Title: The fill in the blank quiz that stumped war! Source:
[None] URL Source:[None] Published:Oct 14, 2011 Author:A K A Stone Post Date:2011-10-14 08:58:37 by A K A Stone Keywords:None Views:73283 Comments:107
In the United States of America you are considered ___________________ until proven guilty.
If you don't answer because you are ignorant as to who and what Benedict Arnold was, I would understand. At least then you would be consistent with how you usually are.
U.S. Indictment: 'Detonated an Explosive Device' Published: November 5, 1998
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Following is an excerpt from the indictment returned yesterday in a Federal District Court in Manhattan against the Saudi exile, Osama bin-Laden:
At all relevant times from, in or about 1989 until the date of the filing of this indictment, an international terrorist group existed which was dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence. This organization grew out of the ''mekhtab al khidemat'' (the ''Services Office'') organization which had maintained offices in various parts of the world, including Afghanistan, Pakistan (particularly in Peshawar) and the United States, particularly at the Alkifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, N.Y. The group was founded by defendants Osama bin Laden and Muhammad Atef, a.k.a ''Abu Hafs al- Masry,'' together with ''Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri'' and others. From in or about 1989 until the present, the group called itself ''Al Qaeda''' (''the Base''). From 1989 until in or about 1991, the group (hereafter referred to as ''Al Qaeda'') was headquartered in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. In or about 1991, the leadership of Al Qaeda, including its ''emir'' (or prince) defendant Osama bin Laden, relocated to Sudan. Al Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan from approximately 1991 until approximately 1996 but still maintained offices in various parts of the world. In 1996, defendants Osama bin Laden and Muhammad Atef and other members of Al Qaeda relocated to Afghanistan. At all relevant times, Al Qaeda was led by its emir, defendant Osama bin Laden. Members of Al Qaeda pledged an oath of allegiance (called a ''bayat'') to defendant Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda opposed the United States for several reasons. First, the United States was regarded as an 'infidel'' because it was not governed in a manner consistent with the group's extremist interpretation of Islam. Second, the United States was viewed as providing essential support for other ''infidel'' governments and institutions, particularly the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the nation of Israel and the United Nations organization, which were regarded as enemies of the group. Third, Al Qaeda opposed the involvement of the United States armed forces in the [Persian] gulf war in 1991 and in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, which were viewed by Al Qaeda as pretextual preparations for an American occupation of Islamic countries. In particular, Al Qaeda opposes the continued presence of American military forces in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) following the gulf war. Fourth, Al Qaeda opposed the United States Government because of the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of persons belonging to Al Qaeda or its affiliated terrorist groups or with whom it worked, including Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.
One of the principal goals of Al Qaeda was to drive the United States armed forces out of Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) and Somalia by violence. Members of Al Qaeda issued fatwahs (rulings of Islamic law) indicating that such attacks were both proper and necessary.
Al Qaeda functioned both on its own and through some of the terrorist organizations that operated under its umbrella, including: the Al Jihad group based in Egypt, led by, among others, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, named as a co- conspirator but not as a defendant herein; the Islamic Group (also known as ''El Gamaa Islamia'' or simply ''Gamaa't''), led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and later by Ahmed Refai Taha, a.k.a. ''Abu Yasser al-Masri,'' named as co- conspirators but not as defendants herein; and a number of jihad groups. . . .
Osama bin Laden, the defendant, and Al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan and with representatives of the Government of Iran, and its associated terrorist group Hezbollah, for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States. . . .
On Oct. 3 and 4, 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, persons who had been trained by Al Qaeda (and by trainers trained by Al Qaeda) participated in an attack on United States military personnel serving in Somalia as part of Operation Restore Hope, which resulted in the killing of 18 United States Army personnel. . . .
Texan Charged With Bin Laden Link By BENJAMIN WEISER Published: September 22, 1998
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A Texan was indicted yesterday on new charges that he lied about his knowledge of the activities of Osama bin Laden, the Saudi exile suspected in the bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania last month.
In bringing the new charges against Wadih el Hage, an Arlington, Tex., man who has admitted that he worked as Mr. bin Laden's personal secretary in the Sudan in 1994, Federal prosecutors in Manhattan offered their most expansive look yet at the scope and direction of their investigation into Mr. bin Laden and his organization, Al Qaeda.
