act makes it an offence for any person knowingly to vote for such representative without having a lawful right to vote. It is charged that the defendant thus voted, she not having a right to vote, because she is a woman. The defendant insists that she has a right to vote; and that the provision of the constitution of this state, limiting the right to vote to persons of the male sex, is in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, and is void. The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were designed mainly for the protection of the newly emancipated negroes, but full effect must, nevertheless, be given to the language employed. The thirteenth amendment provides, that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within - - - - - U. S. v. ANTHONY (Case No. 14,459) [24 Fed. Cas. page 830] the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction." If honestly received and fairly applied, this provision would have been enough to guard the rights of the colored race. In some states it was attempted to be evaded by enactments cruel and oppressive in their nature—as, that colored persons were forbidden to appear in the towns, except in a menial capacity; that they should reside on and cultivate the soil without being allowed to own it; that they were not permitted to give testimony in cases where a white man was a party. They were excluded from performing particular kinds of business, profitable and reputable, and they were denied the right of suffrage. To meet the difficulties arising from this state of things, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were enacted. The fourteenth amendment creates and defines citizenship of the United States. It had long been contended, and had been held by many learned authorities, and had never been judicially decided to the contrary, that there was no such thing as a citizen of the United States, except as that condition arose from citizenship of some state. No mode existed, it was said, of obtaining a citizenship of the United States, except by first becoming a citizen of some state. This question is now at rest. The fourteenth amendment defines and declares who shall be citizens of the United States, to wit, "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The latter qualification was intended to exclude the children of foreign representatives and the like. With this qualification, every person born in the United States or naturalized is declared to be a citizen of the United States and of the state wherein he resides. After creating and defining citizenship of the United States, the fourteenth amendment provides, that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." This clause is intended to be a protection, not to all our rights, but to our rights as citizens of the United States only; that is, to rights existing or belonging to that condition or capacity. The expression, citizen of a state, used in the previous paragraph, is carefully omitted here. In article 4, § 2, subd. 1, of the constitution of the United States, it had been already provided, that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." The rights of citizens of the states and of citizens of the United States are each guarded by these different provisions. That these rights are separate and distinct, was held in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. [83 U. S.] 36, recently decided by the supreme court. The rights of citizens of the state, as such, are not under consideration in the fourteenth amendment. They stand as they did before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and are fully guaranteed by - - - - - other provisions. The rights of citizens of the states have been the subject of judicial decision on more than one occasion. Corfield v. Coryell [Case No. 3,230]; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. [79 U. S.] 418, 430; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. [73 U. S.] 168. These are the fundamental privileges and immunities belonging of right to the citizens of all free governments, such as the right of life and liberty, the right to acquire and possess property, to transact business, to pursue happiness in his own manner, subject to such restraint as the government may adjudge to be necessary for the general good. In Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. [73 U. S.] 35, 44, is found a statement of some of the rights of a citizen of the United States, viz., to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon the government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions, and to have free access to its seaports, through which all the operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several states. "Another privilege of a citizen of the United States," says Mr. Justice Miller, in the Slaughterhouse Cases [supra], "is to demand the care and protection of the federal government over his life, liberty, and property, when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government." "The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," he says, "are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the federal constitution." The right of voting, or the privilege of voting, is a right or privilege arising under the constitution of the state, and not under the constitution of the United States. The qualifications are different in the different states. Citizenship, age, sex, residence, are variously required in the different states, or may be so. If the right belongs to any particular person, it is because such person is entitled to it by the laws of the state where he offers to exercise it, and not because of citizenship of the United States. If the state of New York should provide that no person should vote until he had reached the age of thirty years, or after he had reached the age of fifty, or that no person having gray hair, or who had not the use of all his limbs, should be entitled to vote, I do not see how it could be held to be a violation of any right derived or held under the constitution of the United States. We might say that such regulations were unjust, tyrannical, unfit for the regulation of an intelligent state; but, if rights of a citizen are thereby violated, they are of that fundamental class, derived from his position as a citizen of the state, and not those limited rights belonging to him as a citizen of the United States; and such was the decision in Corfield v. Coryell [supra]. - - - - - [24 Fed. Cas. page 831] (Case No. 14,459) U. S. v. ANTHONY The United States rights appertaining to this subject are those, first, under article 1, § 2, subd. 1, of the United States constitution, which provides, that electors of representatives in congress shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature; and second, under the fifteenth amendment, which provides, that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any state, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." If the legislature of the state of New York should require a higher qualification in a voter for a representative in congress than is required for a voter for a member of the house of assembly of the state, this would, I conceive, be a violation of a right belonging to a person as a citizen of the United States. That right is in relation to a federal subject or interest, and is guaranteed by the federal constitution. The inability of a state to abridge the right of voting on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, arises from a federal guaranty. Its violation would be the denial of a federal right—that is, a right belonging to the claimant as a citizen of the United States. This right, however, exists by virtue of the fifteenth amendment. If the fifteenth amendment had contained the word "sex," the argument of the defendant would have been potent. She would have said, that an attempt by a state to deny the right to vote because one is of a particular sex is expressly prohibited by that amendment. The amendment, however, does not contain that word. It is limited to race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The legislature of the state of New York has seen fit to say, that the franchise of voting shall be limited to the male sex. In saying this, there is, in my judgment, no violation of the letter, or of the spirit, of the fourteenth or of the fifteenth amendment This view is assumed in the second section of the fourteenth amendment, which enacts, that, if the right to vote for federal officers is denied by any state to any of the male inhabitants of such state, except for crime, the basis of representation of such state shall be reduced in a proportion specified. Not only does this section assume that the right of male inhabitants to vote was the especial object of its protection, but it assumes and admits the right of a state, notwithstanding the existence of that clause under which the defendant claims to the contrary, to deny to classes or portions of the male inhabitants the right to vote which is allowed to other male inhabitants. The regulation of the suffrage is thereby conceded to the states as a state's right. The case of Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. [83 U. S.] 130, decided at the recent term of the supreme court, sustains both of the positions above put forth, viz., first, that the rights referred to in the fourteenth amend- - - - - - ment are those belonging to a person as a citizen of the United States and not as a citizen of a state; and second, that a right of the character here involved is not one connected with citizenship of the United States. Mrs. Bradwell made application to be admitted to practice as an attorney and counsellor at law in the courts of Illinois. Her application was denied, and, upon a writ of error, it was held by the supreme court, that, to give jurisdiction under the fourteenth amendment, the claim must be of a right pertaining to citizenship of the United States, and that the claim made by her did not come within that class of cases. Justices Bradley, Swayne, and Field held that a woman was not entitled to a license to practice law. It does not appear that the other judges passed upon that question. The fourteenth amendment gives no right to a woman to vote, and the voting by Miss Anthony was in violation of law. If she believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance upon that belief, does that relieve her from the penalty? It is argued, that the knowledge referred to in the act relates to her knowledge of the illegality of the act, and not to the act of voting; for, it is said, that she must know that she voted. Two principles apply here: First, ignorance of the law excuses no one; second, every person is presumed to understand and to intend the necessary effects of his own