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Title: Secret panel can put Americans on "kill list'
Source:
Reuters
URL Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011 ... killlist-idUSTRE79475C20111005
Published: Oct 6, 2011
Author: Mark Hosenball
Post Date: 2011-10-06 12:16:04 by A K A Stone
Keywords: None
Views: 56555
Comments: 91
(Reuters) - American militants like Anwar al-Awlaki are placed on a kill or capture list by a secretive panel of senior government officials, which then informs the president of its decisions, according to officials. There is no public record of the operations or decisions of the panel, which is a subset of the White House's National Security Council, several current and former officials said. Neither is there any law establishing its existence or setting out the rules by which it is supposed to operate. The panel was behind the decision to add Awlaki, a U.S.-born militant preacher with alleged al Qaeda connections, to the target list. He was killed by a CIA drone strike in Yemen late last month. The role of the president in ordering or ratifying a decision to target a citizen is fuzzy. White House spokesman Tommy Vietor declined to discuss anything about the process. Current and former officials said that to the best of their knowledge, Awlaki, who the White House said was a key figure in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda's Yemen-based affiliate, had been the only American put on a government list targeting people for capture or death due to their alleged involvement with militants. The White House is portraying the killing of Awlaki as a demonstration of President Barack Obama's toughness toward militants who threaten the United States. But the process that led to Awlaki's killing has drawn fierce criticism from both the political left and right. In an ironic turn, Obama, who ran for president denouncing predecessor George W. Bush's expansive use of executive power in his "war on terrorism," is being attacked in some quarters for using similar tactics. They include secret legal justifications and undisclosed intelligence assessments. Liberals criticized the drone attack on an American citizen as extra-judicial murder. Conservatives criticized Obama for refusing to release a Justice Department legal opinion that reportedly justified killing Awlaki. They accuse Obama of hypocrisy, noting his administration insisted on publishing Bush-era administration legal memos justifying the use of interrogation techniques many equate with torture, but refused to make public its rationale for killing a citizen without due process. Some details about how the administration went about targeting Awlaki emerged on Tuesday when the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, Representative Dutch Ruppersberger, was asked by reporters about the killing. The process involves "going through the National Security Council, then it eventually goes to the president, but the National Security Council does the investigation, they have lawyers, they review, they look at the situation, you have input from the military, and also, we make sure that we follow international law," Ruppersberger said. LAWYERS CONSULTED Other officials said the role of the president in the process was murkier than what Ruppersberger described. They said targeting recommendations are drawn up by a committee of mid-level National Security Council and agency officials. Their recommendations are then sent to the panel of NSC "principals," meaning Cabinet secretaries and intelligence unit chiefs, for approval. The panel of principals could have different memberships when considering different operational issues, they said. The officials insisted on anonymity to discuss sensitive information. They confirmed that lawyers, including those in the Justice Department, were consulted before Awlaki's name was added to the target list. Two principal legal theories were advanced, an official said: first, that the actions were permitted by Congress when it authorized the use of military forces against militants in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001; and they are permitted under international law if a country is defending itself. Several officials said that when Awlaki became the first American put on the target list, Obama was not required personally to approve the targeting of a person. But one official said Obama would be notified of the principals' decision. If he objected, the decision would be nullified, the official said. A former official said one of the reasons for making senior officials principally responsible for nominating Americans for the target list was to "protect" the president. Officials confirmed that a second American, Samir Khan, was killed in the drone attack that killed Awlaki. Khan had served as editor of Inspire, a glossy English-language magazine used by AQAP as a propaganda and recruitment vehicle. But rather than being specifically targeted by drone operators, Khan was in the wrong place at the wrong time, officials said. Ruppersberger appeared to confirm that, saying Khan's death was "collateral," meaning he was not an intentional target of the drone strike. When the name of a foreign, rather than American, militant is added to targeting lists, the decision is made within the intelligence community and normally does not require approval by high-level NSC officials. 