If you were of that time and were having tea and crumpets in a restaurant at a table next to him, would you smile and tip your three cornered hat his way and wish him well for the day?
Oh, I know, who are you to involve yourself in condemning betrayal with the death and oppression of his fellow countrymen in mind while this man sought to gain money and influence to his face? Ain't any of your business, right?
You have no opinion on this known infamy and would not want to see Mr. Arnold pay with his life for his murderous actions, I see.
Damn Stone, the least you could do is parrot your old saw and accuse him of having been the father of all those who kill babies and mumble the usual vague generalities of condemnation you love so much in his general direction.
First he flicks his Cricket lighter at you with this superfluous and self serving attack thread, then when cornered he only leaves the sound of crickets chirping in his retreat into silence.
On Oct. 3 and 4, 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, persons who had been trained by Al Qaeda (and by trainers trained by Al Qaeda) participated in an attack on United States military personnel serving in Somalia as part of Operation Restore Hope, which resulted in the killing of 18 United States Army personnel. . . .
The issue is what powers the Commander in Chief has in ordering the killing of a specific enemy combatant.
Neither Aulaqi nor any Al Qaeda fighter is classified as an enemy combatant.
Even the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that the Palestinian Freedom Fighters are civilians and not enemy combatants. PCATI v. Israel, HCJ 769/02 (2006) "as we have seen, the terrorists acting against Israel are not combatants according to the definition of that term in international law...."
The U.S. Supreme Court held that Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were entitled to the protection of Geneva Convention Common Article 3 and that it is not a conflict of an international character. It further found, "Even assuming that Hamden [sic - Hamdan] is a dangerous individual who would cause great harm or death to innocent civilians given the opportunity, the Executive nevertheless must comply with the prevailing rule of law in undertaking to try him and subject him to criminal punishment." In 2006, the Bush administration "agreed to apply the Geneva Conventions to all terrorism suspects in U.S. custody, bowing to the Supreme Court's recent rejection of policies that have imprisoned hundreds for years without trials."
All enemy combatants, upon capture, are entitled to POW status. The Al Qaeda fighters are not classified as enemy combatants.
Even the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that the Palestinian Freedom Fighters are civilians and not enemy combatants. PCATI v. Israel, HCJ 769/02 (2006) "as we have seen, the terrorists acting against Israel are not combatants according to the definition of that term in international law...."
The U.S. Supreme Court held that Al Qaeda fighters were entitled to the protection of Geneva Convention Common Article 3 and that it is not a conflict of an international character. It further found, "Even assuming that Hamden [sic - Hamdan] is a dangerous individual who would cause great harm or death to innocent civilians given the opportunity, the Executive nevertheless must comply with the prevailing rule of law in undertaking to try him and subject him to criminal punishment." In 2006, the Bush administration "agreed to apply the Geneva Conventions to all terrorism suspects in U.S. custody, bowing to the Supreme Court's recent rejection of policies that have imprisoned hundreds for years without trials."
All enemy combatants, upon capture, are entitled to POW status. The Al Qaeda fighters are not classified as enemy combatants.
The Israeli Supreme Court found that the Palestinian fighters were not combatants. The U.S. Supreme Court found that Al Qaeda fighters are not combatants. Both courts found that the Geneva Conventions apply.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in armed conflict involving alleged members of Al Qaeda, the Geneva Convention Common Article 3 applies, it must be complied with, and its protections must be observed. Oh snap!
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 05-184.
Argued March 28, 2006 - Decided June 29, 2006
At 1-2:
The District Court granted habeas relief and stayed the commission's proceedings, concluding that the President's authority to establish military commissions extends only to offenders or offenses triable by such a commission under the law of war; that such law includes the Third Geneva Convention; that Hamdan is entitled to that Convention's full protections until adjudged, under it, not to be a prisoner of war; and that, whether or not Hamdan is properly classified a prisoner of war, the commission convened to try him was established in violation of both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. §801 et seq., and Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention because it had the power to convict based on evidence the accused would never see or hear. The D. C. Circuit reversed.
At 4:
4. The military commission at issue lacks the power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949. Pp. 49-72.
At 6:
(d) The procedures adopted to try Hamdan also violate the Geneva Conventions. The D. C. Circuit dismissed Hamdan's challenge in this regard on the grounds, inter alia, that the Conventions are not judicially enforceable and that, in any event, Hamdan is not entitled to their protections. Neither of these grounds is persuasive. Pp. 6268.