acts. Miss Anthony knew that she was a woman, and that the constitution of this state prohibits her from voting. She intended to violate that provision—intended to test it, perhaps, but, certainly, intended to violate it. The necessary effect of her act was to violate it, and this she is presumed to have intended. There was no ignorance of any fact, but, all the facts being known, she undertook to settle a principle in her own person. She takes the risk, and she can not escape the consequences. It is said, and authorities are cited to sustain the position, that there can be no crime unless there is a culpable intent, and that, to render one criminally responsible a vicious will must be present. A. commits a trespass on the land of B., and B., thinking and believing that he has a right to shoot an intruder upon his premises, kills A. on the spot. Does B.'s misapprehension of his rights justify his act? Would a judge be justified in charging the jury, that, if satisfied that B. supposed he had a right to shoot A., he was justified, and they should find a verdict of not guilty? No judge would make such a charge. To constitute a crime, it is true that there must be a criminal intent, but it is equally true that knowledge of the facts of the case is always held to supply this intent. An intentional killing bears with it evidence of malice in law [and a desire to promote the welfare of the deceased by his translation to a better world would be no justification of the act, were it committed by a - - - - - U. S. v. ANTHONY (.Case No. 14,459; [24 Fed. Cas. page 832] sane man].2 Whoever, without justifiable cause, intentionally kills his neighbor, is guilty of a crime. The principle is the same in the case before us, and in all criminal eases. The precise question now before me has been several times decided, viz., that one illegally voting was bound and was assumed to know the law, and that a belief that he had a right to vote gave no defence, if there was no mistake of fact. Hamilton v. People, 57 Barb. 625; State v. Boyett, 10 Ired. 336; State v. Hart, 6 Jones, 380; McGuire v. State, 7 Humph. 54; State v. Sheeley, 15 Iowa, 404. No system of criminal jurisprudence can be sustained upon any other principle. Assuming that Miss Anthony believed she had a right to vote, that fact constitutes no defence, if, in truth, she had not the right. She voluntarily gave a vote which was illegal, and thus is subject to the penalty of the law. Upon the foregoing ruling, the counsel for the defendant requested the court to submit the ease to the jury on the question of intent, and with the following instructions: (1) If the defendant, at the time of voting, believed that she had a right to vote, and voted in good faith in that belief, she is not guilty of the offence charged. (2) In determining the question whether the defendant did or did not believe that she had a right to vote, the jury may take into consideration, as bearing upon that question, the advice which she received from the counsel to whom she applied, and, also, the fact, that the inspectors of the election considered the question and came to the conclusion that she had a right to vote. (3) The jury have a right to find a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, as they shall believe that the defendant has or has not committed the offence described in the statute. THE COURT declined to submit the case to the jury, on any question, and directed the jury to find a verdict of guilty. A request, by the defendant's counsel, that the jury be polled, was denied by THE COURT, and a verdict of guilty was recorded. On a subsequent day, a motion for a new trial was made, on the part of the defendant, before HUNT, Circuit Justice. HUNT, Circuit Justice, in denying the motion, said, in substance: The whole law of the ease has been reargued, and I have given the best consideration in my power to the arguments presented. But for the evident earnestness of the learned counsel for the defendant, for whose ability and integrity I have the highest respect, I should have no hesitation. Still I can entertain no doubt upon any point in the case. I do not doubt the correctness of my decision, that the defendant had no right to vote, and that her belief that she had a right 2 [From 17 Int. Rev. Rec. 197.] - - - - - to vote, she knowing all the facts and being presumed and bound to know the law, did not relieve her from the penalty for voting, when in truth she had no right to vote. The learned counsel insists, however, that an error was committed in directing the jury to render a verdict of guilty. This direction, he argues, makes the verdict that of the court and not of the jury, and it is contended that the provisions of the constitution looking to and securing a trial by jury in criminal cases have been violated. The right of trial by jury in civil as well as in criminal cases is a constitutional right. The second section of the first article of the constitution of the state of New York provides, that "the trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been heretofore used, shall remain inviolate forever." Articles six and seven of the amendments to the constitution of the United States contain a similar provision. Yet, in cases where the facts are all conceded, or where they are proved and uncontradicted by evidence, it has always been the practice of the courts to take the case from the jury and decide it as a question of law. No counsel has ever disputed the right of the court to do so. No respectable counsel will venture to doubt the correctness of such practice, and this in cases of the character which are usually submitted to a jury. People v. Cook, 4 Seld. [8 N. Y.] 67; Godin v. Bank of Commonwealth, 6 Duer, 76. The right of a trial by jury in a criminal case is not more distinctly secured than it is in a civil case. In each class of cases this right exists only in respect of a disputed fact. To questions of fact the jury respond. Upon questions of law, the decision of the court is conclusive, and the jury are bound to receive the law as declared by the court. People v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137, 141. Such is the established practice in criminal as well as in civil cases, and this practice is recognized by the hignest authorities. It has been so held by the former supreme court of this state, and by the present court of appeals of this state. At a circuit court of the United States, held by Judges Woodruff and Blatchford, upon deliberation and consultation, it was decided, that, in a criminal case, the court was not bound to submit the case to the jury, there being no sufficient evidence to justify a conviction, and the eourt accordingly instructed the jury to find a verdict of not guilty. U. S. v. Fullerton [Case No. 15,176]. The district attorney now states, that, on several occasions, since he has been in office, Judge Hall, being of opinion that the evidence did not warrant a conviction, has directed the jury to find a verdict of not guilty. In the case of People v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137, 141, the court of appeals of the state of New York, through its chief justice, uses the following language: "Contrary to an opinion formerly prevailing, it has been settled that the juries aie not judges of the law, as well - - - - - [24 Fed. Cas. page 833] (Case No. 14,461) U. S. v. ANTHONY as the facts, in criminal cases, but that they must take the law from the court. All questions of law during the trial are to be determined by the court, and it is the duty of the jury to regard and abide by such determination. * * * I can see no reason, therefore, why the court may not, in a case presenting a question of law only, instruct the jury to acquit the prisoner, or to direct an acquittal, and enforce the direction, nor why it is not the duty of the court to do so. This results from the rule, that the jury must take the law as adjudged by the court, and I think it is a necessary result." In these cases the question, in each instance, was, whether the court had power to direct a verdict of not guilty to be rendered. But the counsel for defendant expressly admits that the authority which justifies a direction to acquit will, in a proper case, justify a direction to convict; that it is a question of power; and that, if the power may be exercised in favor of the defendant, it may be exercised against him. As I now state this proposition, the counsel again signifies his assent. The reason given by Chief Justice Church in the case just cited, shows that there is no distinction between the cases in this respect. He says the rule results from the principle, that the jury must take the law from the court The duty of the jury to take the law from the court is the same, whether it is favorable to the defendant, or unfavorable to him. It is laid down in Colby, Cr. Law, c. 12, § 125, that no jury shall in any case be compelled to give a general verdict, so that they find the facts and require the court to give judgment thereon. 2 Rev. St. c. 421, § 68. "A special verdict is given when the jury find certain facts to exist, and leave the court to determine whether, according to law, the prisoner is guilty." "It is not necessary that the jury should, after stating the facts, draw any legal conclusion. If they do so, the court will reject the conclusion as superfluous, and pronounce such judgment as they think warranted by the facts." Colby, Cr. Law, c. 12, § 125. All the authorities tend to the same result. It is the duty of the jury to act upon the facts. It is the duty of the court to decide the law. The facts being specially found by the jury, it is the duty of the court, and not of the jury, to pronounce the judgment of guilty or not guilty. The facts being fully conceded, it is the duty of the court to announce and direct what the verdict shall be, whether guilty or not guilty. Therefore, I cannot doubt the power and the duty of the court to direct a verdict of guilty, whenever the facts constituting guilt are undisputed. In the present case, the court had decided, as matter of law, that Miss Anthony was not a legal voter. It had also decided, as matter of law, that, knowing every fact in the case, and intending, to do just what she did, she had knowingly voted, not having a right to vote, and that her belief did not affect the question. Every fact in the case was undisputed. There was no inference to be drawn or point made on the facts, that could, by possibility, alter the result. It was, therefore, not only the right, but it seems to me, upon the authorities, the plain duty of the judge to direct a verdict of guilty. The motion for a new trial is denied. The defendant was thereupon sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and the costs of the prosecution.
