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Religion Title: fundamental flaw of the Bush administration's war policy The global jihadists' perpetual will to war The fundamental flaw of the Bush administration's war policy lies not so much in its actions, as in the failure to articulate a right understanding of the nature and goals of the war. The Bush policy flounders and seems to fail because in their discussion of the situation, some policymakers still rely upon a shallow, inadequate understanding of war. This shallow understanding prevails in our day, as we see every time the war against Israel erupts into actual fighting. Whatever the occasion of battle, though it be a blatant act of aggression or terror, voices arise calling for an immediate end to "violence," i.e., Israel's military response. They purport to speak for peace, but in this case putting an end to violence is not the same as bringing an end to war. As Thomas Hobbes observed, "war consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lies not in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary." (Leviathan, I, 13) By this understanding, the Middle East has been and remains in a state of perpetual war and will continue in that condition as long as there are those in the region who effectually make known their "will to contend by battle." In light of this understanding, it becomes clear that peace cannot be achieved until the will to contend by battle is extinguished, or until those who, in word or deed, proclaim this will have been effectually eliminated. For many years the European governments, and to a greater or lesser degree successive U.S. administrations, have pursued policies that ignore both the nature of war and the key prerequisite of peace. So-called peace efforts in and about the region have included, without discrimination, parties that openly and persistently proclaim their dedication to contend by battle until their goals are achieved. This means, of course, that any involvement in negotiations is for them simply an element of strategy, meant to influence the opportunity for battle and its outcome. In Lebanon right now, the IDF is experiencing the fruit of this kind of diplomacy. Since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon some years ago, Hezbollah has enjoyed a free hand in the area that borders Israel. They have not only made known their disposition to do battle, they have continually engaged in acts of violence. The nature of the resistance Israeli forces are now encountering demonstrates that Hezbollah also used their undisturbed hegemony in the area to prepare the region for battle with stockpiles of new weapons, and a network of underground tunnels and bunkers to facilitate the supply and movement of their war-making forces. Thanks to the diplomatic framework of Israel's withdrawal and the weight of political pressure and opinion, Israel did not periodically move to disrupt Hezbollah's development of this war-making infrastructure. Now Israel's forces pay the price as they seek finally to dislodge a profoundly entrenched enemy. If we think this through, it becomes clear that in the context of perpetual war, the supposed devotees of peace who clamor for an end to violence the moment battle begins contribute mainly to the strength and success of those whose "will to contend by battle" is responsible for the state of war. Thanks to the very real constraints imposed by the influence of these self-styled peace lovers, the war makers can at will choose the time and place of battle. They can keep their opponents constantly on the defensive. They can demonstrate over time to the populations they seek to govern that the war path leads to power and advantage no peaceful path could offer. When we say "advantage" Americans immediately think in terms of material advantages, the opportunity to enjoy the good things of life. This is mainly because, given our situation in the world, this sense of advantage at once satisfies both our desires and our pride. In today's world, however, the pride of the peoples of the Middle East cannot be satisfied by the measuring rod of material prosperity. By this measure, thanks mainly to their continual scientific advances, others such as the United States, Europe and Japan must stand higher in the scale of power and achievement. The holy-war mentality promoted by the Iranians and al-Qaida, however, introduces a different basis for measurement, one in which the purity of faith and fierce devotion count for more than material goods. On no other basis could al-Qaida's No. 2 leader conjure the prospect of Islamic hegemony from "Spain to Iraq," re-establishing the era – glorious for Islam – when regimes of that faith dominated the Mediterranean basin and reached well into Europe and South Asia. Though much of our experience since World War II suggests otherwise, most Americans still operate on the assumption that our material advantages necessarily translate into superiority in war. If all means could be ruthlessly employed whenever they would be militarily effective, this assumption could be justified. In reality, however, conscience and the enjoyment of peace have an effect upon the national will that limits, for good and ill, the means we can employ. The self-proclaimed holy warriors of Islam labor under no such constraints. They see no wrong in their unprovoked attacks on Israel or anyone else they choose. They see no wrong in violent attacks aimed at taking the lives of masses of unarmed civilians. Their will to war extends beyond aggression to terrorism of every description, and beyond the Middle East to every region of the world. At the beginning of his famous treatise "On War," Clausewitz describes war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." But since the application of available forces depends upon the will, it is will not force alone that ultimately determines the outcome. But the will in question is precisely the will to war, the will to wage battle by every available means until the enemy is eliminated or defeated. In the confrontation between the holy warriors of Islam and democratic republics such as the United States and Israel, the former may have a natural advantage when it comes to sustaining the will to battle over the long term. Most people prefer peace to war. They would rather enjoy a good meal than devour their enemies in battle. They would rather build a home or a business than destroy the strongholds of the ungodly. They would rather seek pleasure in the battle of the sexes than victory in the embrace of glorious death. The passion for holy war must appear to them a kind of madness, and this is precisely why it is so hard for them to deal with the reality