The latest round of attacks aimed toward Donald Trump can only reasonably be considered divinely inspired fails.
OMG Donald Trump Supports Eminent Domain!!
[ *NOTE* Watch closely who picks up on this attack approach and you’ll identify an even larger number of the GOPe deceivers than were visible before. ]
Brett Baier interviewed Donald Trump for his Fox News Special Report segment and carried with him a specifically pre-framed angle of attack, an agenda. Baier used the Club for Growth argument (see video: @3:34) for conversation about Eminent Domain.
Of course Eminent Domain is wonderful, it goes without saying.
It is not even a reasonable argument to state otherwise. Eminent Domain is expressly written into the 5th Amendment of the U.S. constitution because without the ability of government to control property use, institute easements and take ownership of land parcels there would be complete chaos. Think about the power grid as an example. How do you get electricity to your home if the municipal government cannot put a power pole in the neighborhood yards? It really is that simple.
Or if you live in the country and build a home and you need to have utilities installed, think about how ridiculous it would be if the neighboring land owner two miles away refused to allow the transferring infrastructure?
Eminent Domain is an essential element of society and life. There is no other option without it. Donald Trump says “eminent domain is wonderful” because it is.
Yet look at how quick the punditry moved to make an issue out of it:
You just have to laugh at the scope of the FAIL.
Now, there is an argument to be made that the Kelo Supreme Court decision, which expanded Eminent Domain to encompass the transfer of property ownership from one private owner to another private owner, is going to far.
In Kelo you enter into the “greater good” argument where the property rights of an individual are compromised by government intervention. Should a property owner lose their property for a developer or business who is putting a manufacturing facility upon it?
That’s a more nuanced argument and should be decided between the interested parties and resolved in local courts if needed.
However, the larger argument of “eminent domain”, where the government can use private property for the benefit of a larger society is not an issue; it is essential. There’s another aspect to “actual property ownership” that revolves around taxation, economic activity, private property “ownership”, and who actually owns real property that is subject to cyclical taxation, but that’s for another day.
Short version “anything that is taxed, while existing in a static economic form, you do not technically own”.
But in their rush to find something, anything, to attack Donald Trump with – Fox News once again shows how absolutely biased they are in their efforts to get rid of Donald Trump and make way for their chosen candidate, Jeb!
"In Kelo you enter into the “greater good” argument where the property rights of an individual are compromised by government intervention."
All that the Kelo decision said was that local governments could take property for commercial use. Since that decision, 42 states have passed laws against taking property for commercial use, thereby voiding Kelo.
All that the Kelo decision said was that local governments could take property for commercial use. Since that decision, 42 states have passed laws against taking property for commercial use, thereby voiding Kelo.
Kelo involved an eminent domain taking pursuant to Connecticut state law. The U.S. Supreme Court only had jurisdiction to determine if the taking had violated the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It held that over a century of case law confirmed that there was no constitutional violation. The Supreme Court explicitly explained that any state could legislate to restrict its exercise of the takings power.
Kelo at 489-90: (citations omitted)
In affirming the City’s authority to take petitioners’ properties, we do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation. We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose “public use” requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be exercised. As the submissions of the parties and their amici make clear, the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic development are certainly matters of legitimate public debate. This Court’s authority, however, extends only to determining whether the City’s proposed condemnations are for a “public use” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Because over a century of our case law interpreting that provision dictates an affirmative answer to that question, we may not grant petitioners the relief that they seek.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is affirmed.
Sec. 48-6. Time limits for municipal corporations to take real property. Taking of property in neighborhood revitalization zones.(a) Any municipal corporation having the right to purchase real property for its municipal purposes which has, in accordance with its charter or the general statutes, voted to purchase the same shall have power to take or acquire such real property, within the corporate limits of such municipal corporation, and if such municipal corporation cannot agree with any owner upon the amount to be paid for any real property thus taken, it shall proceed in the manner provided by section 48-12 within six months after such vote or such vote shall be void.
(b) In the case of acquisition by a redevelopment agency of real property located in a redevelopment area, except as provided in sections 8-127a, 8-193 and 32-224, the time for acquisition may be extended by the legislative body upon request of the redevelopment agency, provided the owner of the real property consents to such request.
(c) In accordance with the policy established in section 7-603, any municipal corporation may take property which is located within the boundaries of a neighborhood revitalization zone identified in a strategic plan adopted pursuant to sections 7-601 and 7-602. The acquisition of such property shall proceed in the manner provided in sections 8-128 to 8-133, inclusive, and 48-12.
(1949 Rev., S. 7179; 1959, P.A. 152, S. 64; 1961, P.A. 294; 1971, P.A. 198; P.A. 83-587, S. 58, 96; P.A. 91-398, S. 3, 7; P.A. 95-340, S. 5; P.A. 07-141, S. 20.)
History: 1959 act deleted “concerning the condemnation of land for the site of county buildings” following reference to Sec. 48-12, county government having been abolished by the act; 1961 act added reference to powers conferred by the general statutes, imposed six-month deadline for taking action under Sec. 48-12 and specified that unless such action is taken the vote shall be void; 1971 act clarified six-month deadline for taking action by rephrasing provision; P.A. 83-587 made a technical amendment; P.A. 91-398 designated existing language as Subsec. (a), substituted the term “real property” for “real estate” in Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (b) regarding acquisition by a redevelopment agency of real property located in a redevelopment area; P.A. 95-340 added Subsec. (c) re taking of property located within neighborhood revitalization zones; P.A. 07-141 amended Subsec. (b) to add “except as provided in sections 8-127a, 8-193 and 32-224”, effective June 25, 2007, and applicable to property acquired on or after that date.
