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Title: KP student charged with manslaughter in Fairhaven friend’s death; authorities say she encouraged him to commit suicide
Source:
Sun Chronicle
URL Source: http://www.thesunchronicle.com/news ... 30-11e4-ada1-7b43f5417c27.html
Published: Feb 27, 2015
Author: Jim Hand
Post Date: 2015-02-27 18:19:00 by cranky
Keywords: None
Views: 8991
Comments: 44
Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy III A King Philip Regional High School senior has been indicted for involuntary manslaughter, allegedly for urging a friend to commit suicide. She then raised money for mental illness in the name of her friend. Michelle Carter, 18, of Plainville was indicted as a “youthful offender” by a Bristol County grand jury, and was arraigned in New Bedford Juvenile Court. She is accused of urging Conrad Roy III, 18, of Fairhaven and Mattapoisett to kill himself, which he did while idling a truck last July in the parking lot of a Fairhaven Kmart. Authorities said he died of carbon monoxide poisoning. Police found Roy after his family reported him missing. Police went through Roy’s cellphone and allegedly found a number of text messages from Carter, right up until the time he died, when she allegedly urged Roy to go through with the suicide, according to court documents. Fairhaven police Detective Scott Gordon said in a police report: “Not only did Conrad tell Carter in several of his texts prior to his death that he was scared and didn’t want to leave his family, she continued to encourage him to take his own life, and when he actually started to carry out the act, he got scared again and exited his truck, but instead of telling him to stay out of the truck ... Carter told him to ‘get back in.’” The apparent suicide happened last July, but Carter was just indicted Feb. 5 and arraigned the following day. The case had not been previously publicized, and most news organizations don’t regularly cover juvenile court. Gregg Miliote, a spokesman for Bristol County District Attorney Quinn, issued a written statement Thursday outlining the basics of the case. “Based on the totality of the investigation, it is alleged that Ms. Carter had first-hand knowledge of Roy’s suicidal thoughts,” he said. “Instead of attempting to assist him or notify his family or school officials, Ms. Carter is alleged to have strongly influenced his decision to take his own life, encouraged him to commit suicide and guided him in his engagement of activities which led to his death.” He confirmed that Carter called and sent text messages to the victim encouraging him to go through with the suicide. Miliote also said Quinn, the district attorney, has recused himself from involvement in the case because he has a “familial relationship” to the victim. Calls and emails to the Carter family went unanswered Thursday night and no one answered the door at their Plainville home. Carter’s attorney, Joseph P. Cataldo of Franklin, told The Standard-Times of New Bedford Thursday night that she did not commit a crime and that the manslaughter charge probably will be dismissed. “This is terrible tragedy — a young man taking his own life,” he told the Standard-Times. He accused the district attorney’s office of “trying to pin the blame on someone.” “I can’t understand why they brought the charge,” Cataldo said. “They’re trying to claim there is manslaughter, when they freely admit the boy took his own life. You can’t have it both ways.” On Carter’s Facebook page and on the Plainville Athletic League website, postings say she organized a softball tournament last September to raise money for mental health awareness in honor of her friend, Roy. A press release advertising the fundraiser appeared in The Sun Chronicle. The event was called “Homers for Conrad,” and Carter wrote: “life can be tough, but helping others makes it easier.” She also posted several messages on Facebook saying how much she loved her friend and missed him. The Facebook page that was set up for the fundraising event has been taken down and is no longer an active page. However, Carter posted on her Twitter page about the outcome of the fundraiser. “Thank you so much to everyone who came out to support Homers for Conrad! I’m so happy to say that with your help, we raised over $2,300!” Carter posted the message on her Twitter page Sept. 13 under the account @michyc47. She wrote about suicide prevention often on her social media accounts. On Sept. 10, 2014, she posted on her Twitter page: “National Suicide Awareness day, I wish more people understood. I love you and miss you everyday Conrad. Help others #WeCanEndSuicide.” She retweeted the link to a suicide prevention hotline on Sept. 21, 2014. Carter was also a founding member of an organization called Connect-To-Cure, a fundraiser that sells $10 bracelets to raise money for cancer patients at Boston Children’s Hospital. She stopped by the hospital to participate in a charity event, according to an article published in The Plainville Times — three weeks after she was arraigned on the manslaughter charge. Carter was an honor roll student at King Philip Regional High School. The court set bail for Carter at $2,500 and ordered she have no access to the Internet, other than for school work. She must stay off social media and is not allowed to send text messages, other than to her parents. The youthful offender designation she was indicted under means she will be tried in juvenile court, but her trial will be open to the public, unlike typical juvenile cases. Carter was 17 at the time of her friend’s death. Meanwhile, the grandmother of the victim, Janice Roy, said Thursday night she did not want to say too much about the case because it is making the family relive the heartache of Conrad’s death. She did say Conrad was a good kid who had earned his boat captain’s license in only three weeks as he went to work for the family’s marine salvage business. King Philip High School officials today declined to comment on Carter and her indictment for involuntary manslaughter. “The circumstances surrounding this tragic loss are under investigation. Our deepest sympathy is extended to the family and school community of Conrad Roy,” Superintendent Elizabeth Zielinski said. “As an educational institution we are bound by regulations related to the privacy of student records. As such I will not comment on the situation, or discuss anything that is related to any student’s record.” The victim had graduated from Old Rochester Regional High School and was planning to attend Fitchburg State University. His father and paternal grandfather share his name and his love of the ocean. Conrad Roy Jr., the father, was working a tug boat Feb. 19, 2009, when US Airways Flight 1549 went down in the Hudson River. Roy Jr.’s tug was among the first to come to the rescue.