to which it gives rise. In democratic republics, the will of most people ultimately prevails, along with its limitations. Given the popular inclination toward peace, can such republics cope, over the long term, with the challenge of adversaries whose very identity and spirit are defined in terms of war? Most people grow weary of life in war. The holy warrior lives for the prospect of a fulfilling death that cannot be had without it. This does not mean that the people in democratic republics can never meet the challenge of holy war. It does suggest, however, that their survival depends on never predicating their actions on the notion that the will to peace that they take for granted is universal. Wisdom begins when they accept the fact that the holy warrior does not want peace, will never want peace and cannot even conceive of peace as they do. The holy warrior finds peace in the smile of his god at the moment of his glorious death. He thus makes peace only by killing all his enemies. ("But the wicked are like the troubled sea; for it cannot rest, and its waters cast up mire and dirt. There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked." Isaiah 57:20) This is the root of the perpetual war in the Middle East, and of the threat that it poses to the rest of the world. The dedication to holy war results in a permanent will to war that may change only when all enemies have been eliminated or reduced to submission. This was the spirit in which Islamic armies forged the great empires the leaders of al-Qaida and Iran now seek to recreate. With such people it may be possible to negotiate temporary cease-fires and truces of dubious duration, but no peace is possible with those who embrace the culture of holy war. When they are involved, the very idea of peace talks is a dangerous delusion. Unfortunately, the shallow understanding that has characterized U.S. and European policy toward the Middle East has inexorably led to a situation in which the terror-minded forces of holy war now play a decisive role. Though no one would yet dare to suggest that anyone should negotiate with al-Qaida, Hamas and Hezbollah have moved to the fore as de facto negotiating parties in the current battles. Though both continue to be devout practitioners of terror, "leaders" like Kofi Annan at the United Nations and spokesmen for the various European powers press for a quick cease-fire on terms worked out directly or indirectly with their participation. Prior to the present outbreak, the general assumption was that no dealings should take place with Hamas until and unless it renounced terror and aggressive war. Now, by means of terror attacks and aggressive war, the Hamas-Hezbollah combination has advanced to de facto negotiations. The war path has once again borne fruit. The strategy they now follow is similar to the course followed by the PLO through decades of posturing and manipulation of the so-called Middle East peace process. As an inexhaustible source of war and violence, Yasser Arafat made himself an indispensable element of the process, by providing time and again the crisis to be talked about and resolved. Extinguished by time and corruption, such leaders as Arafat have given way to a new generation, following a more blatant and open form of the same strategy. Recruiting their strength with the ideology of holy war, they become the permanent source of violence that keeps the "peace process" alive by making sure that talks are always necessary and peace is never possible. After several generations as the feckless dupes of such leaders, one would think that both European and American leaders would have learned something. But they continue to follow the terrorist factions in this dance of deadly delusion because the alternative contradicts all the rosy platitudes that they wrongly present as the basis for mankind's progress toward peace. Somehow, despite contrary facts that are palpably clear in the historic record, they have managed to convince themselves and the world that the most terrible wars of the 20th century occurred because nations didn't do enough talking to resolve their differences. In fact, they occurred because shortsighted, peace-minded leaders allow good intentions and wishful thinking to take the place of an accurate assessment of the identity and intentions of their adversaries. They occurred because democratic societies want so badly to believe that war is an episode, even when dealing with people whose spirit and intention have already made it a permanent, inevitable reality. The true breach of the peace comes not in the act of violence that reveals the battle, but in the inclination of heart, character and culture through which a people declare themselves to be in a state of war. Once a people or their accepted leaders have exposed this inclination, war exists, and no amount of talking will wish it away. Two courses of action are sensible: to defeat the war-makers by fighting the war as effectively as possible; and to work for peace by breaking and eliminating the culture and mentality that produces their warlike inclination. Though parleys may occur as these actions proceed, they make sense only insofar as they serve one or the other of these purposes. This reasoning has clear application to the present situation. Rather than pressing for a cease-fire in any form, people who really want to see an end to war in the Middle East should press for the total defeat and elimination of the forces who now represent the settled determination to do battle. Though Israel's short-term security may be served by a result that merely pushes Hezbollah away from the Israeli border, regional peace can only be served by the effectual elimination of its war-making capability. The same is true of Hamas, and in the long run of Iran. It should be the clear and unyielding policy of the United States and all who truly desire peace in the region to insist that no peace talks of any kind can take place until, by word and deed, the leaders and regimes who have declared their settled inclination to do battle renounce that inclination. All support for and involvement in terrorist activities in any form must end. All unprovoked attacks must end; all declarations of holy war, battle and struggle must cease and be vigorously disavowed. Leaders who have declared their irrevocable commitment to such things must step down or be removed. Absent these steps, taken and confirmed beyond doubt, the United States and any others determined to make real peace possible should hold firm in the determination to prosecute the war these others insist upon until either their means or their will to make war are eliminated.
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