'FROM INSPIRATIONAL TO OPERATIONAL' Officials said Awlaki, whose fierce sermons were widely circulated on English-language militant websites, was targeted because Washington accumulated information his role in AQAP had gone "from inspirational to operational." That meant that instead of just propagandizing in favor of al Qaeda objectives, Awlaki allegedly began to participate directly in plots against American targets. "Let me underscore, Awlaki is no mere messenger but someone integrally involved in lethal terrorist activities," Daniel Benjamin, top counterterrorism official at the State Department, warned last spring. The Obama administration has not made public an accounting of the classified evidence that Awlaki was operationally involved in planning terrorist attacks. But officials acknowledged that some of the intelligence purporting to show Awlaki's hands-on role in plotting attacks was patchy. For instance, one plot in which authorities have said Awlaki was involved Nigerian-born Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, accused of trying to blow up a Detroit-bound U.S. airliner on Christmas Day 2009 with a bomb hidden in his underpants. There is no doubt Abdulmutallab was an admirer or follower of Awlaki, since he admitted that to U.S. investigators. When he appeared in a Detroit courtroom earlier this week for the start of his trial on bomb-plot charges, he proclaimed, "Anwar is alive." But at the time the White House was considering putting Awlaki on the U.S. target list, intelligence connecting Awlaki specifically to Abdulmutallab and his alleged bomb plot was partial. Officials said at the time the United States had voice intercepts involving a phone known to have been used by Awlaki and someone who they believed, but were not positive, was Abdulmutallab. Awlaki was also implicated in a case in which a British Airways employee was imprisoned for plotting to blow up a U.S.-bound plane. E-mails retrieved by authorities from the employee's computer showed what an investigator described as " operational contact" between Britain and Yemen. Authorities believe the contacts were mainly between the U.K.-based suspect and his brother. But there was a strong suspicion Awlaki was at the brother's side when the messages were dispatched. British media reported that in one message, the person on the Yemeni end supposedly said, "Our highest priority is the US ... With the people you have, is it possible to get a package or a person with a package on board a flight heading to the US?" U.S. officials contrast intelligence suggesting Awlaki's involvement in specific plots with the activities of Adam Gadahn, an American citizen who became a principal English-language propagandist for the core al Qaeda network formerly led by Osama bin Laden. While Gadahn appeared in angry videos calling for attacks on the United States, officials said he had not been specifically targeted for capture or killing by U.S. forces because he was regarded as a loudmouth not directly involved in plotting attacks.
Poster Comment: Who are these people. Someone get their names and we will make our own little list.
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 90.
#2. To: A K A Stone (#0)
In point of fact, an enemy combatant who happened to be a citizen was targeted. And there was nothing "alleged" about his AQ association. He was AQ.
And there was nothing "alleged" about his AQ association. He was AQ. In point of fact he was not a combatant. In point of fact, he was an American citizen. In point of fact, the U.S. Constitution is not waived at the whim of a secret star chamber. If this were lawful, how many people could be put on the secret kill list? Where does the authority end? Does a U.S. citizen have fewer protections than an illegal alien? Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), No. 73-1046, at 77 From the Opinion of the Court by Justice Stevens.
The US is engaged in an authorized military action against Al Qaeda. That is indisuputable. It would, therefore, stand the laws and resolutions regarding armed conflict to disregard any member of an enemy organization who has direct knowledge of its terrorist operations and who also encourages those same operations to be regarded as a civilian rather than some form of combatant. It not only strains credulity of the laws of war but of common sense as well.