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 40.
#1. To: cranky, nolu chan (#0)
(Edited)
This sounds like a variety of Munchausen by proxy. She collects sympathy and admiration for memorializing her "friend" and does fundraising after she explicitly encouraged him repeatedly to off himself, right up to his death. I'm not sure how you criminalize this as a matter of law in a way that isn't counterproductive. But I understand how outraged people are that a vulnerable young man was virtually driven to complete his suicide by this girl for no good reason. It might be best to prosecute her under assisted suicide laws and throw the book at her. It sounds like the local authorities are gutless and have referred this to juvenile court, not a good sign. She should face more serious consequences for her actions.
Perhaps a possible defense is a claim that she thought he was just bullshitting her to get attention and she did not believe his texts until after the fact when she found out he was dead.
I might give it a shot. But would that pass the 'reasonable man' standard? I guess it depends on the judge and jury.
Maybe, maybe not. The question is whether it could sustain reasonable doubt in the mind of at least one juror. Without having seen the texts which may be mostly on a single day, or show a sustained effort, or explain motive, it's difficult to know the strength of the case. They took about 8 months to bring the case and presumably had the texts for about the whole time. The delay indicates it was not a slam dunk and I just threw something out there that could be a potential weakness in the case. I have looked a bit at Connecticut law. It would appear to be the actual charge would be Manslaughter in the Second Degree according to the Connecticut penal code. http://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_952.htm#sec_53a-56 (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: (1) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or (2) he intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide. (b) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony. The Connecticut penal code definition of Man2 appears to be what is commonly called involuntary manslaughter. Sec. 53a-56(a)(1) requires that the actions of the accused were the proximate cause of death. It must be "proved beyond a reasonable doubt that died as a result of the actions of the defendant." A difficulty for this charge would be to prove the suicide was as a direct result of the actions of the defendant. Did the accused contribute to the commission of suicide or did she cause the suicide? Is there proof beyond a reasonable doubt? Sec. 53a-56(a)(2) requires the accused intentionally cause or aid another to commit suicide. The prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, "that the defendant intentionally caused or aided to commit suicide. A person acts 'intentionally' with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such result." A difficulty for this charge would be to prove requisite intent to cause the result. There may well be a plea agreement down to Reckless Endangerment. They may have deliberately overcharged to encourage a plea agreement. Man 2 appears fraught with difficulty. Reckless Endangerment appears much easier to make. http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012-R-0134.htm A Connecticut Class C felony carries 1 to 10 years. Man 2 carries no mandatory minimum. Reckless Endangerment is a Class A misdemeanor and carries up to 1 year. Reckless Endangerment 2 is a Class B misdemeanor which carries up to 6 months. Connecticut law definitions of Reckless Endangerment 1 & 2 http://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_952.htm#sec_53a-63 (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person. (b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor. (1969, P.A. 828, S. 64.) http://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_952.htm#sec_53a-64 (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person. (b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor. (1969, P.A. 828, S. 65.) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endangerment Wikipedia discusses the crime of Reckless Endangerment in general terms. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manslaughter Wikipedia discusses Manslaughter in general terms. Attempted Involuntary Manslaughter was a charge resulting in a Connecticut conviction as a lesser included offense, only to be thrown out by the CT Supreme Court as being nonexistent and logically impossible. State v. Almeda, 189 Conn. 303, 309 (1983). State of Connecticut Jury Instructions re 1st and 2nd degree Reckless Endangerment http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part6/6.3-1.htm Revised to December 1, 2007 The defendant is charged [in count __] with reckless endangerment in the first degree. The statute defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows: For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element 1 - With extreme indifference to human life The first element is that the defendant acted with extreme indifference to human life. "Indifference" means simply not caring. It means lacking any interest in a matter one way or the other. Extreme means existing in the highest or greatest possible degree. Extreme indifference is more than ordinary indifference. It is synonymous with excessive and is the greatest departure from the ordinary. What evinces an extreme indifference to human life is a question of fact. Element 2 - Acted recklessly The second element is that the defendant acted recklessly. A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or circumstances when (he/she) is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstances exist. Element 3 - Created risk of serious physical injury The third element is that the defendant's recklessness created a risk of causing serious physical injury to another person. "Serious physical injury" is something more serious than mere physical injury, which is defined as "impairment of physical condition or pain." It is more than a minor or superficial injury. It is defined by statute as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." It is unnecessary for any person to have been injured by the defendant's conduct or for the defendant to have intended to injure or endanger any person. Conclusion In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant acted with extreme indifference to human life, 2) the defendant's conduct was reckless, and 3) the defendant posed a risk of causing serious physical injury to another person. If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of reckless endangerment in the first degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty. http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part6/6.3-2.htm Revised to December 1, 2007 The defendant is charged [in count __] with reckless endangerment in the second degree. The statute defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows: For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element 1 - Acted recklessly The first element is that the defendant acted recklessly. A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or circumstances when (he/she) is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstances exist. Element 2 - Created risk of physical injury The second element is that the defendant's recklessness created a risk of causing physical injury to another person.1 "Physical injury" means impairment of physical condition or pain. Conclusion In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant acted recklessly, and 2) created a risk of causing physical injury to another person. If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of reckless endangerment in the second degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty. _______________________________________________________ 1 There has to be proof that another person was actually put at risk of physical injury. State v. Thomas, 56 Conn. App. 573, 578, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 953 (2000) (defendant shot a pistol into the ground, but there was no evidence of the presence of other people in the vicinity). Commentary Reckless endangerment in the second degree is not a lesser included offense of assault in the first degree. State v. Fuller, 56 Conn. App. 592, 603-604, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 949, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 911, 121 S. Ct. 262, 148 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2000). Reckless endangerment in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a-64, and reckless driving, General Statutes § 14-222 (a), are separate offenses. "Reckless endangerment involves a risk of physical injury, and reckless driving involves endangering the life of another person. Reckless driving is limited to conduct solely involving the use of a motor vehicle. Reckless endangerment is not so limited." State v. Rudd, 62 Conn. App. 702, 710 (2001). State of Connecticut Jury Instructions re Man 2 http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part5/5.1-4.htm Revised to December 1, 2007 The defendant is charged [in count ___] with manslaughter in the second degree. The statute defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows: For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element 1 - Caused death The first element is that the defendant caused the death of . This means that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the decedent's death. You must find it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that died as a result of the actions of the defendant. Element 2 - Recklessness The second element is that the defendant's actions that resulted in the death of were reckless. A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or circumstances when (he/she) is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstances exist. Conclusion In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant caused the death of , and 2) the defendant's actions that resulted in the death were reckless. If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty. http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part5/5.1-7.htm Revised to December 1, 2007 The defendant is charged [in count ___] with manslaughter in the second degree. The statute defining this offense reads as follows: a person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when (he/she) intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide. For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element 1 - Suicide The first element is that committed suicide. Element 2 - Intent The second element is that the defendant intentionally caused or aided to commit suicide. A person acts "intentionally" with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such result. Conclusion In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) committed suicide, and 2) that the defendant intentionally caused or aided to commit suicide. If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.