I see a fictional event that never occurred in real life. Fitting that you butress your fiction with fiction. That scene is real like the congressional debates in the Spielberg movie Lincoln were real.
North Carolina Constitution, 1776 [...] VIII. That all freemen, of the age of twenty-one years, who have been inhabitants of any one county within the State twelve months immediately preceeding the day of any election, and shall have paid public taxes, shall be entitled to vote for members of the House of Commons for the county in which he resides. That's two and counting. You are still at zero. As previously noted, free Blacks voted in early North Carolina.
New York Constitution 1777 That's three and counting. You are still at zero and running out of options, and I have not touched New England yet.
The fact that you have to dig around for exceptions makes my point -- not all citizens could vote. Meaning, "the people" referred to in the U.S. Constitution did not include all citizens.
Three what? Three posts? It says every male. That's what I said.
It says every male. That's what I said. Three States that are exceptions to your nonsense claim. Make it four. Remember what you claimed? Check your short-term memory. http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=36575&Disp=5#C5 [...] misterwhite posted on 2014-11-15 11:45:41 ET Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1790 Article III, Section 1: That's four states and counting. You are still at zero and running out of options, and I have not touched New England yet. It looks like your claim is universally false. Of course, words are cheap. You have yet to identify or document one single State that supports your claim. You have documented nothing. Your best attempt was a painting of a fictional event.
I am not digging around. I am simply showing, one by one, that the laws of every state say your claim is nonsense. You have yet to show a single state where it ever applied. http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=36575&Disp=5#C5 [...] misterwhite posted on 2014-11-15 11:45:41 ET
Blithering nonsense. COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS, JANUARY TERM,1890. Frieszleben v.Shallcross et al. [...] [58] OPINION OF COURT. [...] Comegys, C. J. The questions presented in the arguments of this case by the counsel of the plaintiff are many; but they are all within the scope of those made by the case stated, and questions reserved thereon, which, in effect, are whether the legislation of [59] this state in 1873, set forth in counsel’s briefs, is a valid exercise of legislative power; and, if not, whether the defendants are liable to the plaintiff in damages in his action. In order to properly comprehend and decide the first question, it is necessary—at least I think it will be useful—to go back into the political history of the state, or rather of the territory of which it is composed, and ascertain what, down to the time of the Revolutionary War, was the law with regard to the suffrage, or right to vote for public officers at elections. Before doing this, it will be well that a proper understanding should obtain in regard to the participation of men in the government they are under; that is, the power of deciding by ballot, at elections held for that purpose, who shall administer public affairs. It is not directly denied on behalf of the plaintiff—in fact, it is conceded—that the power to use the ballot is one of those derived from government, or the political society in which the elector resides. At the same time the contention here is the outgrowth of the idea that the primary object of government is universality of electorate. It is, of course, entirely consistent with the hopes of most men, members of a political body, (as one of the states of the Union,) that every person recognized by society as acting sui juris should participate in the ballot; and all such, it is believed, are accorded that privilege. But in this state, as no doubt in most of the others, it is conferred only upon the condition of contributing to the support of the government. The paramount duty of organized society is not to make the use of the ballot “free” to every such person, but to provide the means for its own sustenance, which is done by taxation, and, after that, but altogether subordinate to it, however, to secure to the payer of taxes, not the mere taxable, the privilege, or “right,” as it is generally called, to vote at elections. There is no natural right to vote. It is one conferred by a community at large upon certain of its members, which implies the power and authority to withhold it from others. The whole idea of our original government—that before 1776—was that only those [60] who paid taxes should vote; not that all should vote, but only those who helped to support the government. It was a privilege conferred upon such, and such only. They were the freemen, out of whose body, in the public aggregate mass, the public officers, particularly the legislative council and assembly, were to be chosen. Those who had real estate were rated upon it, and such as had not were assessed upon the poll. It is a great mistake to suppose that the first law for a poll-tax, as alleged by plaintiff’s counsel in argument, was the act of 1796. The fact is that before William Penn came to America, to take possession of the territory granted him by Charles II, (March, 1681, ) he promulgated a “frame” of government for his province of Pennsylvania, and a Code called “Laws Agreed upon in England,” which latter defines those who are to be considered as freemen to use the ballot. In the language of the “frame,” by the second clause or paragraph, the freemen were to choose the provincial council, and, by the fourteenth, the members of the general assembly. There is, however, no definition therein of a “freeman.” The date of this is the 25th of April, (then the second month,) 1682. On the following 5th of May, the latter rescript was passed, which in the second clause defines the term “freeman,” used in the former and in the first clause of the latter, in the following words: “Second. That every inhabitant of said province [Pennsylvania] that is or shall be a purchaser of one hundred acres of land, or upwards, his heirs and assigns, and every person who shall have paid his passage, and taken up one hundred acres of land at one penny an acre, and have cultivated ten acres thereof, and every person that hath been a servant or bondsman, and is free by his service, that shall have taken up fifty acres of land, and cultivated twenty thereof, and every inhabitant, artificer, or other resident in the said province that pays scot and lot to the government, shall be deemed and accounted a freeman of said province; and every such person shall be, and may be, capable of electing, or being elected, representatives of the people in provincial council or general assembly [61]in the said province.” These documents are to be found in a compilation of the laws established by the Duke of York, and by the Penn government, also, made by authority of the state of Pennsylvania, labeled “Duke of York’s Book of Laws, 1676-1682” and the “Charter and Laws of the Province of Pennsylvania, 1683-1700,” pp. 93-101. In the “act of union” by which the counties which now form this state were, by the desire of the inhabitants, annexed by Penn (who had become enfeoffed of them by deed of the Duke of York, who succeeded his brother, Charles II., as James II.) to his province of Pennsylvania, those inhabitants were guaranteed to be governed by the same laws, and to enjoy the same privileges, in all respects, as the inhabitants of Pennsylvania, etc. Freemen in the counties were then the same as freemen in the province; that is, those who paid “scot and lot,” or “customary contribution laid upon all subjects according to their ability,” as it is defined by the lexicographer, Bailey. The date is 7th of December, 1682. Id: 104. On the same date as the “act of union,” Penn, with the advice and consent of the deputies of the freemen of this province and counties aforesaid,” (the Delaware counties,) enacted what is called “The Great Laws, or Body of Laws,” by chapter 58 of which it is provided as follows: “And, that elections may not be corruptly managed, upon which the present and future good of the province so much depends, be it,” etc., “that all elections of members or representatives of the people and freemen of the province of Pennsylvania, and territories annexed, [now Delaware,] to serve in the assembly thereof, shall be free and voluntary; and that the elector that shall receive any reward or gift, in meat, drink, moneys, or otherwise, shall forfeit his right to elect; and such person as shall give, promise, or bestow any such reward, as aforesaid, to be elected, shall forfeit his election, and be thereby incapable to serve as aforesaid; and the assembly shall be sole judges of the regularity or irregularity of the election of the members thereof.” In chapter 127 following, it is enacted in these words: “And, [62] to the end that due provisions be made to defray the requisite charges incident to the public business and service of this province, and territories thereof, be it enacted,” etc., “that the charges of each county shall be made up in open court by the respective magistrates thereof; and that every such court shall have, and hereby hath, power to assess and lay such taxes upon the county as shall defray the same, so that it be equal, and according to proportion; and that the one-half of the said tax to be paid shall be raised upon land, the other half by the poll, on the male from sixteen to sixty years of age, and that all such persons who hold land within the province and territories thereof, and do not reside therein, and so incapable of giving that attendance, and yielding that service, to the public, as those that live therein, shall pay to all public taxes for such lands so held by them one-half more than residents pay for the same portion.” On the 20th of October, 1691, William and Mary took the government of the province and territories (the Delaware counties) into their own hands. In this state, on dispossession of Penn, they appointed, as captain general and governor, Benjamin Fletcher; one of the first acts of whose