http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=24727&Disp=43#C43 The US is engaged in an authorized military action against Al Qaeda. That is indisuputable. It would, therefore, stand the laws and resolutions regarding armed conflict to disregard any member of an enemy organization who has direct knowledge of its terrorist operations and who also encourages those same operations to be regarded as a civilian rather than some form of combatant. It not only strains credulity of the laws of war but of common sense as well. Stay Hungry...Stay Foolish --Steve Jobs war posted on 2011-10-07 8:54:38 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court held directly to the contrary in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in armed conflict involving alleged members of Al Qaeda, the Geneva Convention Common Article 3 applies, it must be complied with, and its protections must be observed. Oh snap! (Bench Opinion) NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 05-184. Argued March 28, 2006 - Decided June 29, 2006 At 1-2: At 4: At 6: At 6: (iii) While Common Article 3 does not define its "regularly constituted court" phrase, other sources define the words to mean an "ordinary military cour[t]" that is "established and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country." The regular military courts in our system are the courts-martial established by congressional statute. At a minimum, a military commission can be "regularly constituted" only if some practical need explains deviations from court-martial practice. No such need has been demonstrated here. Pp. 69.70. (iv) Common Article 3's requirements are general, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems, but they are requirements nonetheless. The commission convened to try Hamdan does not meet those requirements. P. 72. (d) Even assuming that Hamden is a dangerous individual who would cause great harm or death to innocent civilians given the opportunity, the Executive nevertheless must comply with the prevailing rule of law in undertaking to try him and subject him to criminal punishment. P. 72. - - - - Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006) - Armed Conflict With Al Qaeda and Common Articles 2 and 3
There are no replies to Comment # 90. End Trace Mode for Comment # 90.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestThe role of the president in ordering or ratifying a decision to target a citizen is fuzzy.
#42. To: war, A K A Stone (#2)
In point of fact, an enemy combatant who happened to be a citizen was targeted.
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 339 U. S. 48-51; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 163 U. S. 238; see Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481, 282 U. S. 489. Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. Wong Yang Sung, supra; Wong Wing, supra.
#43. To: nolu chan (#42)
(Edited)
In point of fact he was not a combatant.
#90. To: war, A K A Stone, Liberator (#43)
#43. To: nolu chan (#42) (Edited)
In point of fact he was not a combatant.
OCTOBER TERM, 2005
The District Court granted habeas relief and stayed the commission's proceedings, concluding that the President's authority to establish military commissions extends only to offenders or offenses triable by such a commission under the law of war; that such law includes the Third Geneva Convention; that Hamdan is entitled to that Convention's full protections until adjudged, under it, not to be a prisoner of war; and that, whether or not Hamdan is properly classified a prisoner of war, the commission convened to try him was established in violation of both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. §801 et seq., and Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention because it had the power to convict based on evidence the accused would never see or hear. The D. C. Circuit reversed.
4. The military commission at issue lacks the power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949. Pp. 49-72.
(d) The procedures adopted to try Hamdan also violate the Geneva Conventions. The D. C. Circuit dismissed Hamdan's challenge in this regard on the grounds, inter alia, that the Conventions are not judicially enforceable and that, in any event, Hamdan is not entitled to their protections. Neither of these grounds is persuasive. Pp. 62–68.
(ii) Alternatively, the appeals court agreed with the Government that the Conventions do not apply because Hamdan was captured during the war with al Qaeda, which is not a Convention signatory, and that conflict is distinct from the war with signatory Afghanistan. The Court need not decide the merits of this argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not between signatories. Common Article 3, which appears in all four Conventions, provides that, in a "conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties [i.e., signatories], each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum," certain provisions protecting "[p]ersons . . . placed hors de combat by . . . detention," including a prohibition on "the passing of sentences . . . without previous judgment . . . by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees . . . recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." The D. C. Circuit ruled Common Article 3 inapplicable to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda is international in scope and thus not a "conflict not of an international character." That reasoning is erroneous. That the quoted phrase bears its literal meaning and is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations is demonstrated by Common Article 2, which limits its own application to any armed conflict between signatories and provides that signatories must abide by all terms of the Conventions even if another party to the conflict is a nonsignatory, so long as the nonsignatory "accepts and applies" those terms. Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory who are involved in a conflict "in the territory of" a signatory. The latter kind of conflict does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not). Pp. 65.68.
Replies to Comment # 90.
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