CORRECTION: When I read the story before, I thought the case was in Connecticut. On further review, it appears to be clear that the case is in Massachusetts. I quoted Connecticut law which does not apply. I apologize for my error. Massachusetts does not define involuntary homicide in its statute law. It is common law as defined in court opinions. The statute defines the punishment for the crime without defining the crime. I cannot readily verify the current precedent in the court opinions. Below is the applicable statute, an excerpted court opinion, and a link to the classic 1944 Welansky opinion which defines one type of involuntary manslaughter, apparently the basis for the instant case. https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIV/TitleI/Chapter265/Section13 http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/407/407mass779.html COMMONWEALTH vs. LOUIS CATALINA. 407 Mass. 779 March 5, 1990 - July 3, 1990 Essex County Present: LIACOS, C.J., WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH, & GREANEY, JJ. Evidence presented to a grand jury that the defendant feloniously distributed heroin to a person who then died from injecting the drug could not, as matter of common law, support an indictment for involuntary manslaughter on the theory of "unlawful-act" manslaughter. [782-783] Discussion of the elements of involuntary manslaughter based on an unlawful act in light of this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 (1982). [783-787] Announcement of the abandonment of the common law crime of involuntary manslaughter based on an unlawful act, except for cases where an unintentional death results from the commission of a battery (Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 404 Mass. 774 [1989]) or from the commission of wanton and reckless conduct (Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 [1944]). [787-789] Evidence presented to a grand jury that the defendant feloniously distributed heroin to a known addict who then died from injecting the drug supported an indictment for involuntary manslaughter under the principles set forth in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (1944). [789-792] [...] GREANEY, J. A grand jury in Essex County returned indictments against the defendant for involuntary manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, Section 13 (1988 ed.), and for the unlawful distribution of a class A controlled substance, namely heroin, G. L. c. 94C, Section 32 (a) (1988 ed.). The indictments stemmed from testimony before the grand jury of the defendant’s sale of heroin to Grace Randazza and her death after use of the heroin. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the manslaughter indictment on various grounds, including an assertion that the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to justify the return of an indictment for involuntary manslaughter. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160 , 163 (1982). A judge of the Superior Court did not rule on the motion to dismiss. Instead, acting pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, 378 Mass. 905 -906 (1979), [Note 1] the judge reported the following two questions to the Appeals Court: “1. Was the evidence presented to the Grand Jury sufficient to support an indictment for manslaughter under the principle of ‘unlawful act-manslaughter’? “2. Was the evidence presented to the Grand Jury sufficient to support an indictment for manslaughter under the principles of Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (1944) (wanton and reckless conduct)?” [Note 2] [...] 1. Unlawful-act manslaughter. The first reported question asks whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to support the defendant’s prosecution for manslaughter under the theory of so-called unlawful-act manslaughter. The indictment, however, reads in relevant part as set forth below, [Note 3] and is framed in terms of whether the defendant committed manslaughter under the principles set forth in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (1944). There is an obvious reason for this. Under our common law, involuntary manslaughter cannot be charged under the theory of unlawful-act manslaughter when a death occurred during the commission of a felony. The distribution of heroin, a class A controlled substance is a felony. See G. L. Page 783 c. 94C, Section 32 (a) (1988 ed.); G. L. c. 274, Section 1 (1988 ed.). Involuntary manslaughter of the type mentioned in the first reported question presently pertains only to deaths occurring in the commission of misdemeanors or other acts malum in se, but not to the commission of felonies. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 352 Mass. 387 , 397 (1967). A defendant cannot be prosecuted for an act which was not a crime when it was performed, Lembersky v. Parole Bd. of the Dep’t of Correction, 332 Mass. 290 , 293 (1955). An indictment which is narrow and precise in scope cannot be read to encompass a new and different definition of the crime that did not exist at the time of the occurrence which gave rise to it. For these reasons, unlawful-act manslaughter cannot be used as a basis to prosecute the defendant in this case. The parties, however, have briefed and argued questions about the state of certain aspects of involuntary manslaughter after the decision in Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 (1982), which modified our common law of felony-murder. The issues they raise are important, and they deserve resolution in order to clarify the state of our manslaughter law. See Commonwealth v. Giang, 402 Mass. 604 , 608 (1988); Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722 , 731 (1943). We