administration was to procure the passage of a law for granting a penny in the pound to the sovereigns, towards the support of the government uuder him. The fourth clause of the act provides that the tax shall be a charge upon real and personal estate for a year only, and then declares that “all freemen within this proviuce and territories as have been out of their servitude by the space of six months, and shall not be otherwise rated by this act, nor worth one hundred pounds, shall pay unto the use aforesaid the sum of six shillings per head, with a proviso that our chief proprietary and his late deputies shall not be assessed or otherwise chargeable by virtue of this act.” Id. 221, 222. By section 17 of this act, (the law about counties levies,) it is provided that the grand jury shall present any sum necessary to be raised, either for the paying of any public debt, or other occasion for the public utility of the county, “and the justices [of the [63] quarter sessions] to make the rate or assessment, which shall be raised in the same manner as moneys are by the sessions agreed to be raised for the support of the government, viz., after the rate of one penny per pound [upon property] and six shillings upon the poll.” Id. 233. William Penn was restored to the government of his province and territories by William and Mary in the sixth year of their reign, (21st October, 1693,) and appointed his nephew, William Markham, his deputy, who, with the advice and consent of the council and representatives of the province and territories, passed an act or body of laws, the first clause of which, after the preamble defines the term “freemen,” (that is, those who were to vote for council and assemblymen,) as follows: “That no inhabitant of this province or territories shall have right of electing or being elected as aforesaid unless they be free denizens of this government, and are of the age of twenty-one years of age or upwards, and have fifty acres of land, ten acres whereof are seated and cleared, or be otherwise worth fifty pounds lawful money of this government, clear estate, and have resident within this government for the space of two years next before such election.” Id., 247. By this law, Penn made the electoral qualification one entirely of property. In the second chapter of the enactment is an act for raising the rate of one penny per pound, and six shillings per head, upon such as are not otherwise rated thereby, to be employed by the government for the time being as is hereinafter limited and appointed;” the enacting section of which fixes the rate for housekeepers, and then provides that all males within this province and territories of this act who have been free of their servitude by the space of six months, and shall be above the age of 21 years, being worth £72 and upwards, shall be assessed and pay after the rate of 1 penny per pound clear estate as aforesaid, and that such of the said males only as be not worth £72 shall pay six shillings per head. In 1704 the separation between the territories and the province took place; and thereafter they had separate legislative bodies, though under [64] the lieutenant governors of the Penn proprietorship of the province as long as the rule of the family lasted, that is, down to the Revolutionary War. The first declaration of those entitled to vote, of electing and being elected, after the separation was made by an act of the 7th George II., (1736,) passed by the then Lieut. Gov. Patrick Gordon, “by and with the advice and consent of the representatives of the freemen of the said counties, [New Castle, Kent and Sussex on Delaware,] in general assembly met,” etc., which in its second section confines the suffrage to property holders by this language : “Provided, always, that no inhabitants of this government shall have right of electing or being elected as aforesaid unless he or they be natural born subjects of Great Britain, or be naturalized in England, or in this government, or in the province of Pennsylvania, and unless such person or persons be of the age of twenty-two years or upwards, and be a freeholder or freeholders in this government, and have fifty acres of land or more well settled, and twelve acres thereof cleared and improved, or be otherwise worth forty pounds lawful money of this government clear estate, and have been resident therein for the space of two years before such election.” 1 Laws Del., 146. There is no other act relating to the qualification of elector in the colonial period. In the year 1797 an act of the general assembly of the state was passed which established a different rule from that then prevailing for assessing the polls of freemen, that is, the personal rate. This fixed it at not more than £1,000 of the then currency, nor less than £200. This is the act erroneously supposed to have first created the poll-tax. Hall’s Dig. Laws Del., 390. In the revision of 1852 the phraseology is changed, the highest rate of poll tax being $2,700, the equivalent of £1,000, and the lowest $140, the virtual equivalent of £50, Delaware,currency. Such is the law of the state at this day. From this review of the law which has always prevailed here in regard to the qualification of voters, two things seem to be clear, —that is, that the right to vote was conditional altogether upon the [65] payment of taxes previously assessed, (“scot and lot,” as tersely expressed in the homely but perfectly well understood language of the ancient enactments,) and that the poll-tax was adopted 100 years, at least, before 1797, for those who had no property. Under the old system, there could be no privilege of voting by any without payment of tax, without each man paying his part towards the support of government. The theory then was that no man should enjoy the privilege of voting for public officers unless he paid for it, by adding the requirement of tax upon him to the general concession for the maintenance of the state. The privilege was conditional upon his doing that in some form, voluntary or by compulsion. “ Pay your tax, and you may vote,” said the law; which shows that it was only upon compliance with a condition that a citizen could cast a ballot. All arguments, therefore, which are the offspring of any notion of inalienable right, sacred right, indefeasible right, have no place in this discussion. The right to vote was, in the old time as now, conditional upon several things,— citizenship, majority of age, payment of county rates and levies. It was and is but a privilege or right sub conditione; and those who fixed the terms of it were strangers to any other idea than quid pro quo,—“scot and lot.” Such modern ideas as manhood suffrage, (if by that be meant a suffrage because of full age,) ballot for all, and slavery without the ballot, were properly left to be evolved out of the consciousness of visionary theorists, with aspirations for a state of society dreamt of only by those who would substitute our poor humanity for the great creator. The law of 7th George II., (1736,) continued, as that fixing the qualification of voters, until the constitution of the state, of 1792, was made; for that of the 20th September, 1776, (1 Laws Del. App., 83,) expressly provides that “the right of suffrage in the election of members of both houses shall remain as exercised by law at present,” etc. Article 5. [...]
http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=36575&Disp=5#C5 [...] misterwhite posted on 2014-11-15 11:45:41 ET 9 Delaware 49-50, 51-52 The line of decisions on the construction of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments is clearly to the effect that the former has no relation to the right of suffrage, and the latter only that above indicated. The first elaborate examination of the Fourteenth Amendment was in the Slanghter House cases, and it was then determined that citizenship of the State and of the United States are different, and depend on different characteristics and circumstances in the individual. It was also expressly held that the privileges and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, are those belonging to citizenship of the United States, and not to that of the State. Slaughter House cases, 16 Wall., 86, 74, 76. Soon after the same Court decided that suffrage was not conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment; that the United States has no voters of its own creation, and that suffrage is not a privilege or immunity of citizenship of the United States, either originally or under the Fourteenth Amendment. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall., 162, 170, 173. The same principle had been determined by Mr. Justice [50] Blatchford, before the last decision, in the Circuit Court of the United States at New York. U. S. v. Anthony, 11 Blatchf., 200. The words privileges and immunities had been long before accurately defined and their scope determined by Mr. Justice Washington, and his definition was approved and adopted by the Supreme Court in The Slaughter House cases, 16 Wall, at page 75, and the Court refers to its prior approval of the same in Ward v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wall, 430. The Court then clearly expressed the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment did not add anything to the words "privileges and immunities" as contained in the original constitution. Judge Washington's characterization of these terms is in Garfield v. Coryell 4 Wash. C. C, 380. In a later one of the same line of cases it was held that the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the U. S., does not confer the right of suffrage on any one. Its sole effect is to prevent the States from giving preference to one citizen over another on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S., 214, 217. The right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship; but only exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that right on account of race, etc., is an attribute of national citizenship. U S. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 542, 556. The right to vote comes from the States and has not been granted or secured by the Constitution of U. S. Ib., 556. [...] State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis., 574,578; State v. Bakw, 38 Wis., 71, 85, 87.