Cited. 100 C. 411. Challenge of authority’s decision must be by procedures under Sec. 48-12. 154 C. 446. Cited. 186 C. 229.
Cited. 23 CA 554; 32 CA 611. 6-month time limitation in Subsec. (a) applies only to condemnation proceedings and not to voluntary sales. 94 CA 364. Where referendum question stated that property proposed to be acquired by eminent domain by municipality for a school project would also be used for open space and general government, provisions of section requiring commencement of compensation process within 6 months of referendum apply. 103 CA 369.
Establishment of an airport by a town is clearly one of its municipal purposes and proceedings to condemn for such are brought under this section and Sec. 48-12. 9 CS 317. Cited. 20 CS 422.
#12. To: nolu chan, tooconservative, tomder55, cz82, misterwhite (#11)
This Court’s authority, however, extends only to determining whether the City’s proposed condemnations are for a “public use” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
So here is the fifth amendment. Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Lets zero in on this part "No person shall...... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation".
So the constitution has some requirements. It has to be for public use. There has to be just compensation. It says public use not public ownership. So it seems constitutionally Kelo is correct. Even though we don't like people having things taken by us from the Government.
It also says states can have higher standards. So having seen and thought about this Kelo is correct if you use the text of the constitution. Or at least an argument could be made that it is.
It seems even when Trump went to court and won. He actually had a constitutional case to make. I mean it met the two requirements in the constitution. There was just compensation. It was for public use. Remember the constitution says public use not public ownership. If we like that or not.
It seems even when Trump went to court and won. He actually had a constitutional case to make. I mean it met the two requirements in the constitution. There was just compensation. It was for public use. Remember the constitution says public use not public ownership. If we like that or not.
The Founders and all the Courts since never discovered any such legitimate use until the Kelo decision a decade ago.
This was the Court, mad with power, tinkering with the Constitution. They should have all been impeached in the Senate. It was shameless politicking to sell out to the Chambers of Commerce types for a Court victory.
The issue is clearly presented and it ought to be fairly met. That the purposes mentioned in the act “are of vital necessity to the people of this state,” cannot be denied; that mining is the paramount interest of the state is not questioned; that anything which tends directly to encourage mineral developments and increase the mineral resources of the state is for the benefit of the public and is calculated to advance the general welfare and prosperity of the people of this state, is a self-evident proposition. Hence, it necessarily follows that if the position contended for by petitioner is correct, and I believe it is, then the act is constitutional and should be upheld. Although other and weaker reasons have more frequently been assigned, it seems to me that this is the true interpretation upon which courts have really acted in sustaining the right of eminent domain in favor of railroads and other objects, and in several of the decided cases this reason is expressly given.
At 403-04:
“The principle is, that the lands of individuals are holden subject to the requisitions of the public exigencies, a reasonable compensation being paid for the damage. It is not taking the property of one man and giving it to another. At most, it is a forced sale to satisfy the pressing want of the public.” (12 Pick. 480.)
At 405:
It has never been deemed essential that the entire community, or any considerable portion of it, should directly enjoy or par ticipate in an improvement or enterprise, in order to constitute a public use, within the true meaning of these words as used in the constitution. Such an interpretation would greatly narrow and cripple the authority of the legislature, so as to deprive it of the power of exerting a material and beneficial influence on the welfare and prosperity of the state.
At 406:
In Connecticut the doctrines advanced in the Massachusetts cases are fully supported. Especially is this true of the reasoning of the supr eme court in Olmstead v. Camp, sustaining the validity of the flowage act of that state. It was there contended that the act manifestly authorized the taking of property for private use; that in order to sustain the law it must affirmatively appear that th e public have an interest in the thing to be taken; that there must be a public right of control of the thing taken as property in which the state has an interest; that the thing taken is to be used by the public, and is taken that it may be so used. In di scussing this question the court say: “One of the most common meanings of the word ‘use' as defined by Webster, is ‘usefulness, utility, advantage, productive of benefit.' Public use may therefore well mean public usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit, so that any appropriating of private property by the state under its right of eminent domain for purposes of great advantage to the community, is a taking for public use.” (33 Conn. 546.) This decision directly declaring t hat the “term ‘public use’ is synonymous with public benefit or advantage” was concurred in by all the judges except Hinman, C. J., who dissented.
At 409:
Now it so happens, or, at least, is liable to happen, that individuals, by securing a title to the barren lands adjacent to the mines, mills or works, have it within their power, by unreasonably refusing to part with their lands for a just and fair compensation, which capital is always willing to give without litigation, to greatly embarra ss if not entirely defeat the business of mining in such localities. In my opinion, the mineral wealth of this state ought not to be left undeveloped for the want of any quantity of land actually necessary to enable the owner or owners of mines to conduct and carry on the business of mining.
At 410:
But it is argued, that in sustaining this act upon the principles we have announced, there is no limitation to the exercise of legislative will in the appropriation of private property. After a thorough investigation of this question, I am of opinion that this argument is more specious than sound.
At 410:
If public occupation and enjoyment of the object for which land is to be condemned furnishes the only and true test for the right of eminent domain, then the legislature would certainly have the constitutional authority to condemn the lands of any private citizen for the purpose of building hotels and theaters. Why not? A hotel is used by the public as much as a railroad. The public have the same right, upon payment of a fixed compensation, to seek rest and refreshment at a public inn as they have to travel upon railroad.