proceed to consider them. There is no statutory definition of manslaughter in Massachusetts; its elements are derived from common law. Commonwealth v. Godin, 374 Mass. 120 , 126 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978). We have said that “[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused (1) in the commission of an unlawful act, malum in se, [Note 4] not amounting to a felony nor likely to endanger life . . ., or (2) by an act which constitutes such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to constitute wanton or reckless conduct.” Commonwealth v. Campbell, supra at 397. The first type of manslaughter mentioned in Page 784 this passage is sometimes called unlawful-act manslaughter, while the second type is manslaughter according to the principles stated in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 , 399 (1944). We have also consistently stated that “‘[a] battery that causes death is manslaughter.’” Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 404 Mass. 774 , 776 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Bianco, 388 Mass. 358 , 362 (1983). See Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662 , 703 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. Campbell, supra; Commonwealth v. Sostilio, 325 Mass. 143 , 145 (1949); Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403 , 404 (1944); Commonwealth v. Welansky, supra at 401. [Note 5] This type of manslaughter recognizes the danger inherent in the intentional infliction of bodily harm associated with a criminal battery. [Note 6] [...] We believe that unlawful-act manslaughter should be abandoned in Massachusetts except for appropriate cases which are based on the principle that a battery that causes death is manslaughter. The latter principle has long been part of our common law and has been applied, as the Sheppard case illustrates, see note 6, supra, in circumstances in which the defendant is, or should be, cognizant of the fact that the battery he is committing endangers human life. Apart from this principle, unlawful-act manslaughter has Page 788 been rarely used as a basis for prosecution, and then in cases that are factually eccentric. [Note 11] Any effort to redefine the basis of culpability for unlawful-act manslaughter in terms of the various standards described above, see notes 8, 9, and 10, supra, would cast the offense in terms of a standard which comes close to duplicating the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Matchett, supra at 508, for felony-murder (conduct involving a “conscious disregard of the risk to human life”), or the standard for implied malice in murder described in Commonwealth v. Starling, 382 Mass. 423 , 426 (1981) (conduct which, according to common experience, involves a plain and strong likelihood of death). The resulting overlap would make it virtually impossible to instruct a jury in a manner which would enable them sensibly to differentiate between murder and manslaughter, and an unnecessary layer of confusion would be added to our already complicated common law of homicide. Further, negligence cannot be a proper common law basis for liability because “[t]here is in Massachusetts at common law no such thing as ‘criminal negligence’.” Commonwealth v. Welansky, supra at 400. Where the Legislature had determined that a negligently caused death, or a death occurring during the commission of a misdemeanor, should be punished as manslaughter it has enacted specific statutes. See, e.g., G. L. c. 90, Section 24G (a) and (b) (1988 ed.) (punishing motor vehicle homicide occurring as a result of negligent, reckless, and alcohol impaired driving). There is no doubt of the desirability of legislative consideration of the homicide law with a view toward simplification and modernization. See Commonwealth v. Starling, supra at 428-429. However, in the absence of definitive action by the Legislature, we must bring our involuntary manslaughter law in line with the Matchett decision. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law 602 (1972 ed.). For the reasons stated above, Page 789 a person henceforth may be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter only for causing an unintentional death (1) during the commission of wanton or reckless conduct, as defined in Commonwealth v. Welansky, supra, or (2) during the commission of battery, under the principles set forth in Sheppard, supra, and the other cases cited therein. For the reasons previously stated, the answer to the first reported question is “no.” 2. Welansky manslaughter. The second reported question asks whether the evidence before the grand jury supports the defendant’s indictment for manslaughter under the principles set forth in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (1944). Welansky holds that involuntary manslaughter includes an unlawful homicide unintentionally caused by wanton or reckless conduct. “The essence of wanton or reckless conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.” Id. at 399. See Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659 , 665 (1981). Moreover, we have approved jury instructions which stated that “even if a particular defendant is so stupid [or] so heedless . . . that in fact he did not realize the grave danger, he cannot escape the imputation of wanton or reckless conduct in his dangerous act or omission, if an ordinary normal man under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.” Commonwealth. Welansky, supra at 398-399. See Commonwealth v. Godin, 374 Mass. 120 , 129, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 917 (1977). Thus, under Welansky, a defendant’s subjective awareness of the reckless nature of his conduct is sufficient, but not necessary, to convict him of involuntary manslaughter. Conduct which a reasonable person, in similar circumstances, would recognize as reckless will suffice as well. We inquire whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to support the defendant’s indictment for involuntary manslaughter under the Welansky theory as described above. The defendant has not yet been tried on this charge, so we are not concerned with whether sufficient evidence Page 790 exists to warrant a finding of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, we consider only whether the information before the grand jury was adequate to establish his identity and probable cause to arrest him for the crime charged. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160 , 163 (1982). Probable cause requires facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1923). [...] The defendant’s contention that the causal link between the heroin sale and Randazza’s death was broken by Randazza’s intervening conduct of injecting herself lacks merit. Intervening conduct that is reasonably foreseeable will not relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Askew, 404 Mass. 532 , 534 (1989). It is untenable to suggest that heroin consumption is not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of selling that drug to a known addict. We conclude that “the act of the customer in injecting [her]self is not necessarily so unexpected, unforeseeable or remote as to insulate the seller from criminal responsibility as a matter of law.” State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tenn. 1984). See State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 380 (1972). See also Ureta v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 2d 672, 676 (1962) (“The person who furnished [her] Page 792 the narcotic is liable even though deceased did the actual administering of it”). The evidence before the grand jury furnishes probable cause to believe that the defendant committed involuntary manslaughter under the principles stated in the Welansky case. It follows that our answer to the second reported question is “yes.” [snip] http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/316/316mass383.html 316 Mass. 383 February 7, 1944 - June 5, 1944 [full opinion at link] http://www.massmurderdefense.com/pages/manslaughter-in.html Involuntary Manslaughter As with voluntary manslaughter Massachusetts statutory law does not define involuntary manslaughter. Rather, Massachusetts common law, as pronounced by the courts, provides the definition for involuntary manslaughter: One can commit involuntary manslaughter through: (1) an unintentional killing occasioned by an act which constitutes such a disregard of the probable harmful consequences to another as to be wanton or reckless; or (2) an unintentional killing resulting from a battery. The first theory under which a person may face conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires an unintentional, yet unlawful killing resulting from the wanton or reckless conduct of the defendant. This theory of involuntary manslaughter is sometimes called "Welansky manslaughter," after the 1944 case in which the owner of a nightclub was convicted of involuntary manslaughter when a fire in his club caused the death of over 400 patrons. That case also established that wanton or reckless conduct includes both affirmative acts and failures to act where a duty to act exists. Such acts or omissions must embody a disregard for the probable harmful consequences to another. The conduct must involve a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another. The law requires that the defendant have knowledge of the circumstances and the intent to do the act that caused the death, and also requires that the circumstances presented a danger of serious harm such that a reasonable man would have recognized the nature and degree of danger. Wanton and reckless conduct is distinct from negligence or gross negligence for which, in the common law of Massachusetts, there is no criminal liability. The second theory on which a defendant may face conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires that the defendant commit a battery, not amounting to a felony, which causes death. A person who uses a level of force against another that is likely to cause harm and which produces death is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The law requires that the prosecution establish that the defendant knew, or should have known that his conduct created a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm would result to another. This means that the same standards of proof apply to both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The punishment for both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, as set by statute, is the same. The maximum sentence for an involuntary manslaughter conviction is imprisonment for twenty years, except in circumstances where the voluntary manslaughter involves explosives or infernal machines, in which cases the maximum punishment is life imprisonment.
So it would appear the case hinges on whether or not the defendant 'would have recognized the nature and degree of danger' and if so, had a affirmative 'duty to act'?
They can demostrate this little ghoul knew full well he had attempted suicide 1.5 years ago. I'd say they have a hell of a case against her. Let her spend a few years thinking about what she did in a women's prison in MA instead of flitting off to college.
They very well may but that doesn't mean a jury will convict. Judging solely from the pics, I'd say she has a chance of swaying at least one juror.
