PAGE 1 In late May 2009, Israels defense minister, Ehud Barak, used a visit from a Congressional delegation to send a pointed message to the new American president.
In a secret cable sent back to Washington, the American ambassador to Israel, James B. Cunningham, reported that Mr. Barak had argued that the world had 6 to 18 months in which stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable. After that, Mr. Barak said, any military solution would result in unacceptable collateral damage.
There was little surprising in Mr. Baraks implicit threat that Israel might attack Irans nuclear facilities. As a pressure tactic, Israeli officials have been setting such deadlines, and extending them, for years. But six months later it was an Arab leader, the king of Bahrain, who provides the base for the American Fifth Fleet, telling the Americans that the Iranian nuclear program must be stopped, according to another cable. The danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it, he said.
His plea was shared by many of Americas Arab allies, including the powerful King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who according to another cable repeatedly implored Washington to cut off the head of the snake while there was still time.
These warnings are part of a trove of diplomatic cables reaching back to the genesis of the Iranian nuclear standoff in which leaders from around the world offer their unvarnished opinions about how to negotiate with, threaten and perhaps force Irans leaders to renounce their atomic ambitions.
The cables also contain a fresh American intelligence assessment of Irans missile program. They reveal for the first time that the United States believes that Iran has obtained advanced missiles from North Korea that could let it strike at Western European capitals and Moscow and help it develop more formidable long-range ballistic missiles.
In day-by-day detail, the cables, obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to a number of news organizations, tell the disparate diplomatic back stories of two administrations pressed from all sides to confront Tehran. They show how President George W. Bush, hamstrung by the complexities of Iraq and suspicions that he might attack Iran, struggled to put together even modest sanctions.
They also offer new insights into how President Obama, determined to merge his promise of engagement with his vow to raise the pressure on the Iranians, assembled a coalition that agreed to impose an array of sanctions considerably harsher than any before attempted.
When Mr. Obama took office, many allies feared that his offers of engagement would make him appear weak to the Iranians. But the cables show how Mr. Obamas aides quickly countered those worries by rolling out a plan to encircle Iran with economic sanctions and antimissile defenses. In essence, the administration expected its outreach to fail, but believed that it had to make a bona fide attempt in order to build support for tougher measures.
A Sense of Urgency
Feeding the administrations urgency was the intelligence about Irans missile program. As it weighed the implications of those findings, the administration maneuvered to win Russian support for sanctions. It killed a Bush-era plan for a missile defense site in Poland which Moscows leaders feared was directed at them, not Tehran and replaced it with one floating closer to Irans coast. While the cables leave unclear whether there was an explicit quid pro quo, the move seems to have paid off.
There is also an American-inspired plan to get the Saudis to offer China a steady oil supply, to wean it from energy dependence on Iran. The Saudis agreed, and insisted on ironclad commitments from Beijing to join in sanctions against Tehran.
At the same time, the cables reveal how Irans ascent has unified Israel and many longtime Arab adversaries notably the Saudis in a common cause. Publicly, these Arab states held their tongues, for fear of a domestic uproar and the retributions of a powerful neighbor. Privately, they clamored for strong action by someone else.
If they seemed obsessed with Iran, though, they also seemed deeply conflicted about how to deal with it with diplomacy, covert action or force. In one typical cable, a senior Omani military officer is described as unable to decide what is worse: a strike against Irans nuclear capability and the resulting turmoil it would cause in the Gulf, or inaction and having to live with a nuclear-capable Iran.