http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=36575&Disp=5#C5 Now, who was in the militia back then? According to the Militia Act of 1792, only white adult male citizens. misterwhite posted on 2014-11-15 11:45:41 ET Purported facts: Did you see what was in the Militia Act of 1792 when you read it carefully? 1 Stat. 271 May 8, 1792. Chap. XXXIII.—An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States.(a) Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That and by whom each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia [...] That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; [...] Hot damn. “The people” were rich, white men only and only these rich white men had the right to vote and to keep and bear arms. And every able-bodied white male between the ages of 18 and 44 was required, by Federal statute, to keep and bear arms. It logically follows that every able-bodied white male between the ages of 18 and 44 was rich and could vote. Who knew? It makes as much sense as your other brain farts. SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 33. 1792. 1 Stat. 271 May 8, 1792. Chap. XXXIII.—An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States.(a) Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That and by whom each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain or commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall reside, and that within twelve months after the passing of this act. And it shall at all times hereafter be the duty of every such captain or commanding officer of a company to enrol every such citizen, as aforesaid, and also those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of eighteen years, or being of the age of eighteen years and under the age of forty-five years (except as before excepted) shall come to reside within his bounds; and shall without delay notify such citizen of the said enrolment, by a proper non-commissioned officer of the company, by whom such notice may be proved. That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack. That the commissioned officers shall severally be armed with a sword or hanger and espontoon, and that from and after five years from the passing of this act, all muskets for arming the militia as herein required, shall be of bores sufficient for __________ (a) The acts for the establishment of an uniform system for the government of the militia, are: An act more effectually to provide for the national defence by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States, May 8, 1792, chap. 33; an act providing arms for the militia throughout the United States. July 6, 1798, chap. 65; an act in addition to an act entitled, “An act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States,” March 2, 1803, chap. 15; an act more effectually to provide for the organizing of the militia of the District of Columbia, March 3, 1803, chap. 20; an act establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States, April 10, 1806, chap. 20; an act in addition to the act entitled, “An act to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and to repeal the act now in force for those purposes,” April 18. 1814, chap. 82; an act concerning field officers of the militia, April 20, 1816, chap. 64; an act to establish an uniform mode of discipline and field exercise for the militia of the United States, May 12, 1820, chap. 96; an act to reduce and fix the military peace establishment of the United States, March 2, 1821, chap. 12, sec. 14. 272 SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 33. 1792. balls of the eighteenth part of a pound. And every citizen so enrolled, and providing himself with the arms, ammunition and accoutrements required as aforesaid, shall hold the same exempted from all suits, distresses, executions or sales, for debt or for the payment of taxes. Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Vice President of the United States; the officers judicial and executive of the government of the United States; the members of both Houses of Congress, and their respective officers; all custom-house officers with their clerks; all post-officers, and stage drivers, who are employed in the care and conveyance of the mail of the post-office of the United States; all ferrymen employed at any ferry on the post road; all inspectors of exports; all pilots; all mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States; and all persons who now are or may hereafter be exempted by the laws of the respective states, shall be, and are exempted from militia duty, notwithstanding their being above the age of eighteen, and under the age of forty-five years. Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That within one year after the passing of this act, the militia of the respective states shall be arranged into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies, as the legislature of each state shall direct; and each division, brigade and regiment, shall be numbered at the formation thereof; and a record made of such numbers in the adjutant-general's office in the state; and when in the field, or in service in the state, each division, brigade and regiment shall respectively take rank according to their numbers, reckoning the first or lowest number highest in rank. That if the same be convenient, each brigade shall consist of four regiments; each regiment of two battalions; each battalion of five companies; each company of sixty-four privates. That the said militia shall be officered by the respective states, as follows: To each division, one major-general and two aids-de-camp, with the rank of major; to each brigade, one brigadier-general, with one brigade inspector, to serve also as brigade-major, with the rank of a major; to each regiment, one lieutenant-colonel commandant; and to each battalion one major; to each company one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, one drummer and one fifer or bugler. That there shall be a regimental staff, to consist of one adjutant and one quartermaster, to rank as lieutenants; one paymaster; one surgeon, and one surgeon's mate; one sergeant-major; one drum-major, and one fife-major. Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That out of the militia enrolled, as herein directed, there shall be formed for each battalion at least one company of grenadiers, light infantry or riflemen; and that to each division there shall be at least one company of artillery, and one troop of horse: there shall be to each company of artillery, one captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, six gunners, six bombadiers, one drummer, and one fifer. The officers to be armed with a sword or hanger, a fusee, bayonet and belt, with a cartridge-box to contain twelve cartridges; and each private or matross shall furnish himself with all the equipments of a private in the infantry, until proper ordnance and field artillery is provided. There shall be to each troop of horse, one captain, two lieutenants, one cornet, four sergeants, four corporals, one saddler, one farrier, and one trumpeter. The commissioned officers to furnish themselves with good horses of at least fourteen hands and an half high, and to be armed with a sword and pair of pistols, the holsters of which to be covered with bearskin caps. Each dragoon to furnish himself with a serviceable horse, at least fourteen hands and an half high, a good saddle, bridle, mailpillion and valise, holsters, and a breast-plate and crupper, a pair of boots and spurs, a pair of pistols, a sabre, and a cartouch-box, to contain twelve cartridges for pistols. That each company of artillery; and troop of horse shall be formed of volunteers from the brigade, at the SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 33. 1792. 273 discretion of the commander-in-chief of the state, not exceeding one company of each to a regiment, nor more in number than one eleventh part of the infantry, and shall be uniformly clothed in regimentals, to be furnished at their own expense; the colour and fashion to be determined by the brigadier commanding the brigade to which they belong. Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That each battalion and regiment shall be provided with the state and regimental colours by the field officers, and each company with a drum and fife, or bugle-horn, by the commissioned officers of the company, in such manner as the legislature of the respective states shall direct. Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That there shall be an adjutant-general appointed in each state, whose duty it shall be to distribute all orders from the commander-in-chief of the state to the several corps; to attend all public reviews when the commander-in-chief of the state shall review the militia, or any part thereof; to obey all orders from him relative to carrying into execution and perfecting the system of military discipline established by this act; to furnish blank forms of different returns that maybe required, and to explain the principles on which they should be made; to receive from the several officers of the different corps throughout the state, returns of the militia under their command, reporting the actual situation of their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, their delinquencies, and every other thing which relates to the general advancement of good order and discipline: all which the several officers of the divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions, are hereby required to make in the usual manner, so that the said adjutant-general may be duly furnished therewith: from all which returns he shall make proper abstracts, and lay the same annually before the commander-in-chief of the state. Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That the rules of discipline, approved and established by Congress in their resolution of the twenty-ninth of March, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine, shall be the rules of discipline to be observed by the militia throughout the United States, except such deviations from the said rules as may be rendered necessary by the requisitions of this act, or by some other unavoidable circumstances. It shall be the duty of the commanding officer at every muster, whether by battalion, regiment, or single company, to cause the militia to be exercised and trained agreeably to the said rules of discipline. Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That all commissioned officers shall take rank according to the date of their commissions; and when two of the same grade bear an equal date, then their rank to be determined by lot, to be drawn by them before the commanding officer of the brigade, regiment, battalion, company, or detachment. Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That if any person, whether officer or soldier, belonging to the militia of any state, and called out into the service of the United States, be wounded or disabled while in actual service, he shall be taken care of and provided for at the public expense. Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the brigade-inspector to attend the regimental and battalion meetings of the militia composing their several brigades, during the time of their being under arms, to inspect their arms, ammunition, and accoutrements; superintend their exercise and manoeuvres, and introduce the system of military discipline before described throughout the brigade, agreeable to law, and such orders as they shall from time to time receive from the commander-in-chief of the state; to make returns to the adjutant-general of the state, at least once in every year, of the militia of the brigade to which he belongs, reporting therein the actual situation of the arms, accoutrements, and ammunition of the several corps, and every other thing which, in his judgment, may relate to their government and the 274 SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch 34. 1792. general advancement of good order and military discipline; and the adjutant-general shall make a return of aD the militia of the state to the commander-in-chief of the said state, and a duplicate of the same to the President of the United States. And whereas sundry corps of artillery, cavalry, and infantry now exist in several of the said states, which by the laws, customs, or usages thereof have not been incorporated with, or subject to the general regulations of the militia: Sec. 11. Be it further enacted, That such corps retain their accustomed privileges, subject, nevertheless, to all other duties required by this act, in like manner with the other militia. Approved, May 8, 1792.