That depends on how well the prosecution picks a jury and seats them. Put some mothers on that jury and show them those texts and replay those events, minute by minute with photos of that boy and the account of how well she knew he had tried to kill himself. I think you'd get a conviction. Or the prosecutor could go for a plea bargain which may be what is happening.
It only takes one juror for an acquittal.
Really? I had absolutely no idea. You would almost think convictions require a unanimous jury or something.
#42. To: TooConservative, cranky (#40)
Just as trivia, I note that in Military Courts-Martial, it takes two-thirds to convict. And, if you are enlisted, you have the right to have one-third enlisted on the panel (jury).
It's a little known technicality.
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#7. To: TooConservative, cranky (#1)
I'm not sure how you criminalize this as a matter of law in a way that isn't counterproductive. But I understand how outraged people are that a vulnerable young man was virtually driven to complete his suicide by this girl for no good reason.
#11. To: nolu chan (#7)
Perhaps a possible defense is a claim that she thought he was just bullshitting her to get attention and she did not believe his texts until after the fact when she found out he was dead.
#13. To: cranky, TooConservative, GrandIsland (#11)
But would that pass the 'reasonable man' standard?
Sec. 53a-56. Manslaughter in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
The illogic of attempted involuntary manslaughter is easily demonstrated. Manslaughter, as herein involved, requires that an individual having the intent to cause serious physical injury to another person causes the death of such person. Involuntary manslaughter is a homicide unintentionally caused. Commonwealth v. Hebert, 373 Mass. 535, 537, 368 N.E.2d 1204 (1977). Attempt liability requires that the defendant entertain the intent required for the substantive crime. General Statutes § 53a-49 (a). Unless death results there can be no crime of involuntary manslaughter. Thus, the crime of attempted involuntary manslaughter requires a logical impossibility, namely, that the actor in his attempt intend that an unintended death result. Such an anomaly the legislature could scarcely have intended. Accordingly, we hold that attempted manslaughter in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (1) is not a crime cognizable under our law.
6.3-1 Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree -- § 53a-63
a person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme indifference to human life, (he/she) recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person.
6.3-2 Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree -- § 53a-64
a person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when (he/she) recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person.
5.1-4 Manslaughter in the Second Degree -- § 53a-56 (a) (1)
a person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when (he/she) recklessly causes the death of another person.
5.1-7 Manslaughter in the Second Degree (Aiding Suicide) -- § 53a-56 (a) (2)
a person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when (he/she) intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide.
#30. To: cranky, TooConservative, GrandIsland (#13)
[nolu chan #13]It would appear to be the actual charge would be Manslaughter in the Second Degree according to the Connecticut penal code.
Section 13. Whoever commits manslaughter shall, except as hereinafter provided, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail or a house of correction for not more than two and one half years. Whoever commits manslaughter while violating the provisions of sections 102 to 102C, inclusive, of chapter 266 shall be imprisoned in the state prison for life or for any term of years.
Massachusetts v Catalina, 407 Mass 779 (1990)
COMMONWEALTH vs. BARNETT WELANSKY (and a companion case against the same defendant).
Massachusetts Murder Defense
#32. To: nolu chan (#30)
That case also established that wanton or reckless conduct includes both affirmative acts and failures to act where a duty to act exists. Such acts or omissions must embody a disregard for the probable harmful consequences to another. The conduct must involve a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another. The law requires that the defendant have knowledge of the circumstances and the intent to do the act that caused the death, and also requires that the circumstances presented a danger of serious harm such that a reasonable man would have recognized the nature and degree of danger.
#33. To: cranky, nolu chan, GrandIsland (#32)
#34. To: TooConservative (#33)
I'd say they have a hell of a case against her.
#35. To: cranky (#34)
Judging solely from the pics, I'd say she has a chance of swaying at least one juror.
#38. To: TooConservative (#35)
Put some mothers on that jury and show them those texts and replay those events, minute by minute with photos of that boy and the account of how well she knew he had tried to kill himself. I think you'd get a conviction.
#40. To: cranky (#38)
It only takes one juror for an acquittal.
Replies to Comment # 40. You would almost think convictions require a unanimous jury or something.
#44. To: TooConservative (#40)
Really? I had absolutely no idea.
End Trace Mode for Comment # 40.
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