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(ii) Alternatively, the appeals court agreed with the Government that the Conventions do not apply because Hamdan was captured during the war with al Qaeda, which is not a Convention signatory, and that conflict is distinct from the war with signatory Afghanistan. The Court need not decide the merits of this argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not between signatories. Common Article 3, which appears in all four Conventions, provides that, in a "conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties [i.e., signatories], each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum," certain provisions protecting "[p]ersons . . . placed hors de combat by . . . detention," including a prohibition on "the passing of sentences . . . without previous judgment . . . by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees . . . recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." The D. C. Circuit ruled Common Article 3 inapplicable to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda is international in scope and thus not a "conflict not of an international character." That reasoning is erroneous. That the quoted phrase bears its literal meaning and is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations is demonstrated by Common Article 2, which limits its own application to any armed conflict between signatories and provides that signatories must abide by all terms of the Conventions even if another party to the conflict is a nonsignatory, so long as the nonsignatory "accepts and applies" those terms. Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory who are involved in a conflict "in the territory of" a signatory. The latter kind of conflict does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not). Pp. 65.68.
(iii) While Common Article 3 does not define its "regularly constituted court" phrase, other sources define the words to mean an "ordinary military cour[t]" that is "established and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country." The regular military courts in our system are the courts-martial established by congressional statute. At a minimum, a military commission can be "regularly constituted" only if some practical need explains deviations from court-martial practice. No such need has been demonstrated here. Pp. 69.70.
(iv) Common Article 3's requirements are general, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems, but they are requirements nonetheless. The commission convened to try Hamdan does not meet those requirements. P. 72.
(d) Even assuming that Hamden is a dangerous individual who would cause great harm or death to innocent civilians given the opportunity, the Executive nevertheless must comply with the prevailing rule of law in undertaking to try him and subject him to criminal punishment. P. 72.
Secondly,. read the decision rendered in Ex Parte Qurin from 1942. The term "ENEMY COMBATANT" has been around for decades.
Thirdly, as a result of court decisions surrounding the detention of Al Qaeda prisoners at Gitmo, DumbDubv43 was actually forced to narrowly define what an "enemy combatant" was in the war against Al Qeada:
"Enemy combatant" shall mean an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy combat forces.
This bullshit was destroyed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan.
You're citing a case that decided the powers of the Commander in Chief when an enemy combatant is CAPTURED and IN CUSTODY.
I cited a case that decided Common Article 3 was applicable. What was his status at the time of capture? If you can't figure out what the status of someone entitled to Common Article 3 protection is, ask one of your imaginary friends to help.
That was the definition that was used from 2004 until Obama - supposedly - abandoned it.
Read the opinion. "On November 13, 2001, while the United States was still engaged in active combat with the Taliban, the President issued a comprehansive military order intended to govern the 'Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,' 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (hereinafter November 13 Order or Order."
That's the Order that was at issue before the Court. The legal action was commenced in 2004. The Supreme Court was acting as an Appellate court. Get a clue.
You're citing a case that decided the powers of the Commander in Chief when an enemy combatant is CAPTURED and IN CUSTODY.
It did not decide any powers of the Commander-in-Chief. It determined what protections inhered to the detainee. It determined the actions of the United States government violated those protections.
The President (or C-in-C) has no authority to commit unlawful acts.
You mean the word that no on ever heard of until after 911.
Aulaqi was not alleged to me a member of AQ, but of AQAP (al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). "AQAP appears to be merely the latest iteration of al Qaeda's long-standing operational presence in Yemen, contrasting sharply with the lack of historical ties to al Qaeda when it comes to some other current al Qaeda franchises such as AQIM. On the other hand, AQAP appears to operate without direct lines of control running to bin Laden or other senior al Qaeda leaders." Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2010, (2011), p. 8.
It may be easier to show an armed conflict between AQAP and the U.S. than to show that AQAP is a part of AQ. AQAP did not exist in 2001.
That's the Order that was at issue before the Court. The legal action was commenced in 2004. The Supreme Court was acting as an Appellate court. Get a clue.
I have one. You're using your typical sleight of hand to meld two concurrent yet separate events as being the same event.
As you stated, Hamden decided that the "comprehensive military order" that DumbDubv43 had issued was extra legal and NOT the definition of "enemy combatant".