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Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest "The people" were citizens with full rights. Only "the people" could vote. Not all citizens could vote.
Being unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one
Looking at the Constitution itself we find that it was ordained and established by "the people of the United States," and then going further back, we find that these were the people of the several States that had before dissolved the political bands which connected them with Great Britain
#52. To: misterwhite, nolu chan (#49)
#53. To: A K A Stone (#52)
Ok they gave women the right to vote with the 19th amendment. Or maybe they already had it.
The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College. U. S. Const., Art. II, §1. This is the source for the statement in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 35 (1892), that the State legislature’s power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself, which indeed was the manner used by State legislatures in several States for many years after the Framing of our Constitution. Id., at 28–33.
The constitution refers to who is elibible to be President. It only says "he". It never says she.
Belva Ann Bennett Lockwood (October 24, 1830 – May 19, 1917) was an American attorney, politician, educator, and author. She was active in working for women's rights. The press of her day referred to her as a "suffragist," someone who believed in women's suffrage or voting rights. Lockwood overcame many social and personal obstacles related to gender restrictions. After college, she became a teacher and principal, working to equalize pay for women in education.[1] She supported the movement for world peace, and was a proponent of temperance.
In 1884 she accepted the nomination of the National Equal Rights Party and ran for president. Although suffrage leaders opposed her candidacy, Lockwood saw it as an entering wedge for women. She polled over 4,000 votes and ran again in 1888.
#54. To: nolu chan (#50)
"Women voted for over thirty years in New Jersey."
#55. To: nolu chan (#51)
"Not all citizens had all the rights held by others."
#56. To: misterwhite (#54)
The 19th protected the right of women to vote.
#57. To: misterwhite (#55)
I'm only discussing one right now -- the right to vote. Could women vote in all the states in 1792? Why won't you answer this very simple question?
#58. To: nolu chan (#57)
#59. To: nolu chan (#56)
"Our rights are not granted to us by State governments."
#60. To: A K A Stone (#58)
"It says you can't be taxes without representation. Everyone is taxed."
#61. To: nolu chan (#57)
"Not all women and not all men qualified for the elective franchise in 1792 or now, or at any time in between."
#62. To: A K A Stone (#58)
Let me throw a wrench in here. The Declaration of Independence gives you the right to vote. Because it is based on natural law. It says you can't be taxes without representation. Everyone is taxed. So you have a natural right to vote. Indirectly.
Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776
To all to whom these Presents shall come, we the undersigned Delegates of the States affixed to our Names send greeting.
"The United States of America".
The Paris Peace Treaty of September 30, 1783
JOHN ADAMS (SEAL)
B. FRANKLIN (SEAL)
JOHN JAY (SEAL)
#63. To: misterwhite (#59)
Meaning that those who voted in 1792 -- "the people" -- did not include women in all the states.
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, 2, that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" 9 means that as [376 U.S. 1, 8] nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. 10 This rule is followed automatically, of course, when Representatives are chosen as a group on a statewide basis, as was a widespread practice in the first 50 years of our Nation's history. 11
We do not believe that the Framers of the Constitution intended to permit the same vote-diluting discrimination to be accomplished through the device of districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants. To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected "by the People," a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional Convention. The history of the Constitution, particularly that part of it relating to the adoption of Art. I, 2, reveals that those who framed the Constitution [376 U.S. 1, 9] meant that, no matter what the mechanics of an election, whether statewide or by districts, it was population which was to be the basis of the House of Representatives.
The deadlock was finally broken when a majority of the States agreed to what has been called the Great Compromise, 27 based on a proposal which had been repeatedly advanced by Roger [376 U.S. 1, 13] Sherman and other delegates from Connecticut. 28 It provided on the one hand that each State, including little Delaware and Rhode Island, was to have two Senators. As a further guarantee that these Senators would be considered state emissaries, they were to be elected by the state legislatures, Art. I, 3, and it was specially provided in Article V that no State should ever be deprived of its equal representation in the Senate. The other side of the compromise was that, as provided in Art. I, 2, members of the House of Representatives should be chosen "by the People of the several States" and should be "apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers." While those who wanted both houses to represent the people had yielded on the Senate, they had not yielded on the House of Representatives. William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut had summed it up well: "in one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the other, the States." 29
376 U.S. 17-18, Opinion of the Court It is in the light of such history that we must construe Art. I, 2, of the Constitution, which, carrying out the ideas of Madison and those of like views, provides that Representatives shall be chosen "by the People of the several States" and shall be "apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers." It is not surprising that our Court has held that this Article gives persons qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote and to have their votes counted. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 ; Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 . Not only can this right to vote not be denied outright, it cannot, consistently with Article I, be destroyed by alteration of ballots, see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 , or diluted by stuffing of the ballot box, see United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 . No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges [376 U.S. 1, 18] this right. In urging the people to adopt the Constitution, Madison said in No. 57 of The Federalist:
"Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. . . . " 47
In any event, the very sentence of Art. I, 2, on which the Court exclusively relies confers the right to vote for Representatives only on those whom the State has found qualified to vote for members of "the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." Supra, p. 22. So far as Article I is concerned, it is within the State's power to confer that right only on persons of wealth or of a particular sex or, if the State chose, living in specified areas of the State. 7 Were Georgia to find the residents of the [376 U.S. 1, 26] Fifth District unqualified to vote for Representatives to the State House of Representatives, they could not vote for Representatives to Congress, according to the express words of Art. I, 2. Other provisions of the Constitution would, of course, be relevant, but, so far as Art. I, 2, is concerned, the disqualification would be within Georgia's power. How can it be, then, that this very same sentence prevents Georgia from apportioning its Representatives as it chooses? The truth is that it does not.
Representatives were to be apportioned among the States on the basis of free population plus three-fifths of the slave population. Since no slave voted, the inclusion of three-fifths of their number in the basis of apportionment gave the favored States representation far in excess of their voting population.
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, 2, that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" 9 means that as [376 U.S. 1, 8] nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. 10 This rule is followed automatically, of course, when Representatives are chosen as a group on a statewide basis, as was a widespread practice in the first 50 years of our Nation's history. 11
We do not believe that the Framers of the Constitution intended to permit the same vote-diluting discrimination to be accomplished through the device of districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants. To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected "by the People," a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional Convention. The history of the Constitution, particularly that part of it relating to the adoption of Art. I, 2, reveals that those who framed the Constitution [376 U.S. 1, 9] meant that, no matter what the mechanics of an election, whether statewide or by districts, it was population which was to be the basis of the House of Representatives.
The deadlock was finally broken when a majority of the States agreed to what has been called the Great Compromise, 27 based on a proposal which had been repeatedly advanced by Roger [376 U.S. 1, 13] Sherman and other delegates from Connecticut. 28 It provided on the one hand that each State, including little Delaware and Rhode Island, was to have two Senators. As a further guarantee that these Senators would be considered state emissaries, they were to be elected by the state legislatures, Art. I, 3, and it was specially provided in Article V that no State should ever be deprived of its equal representation in the Senate. The other side of the compromise was that, as provided in Art. I, 2, members of the House of Representatives should be chosen "by the People of the several States" and should be "apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers." While those who wanted both houses to represent the people had yielded on the Senate, they had not yielded on the House of Representatives. William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut had summed it up well: "in one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the other, the States." 29
376 U.S. 17-18, Opinion of the Court It is in the light of such history that we must construe Art. I, 2, of the Constitution, which, carrying out the ideas of Madison and those of like views, provides that Representatives shall be chosen "by the People of the several States" and shall be "apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers." It is not surprising that our Court has held that this Article gives persons qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote and to have their votes counted. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 ; Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 . Not only can this right to vote not be denied outright, it cannot, consistently with Article I, be destroyed by alteration of ballots, see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 , or diluted by stuffing of the ballot box, see United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 . No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges [376 U.S. 1, 18] this right. In urging the people to adopt the Constitution, Madison said in No. 57 of The Federalist:
"Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. . . . " 47
In any event, the very sentence of Art. I, 2, on which the Court exclusively relies confers the right to vote for Representatives only on those whom the State has found qualified to vote for members of "the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." Supra, p. 22. So far as Article I is concerned, it is within the State's power to confer that right only on persons of wealth or of a particular sex or, if the State chose, living in specified areas of the State. 7 Were Georgia to find the residents of the [376 U.S. 1, 26] Fifth District unqualified to vote for Representatives to the State House of Representatives, they could not vote for Representatives to Congress, according to the express words of Art. I, 2. Other provisions of the Constitution would, of course, be relevant, but, so far as Art. I, 2, is concerned, the disqualification would be within Georgia's power. How can it be, then, that this very same sentence prevents Georgia from apportioning its Representatives as it chooses? The truth is that it does not.
It seems to me that we ought to pause but a moment upon the suggestion, that, in the enforcement of a law such as we have now before us for consideration, intended to secure an election of members of the House of Representatives by the giving of all legal votes and by the giving of none that are frandulent, the Government of the United States has no interest. "The Government of the United States" - what is that? It may be conceded to be an artificial thing, which men call "the Government," and which is sometimes looked upon as the source as well as the exhibition of power, and not capable of interest more than it is of thought or feeling. But, the Government of the United States, in the true sense, is the people of the United States, one and all, throughout the length and breadth of the land. And the people of the United States, here and everywhere, have not only an interest, but an interest that is vital, in the preservation of their institutions and in the preservation of all that is pure~ just and honest in the popular vote, on which, for their safety and security, their institutions and their Government rest.
Undoubtedly a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power and is incapacitated from holding particular offices. Women and minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote, and when a property qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those who have not the necessary qualification cannot vote or hold the office, yet they are citizens. So, too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of the State, who is not a citizen even of the State itself. And in some of the States of the Union, foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote.
Section 2. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature."
It is not to be doubted, that the power to regulate suffrage in a state, and to determine who shall and who shall not be a voter, belongs exclusively to the state itself; the constitution of the United States confers no authority upon congress, to prescribe the qualifications of electors, within the several states that compose the federal union. Congress is, indeed, empowered to make regulations for the time, place and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, or to alter those made by the legislature of a state (except those in relation to the places of choosing senators), but here its power stops; the right of suffrage at a state election, is a state right, a franchise conferrable only by the state, which congress can neither give nor take away. If, therefore, the act now under consideration is, in truth, an attempt to regulate the right of suffrage in the state, or to prescribe the conditions upon which that right may be exercised, it must be held unwarranted by the constitution. In the exercise of its admitted powers, congress may doubtless deprive an individual of the opportunity to enjoy a right that belongs to him as a citizen of a state, even the right of suftrage; but this is a different thing from taking away or impairing the right itself. Under the laws of the federal government, a voter may be sent abroad in the military service of the country, and thus deprived of the privilege of exercising his right; or a voter may be imprisoned for a crime against the United States; but it is a perversion of language, to call this impairing his right of suffrage.
#64. To: misterwhite (#61)
Do we also agree that those who could vote were "the people" referenced in Article I, Section 2?
Undoubtedly a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power and is incapacitated from holding particular offices. Women and minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote, and when a property qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those who have not the necessary qualification cannot vote or hold the office, yet they are citizens. So, too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of the State, who is not a citizen even of the State itself. And in some of the States of the Union, foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote.
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, 2, that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" 9 means that as [376 U.S. 1, 8] nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. 10 This rule is followed automatically, of course, when Representatives are chosen as a group on a statewide basis, as was a widespread practice in the first 50 years of our Nation's history. 11
In urging the people to adopt the Constitution, Madison said in No. 57 of The Federalist:
"Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. . . . " 47
It is not to be doubted, that the power to regulate suffrage in a state, and to determine who shall and who shall not be a voter, belongs exclusively to the state itself; the constitution of the United States confers no authority upon congress, to prescribe the qualifications of electors, within the several states that compose the federal union. Congress is, indeed, empowered to make regulations for the time, place and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, or to alter those made by the legislature of a state (except those in relation to the places of choosing senators), but here its power stops; the right of suffrage at a state election, is a state right, a franchise conferrable only by the state, which congress can neither give nor take away. If, therefore, the act now under consideration is, in truth, an attempt to regulate the right of suffrage in the state, or to prescribe the conditions upon which that right may be exercised, it must be held unwarranted by the constitution. In the exercise of its admitted powers, congress may doubtless deprive an individual of the opportunity to enjoy a right that belongs to him as a citizen of a state, even the right of suftrage; but this is a different thing from taking away or impairing the right itself. Under the laws of the federal government, a voter may be sent abroad in the military service of the country, and thus deprived of the privilege of exercising his right; or a voter may be imprisoned for a crime against the United States; but it is a perversion of language, to call this impairing his right of suffrage.
#65. To: nolu chan (#56)
"The 19th Amendment does not protect a right. It prohibits the States from discriminating on the basis of sex in laws passed that determine who is a qualified voter."
#66. To: nolu chan (#63)
"The people of the United States are its citizens"
#67. To: nolu chan (#64)
#68. To: misterwhite (#65)
Look. Call it whatever you want. The point is that women couldn't vote before the 19th amendment. Meaning, not all citizens were allowed to vote.
#69. To: misterwhite (#67)
Words mean things. The U.S. Constitution refers to "persons", "citizens", and "the people".
#70. To: misterwhite (#66)
Article I, Section 2 says "the people" are the voters.
In 1792 women didn't vote. How could they belong to "the people"?
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, 2, that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" 9 means that as [376 U.S. 1, 8] nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. 10 This rule is followed automatically, of course, when Representatives are chosen as a group on a statewide basis, as was a widespread practice in the first 50 years of our Nation's history. 11
We do not believe that the Framers of the Constitution intended to permit the same vote-diluting discrimination to be accomplished through the device of districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants. To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected "by the People," a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional Convention. The history of the Constitution, particularly that part of it relating to the adoption of Art. I, 2, reveals that those who framed the Constitution [376 U.S. 1, 9] meant that, no matter what the mechanics of an election, whether statewide or by districts, it was population which was to be the basis of the House of Representatives.
The debates at the Convention make at least one fact abundantly clear: that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent "people" they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of the State's inhabitants. 30 The Constitution embodied Edmund Randolph's proposal for a periodic census to ensure "fair representation of the people," 31 an idea endorsed by Mason as assuring that "numbers of inhabitants" [376 U.S. 1, 14] should always be the measure of representation in the House of Representatives. 32
It is in the light of such history that we must construe Art. I, 2, of the Constitution, which, carrying out the ideas of Madison and those of like views, provides that Representatives shall be chosen "by the People of the several States" and shall be "apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers." It is not surprising that our Court has held that this Article gives persons qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote and to have their votes counted. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 ; Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 . Not only can this right to vote not be denied outright, it cannot, consistently with Article I, be destroyed by alteration of ballots, see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 , or diluted by stuffing of the ballot box, see United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 . No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges [376 U.S. 1, 18] this right. In urging the people to adopt the Constitution, Madison said in No. 57 of The Federalist:
"Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. . . . " 47
#71. To: nolu chan (#70)
"Article 1, Section 2 only says that in your spider infested mind."
#72. To: misterwhite (#71)
The Founders could have written that, but they chose not to. They wrote "the people" -- citizens with full rights.
The power to determine who are qualified electors and who are entitled to exercise the elective franchise is left to the several states. The federal Constitution does not prescribe the regulations as to this matter, except that the electors for Representatives in Congress shall have the qualifications reuisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature, and also the fifteenth amendment, which forbids the state from denying any citizen the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The exercise of elective franchise is a privilege, and not a right. The state may grant or deny the right. Aliens are denied the right. The fifteenth amendment does not deny the state the right to forbid any person from voting, but only provides that he shall not be excluded on account of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Minors and women may be and are usually excluded from the right to vote, and also those who have been convicted of infamous crimes, also idiots and lunatics, also non-residents of the state, county or municipality, etc., in which the election is to be held; but these are not the only qualifications that the states may require. They may require any qualifications, or exclude any person or class of persons, unless the federal Constitution or the state Constitution forbids it. The state may provide registration laws, and require that citizens conform thereto before they are entitled to vote.
There are, then, under our republican form of government, two classes of citizens, one of the United States and one of the state. One class of citizenship may exist in a person, without the other, as in the case of a resident of the District of Columbia; but both classes usually exist in the same person.
#73. To: misterwhite (#71)
Meaning, in 1792, "the people" did not include all citizens. Agreed?
CRS Annotated Constitution
From these it will be seen, that the characteristic peculiarities of the Constitution are, 1, the mode of its formation; 2, the division of the supreme powers of government between the states in their united capacity, and the states in their individual capacities.
The ratification of the conventions of nine states, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the states so ratifying the same.
#74. To: nolu chan (#72)
"There is no such thing as citizens with less than full rights."
#75. To: nolu chan (#73)
"Since there has been a United States, and there have been a people of the United States, the C-I-T-I-Z-E-N-S of the United States have been the people of the United States."
#76. To: misterwhite (#74)
A child is a citizen but doesn't have full rights. Correct?
#77. To: misterwhite (#75)
Not "people". Not "a people".
[50] ...
#78. To: misterwhite (#74)
And back in 1792, only white, male citizens with property had full rights. They were called freeholders and were "the people".
IV. That all inhabitants of this Colony, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds proclamation money, clear estate in the same, and have resided within the county in which they claim a vote for twelve months immediately preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote for Representatives in Council and Assembly; and also for all other public officers, that shall be elected by the people of the county at large.
#79. To: nolu chan (#78)
"Voting rights were a state matter, left to the states to regulate."
#80. To: nolu chan (#78)
“We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union ..."
#81. To: misterwhite (#79)
Who said that? I said the U.S. Constitution held that only "the people" were allowed to vote.
The right of voting, or the privilege of voting, is a right or privilege arising under the constitution of the state, and not under the constitution of the United States. The qualifications are different in the different states. Citizenship, age, sex, residence, are variously required in the different states, or may be so. If the right belongs to any particular person, it is because such person is entitled to it by the laws of the state where he offers to exercise it, and not because of citizenship of the United States. If the state of New York should provide that no person should vote until he had reached the age of thirty years, or after he had reached the age of fifty, or that no person having gray hair, or who had not the use of all his limbs, should be entitled to vote, I do not see how it could be held to be a violation of any right derived or held under the constitution of the United States.
US v Anthony, 24 Fed Cas 829 (1873)
#82. To: misterwhite (#80)
Here's your We The People ... See any women? Children? Blacks? Foreigners? Illegals? Green Cards?
#83. To: misterwhite (#79)
With rare exceptions made by one or two states
The Constitution or Form of Government
#84. To: misterwhite (#79)
With rare exceptions made by one or two states, "the people" were white, male citizens with property -- the point being, not all citizens were "the people".
VII. That every male inhabitant of full age, who shall have personally resided within one of the counties of this State for six months immediately preceding the day of election, shall, at such election, be entitled to vote for representatives of the said county in assembly; if, during the time aforesaid, he shall have been a freeholder, possessing a freehold of the value of twenty pounds, within the said county, or have rented a tenement therein of the yearly value of forty shillings, and been rated and actually paid taxes to this State: Provided always, That every person who now is a freeman of the city of Albany, or who was made a freeman of the city of New York on or before the fourteenth day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, and shall be actually and usually resident in the said cities, respectively, shall be entitled to vote for representatives in assembly within his said place of residence.
#85. To: nolu chan (#83)
#86. To: nolu chan (#84)
"That's three and counting."
#87. To: misterwhite (#86)
Three what? Three posts?
Only "the people" could vote (Article I, Section 2), for example. And back then, those were the rich white men only. Only they had the right to vote, to assemble, petition the government, keep and bear arms, and be free from ubreasonable searches.
Section 1. In elections by the citizens, every freeman of the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State two years next before the election, and within that time paid a State or county tax, which shall have been assessed at least six months before the election, shall enjoy the rights of an elector: Provided, That the sons of persons qualified as aforesaid, between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-two years, shall be entitled to vote, although they shall not have paid taxes.
#88. To: misterwhite (#85)
The fact that you have to dig around for exceptions makes my point -- not all citizens could vote.
Only "the people" could vote (Article I, Section 2), for example. And back then, those were the rich white men only. Only they had the right to vote, to assemble, petition the government, keep and bear arms, and be free from ubreasonable searches.
#89. To: misterwhite (#85)
Meaning, "the people" referred to in the U.S. Constitution did not include all citizens.
Frieszleben v Shallcross, 9 Delaware 1 (1890)
#90. To: misterwhite (#5)
Only "the people" could vote (Article I, Section 2), for example. And back then, those were the rich white men only. Only they had the right to vote, to assemble, petition the government, keep and bear arms, and be free from ubreasonable searches.
[49] That Court has settled the principle that the Constitution of the United States has no relation to the right of voting in the States, except to secure that right against any denial or abridgement on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.
[51] Under our existing laws every person having the right, has an equal opportunity to qualify himself to vote. If he fail to do [52] so, it is by his own neglect or omission, and his disfranchisement, if it occur, is voluntary.
#91. To: misterwhite (#5)
Only "the people" could vote (Article I, Section 2), for example. And back then, those were the rich white men only. Only they had the right to vote, to assemble, petition the government, keep and bear arms, and be free from ubreasonable searches.
SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 33. 1792.
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